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Soviet Union

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SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

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19980507 142

Soviet Union

International Affairs

JPRS-UIA-89-009

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22 MAY 1989

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UN Seminar on Indian Ocean "Peace Zone"
18070194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 89
Morning Edition p 4

[Article by M. Yusin, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Results of the Sochi Discussions"]

[Text] The International Seminar on Problems of Declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone held under the aegis of the UN was concluded in Sochi. Three full work days lay behind it.

Many a lance was broken over the ticklish topic: How many bases should one country or another have in the Indian Ocean, and what in general can we consider to be a military base? The representatives of the Western countries did not agree with the definition of this concept presented by the Soviet Union. In their opinion, the definition of a military base as "a territory leased from another state, having its own infrastructure for supplying the continued operation of the strike force located there" leads to the conclusion that only the American bases on the island of Diego Garcia, in Kenya, Oman and Bahrain will be considered military bases, since the other military facilities in the Indian Ocean do not fit this definition.

Nevertheless, despite the arguments and differences of opinion, we were able to achieve proximity of views on certain key questions. The overwhelming majority of the speakers spoke out against excessive military presence in the Indian Ocean and saturation of the coastal waters with combat vessels, which creates an explosive situation in the region.

"Our primary achievement is that some constructive ideas were born during the Sochi discussions. The fact that there were scientists and representatives of non-governmental organizations present among the seminar participants, along with professional diplomats, allowed us to achieve an important breakthrough in mutual understanding," the representative of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean and permanent UN representative from Sri-Lanka D. Perer, who presided over the meetings, told me after the conclusion of the seminar. For the first time in many years we have held discussions which touched upon key questions, and not limited ourselves to declarations. I am in full agreement with the opinion of one of the meeting participants: In the last 3 days we have made a significant step toward the Colombo Conference."

Discussion of 'Peaceful Coexistence' As Form of Class Struggle

18070593 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 4, Feb 89 pp 84-88

[Article by Col V. Strebkov, candidate of philosophical sciences and lecturer, under "A Scientist's Opinion" rubric: "Criteria of Military Strategic Parity"]

[Text] The fundamental and truly revolutionary changes in our own house demanded qualitatively new approaches to international affairs. The new political thinking based on the realities of the nuclear age and the priority of common human interests is finding more and more understanding and support in world public opinion and by leading figures of many states. We are seeing the gradual collapse of the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism and of the groundless conjectures of imperialist propaganda about the "Soviet military threat."

Among the many steps being taken on the basis of the new thinking, an important role is assigned to the reduction of the level of military strategic parity (balance) between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which expresses a significant part of the balance of interests of the sides. Today this problem is already being put on a practical plane, as indicated by the INF Treaty. Next is a possible agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. The prospect of a reduction of conventional armed forces and arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is also quite realistic. The speech by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations and his declaration of the decision of the Soviet Union on a unilateral reduction of its armed forces and conventional arms provided a new impulse here.

All of this requires the scientific substantiation of the questions of security in the changing situation and the identification of clear criteria for military parity.

It should be noted from the outset that in the current stage there is not only an urgent need but also considerable difficulties in the determination of the criteria of parity. These difficulties issue, in the first place, from the very structure of the military balance. It is a matter of different military strategic systems with by no means identical tactical and technical data. All of the elements of the military balance are interrelated and interdependent, which makes it much more difficult to put them on the same basis. Secondly, there are difficulties in the different geostrategic position of the sides. Thirdly, difficulties arise through the dynamic development of military equipment. There is a process of the continual rejection of old types and the appearance of new ones. And although new systems for armed hostilities are being introduced on the basis of old systems, assessments of parity nevertheless change, become more profound and multivariant and require substantial and qualitative approaches.

In speaking of the difficulties in determining precise criteria for the balance of military forces of the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO, we note that this is even more valid as applied to the correlation of conventional forces and arms in Europe. In contrast to the strategic nuclear forces, where there is a certain uniqueness of their combat tasks and relatively few hypothetical scenarios for their application, here we are dealing with a more complex spectrum of arms (hundreds of systems with a rather indefinite degree of equivalence). It is also necessary to compare the conventional armed forces of the opposing sides and find comparable criteria for them.

It is even more necessary to take into account geostrategic and many other factors. It is a matter of the development of an equation not just of two powers but of more than twenty states.

It is quite obvious that the development of the criteria of military strategic parity is an extremely necessary matter but it is hardly a simple one. What are needed are indicators that would provide a basis for the measurement of the correlation of forces of socialism and capitalism at all levels and "floors." In the military-technical aspect—from the current irrational level to the minimum level of reasonable sufficiency. In geostrategic terms—from the European or Asian-Pacific region to the overall world level.

What must these criteria be? They can be quantitative as well as qualitative.

The primarily quantitative approach to the evaluation of the correlation of the forces of the sides had priority importance in the first stage after the general recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union had achieved military strategic parity with the United States as early as the beginning of the 1970's. To a certain extent, this was quite justified. It is well known that quantitative analysis plays a huge role in knowledge. And when the USSR and United States sat down to the negotiating table, they scrupulously counted the number of strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads on both sides.

The advantages of the qualitative approach were utilized in reaching the SALT I and SALT II agreements as well as in the current negotiations on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. The existence of strategic parity is confirmed by the following quantitative indicators for the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and United States: the Soviet Union has somewhat more delivery systems (2,494 for the USSR, 2,260 for the United States), whereas the United States continues to have significantly more warheads on them (the USSR has approximately 10,000, the United States 14,000 to 16,000). But it is precisely the warheads that have the destructive capability and not the delivery systems themselves. Overall there is an approximate balance.

As for the quantitative aspect of the correlation of forces in Europe, the military balance here is composed, as everyone knows, of imbalance and asymmetries. At the same time, as the Declaration of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Member States on 30 January 1989 points out, the military balance in Europe taking into account all of its components can be characterized as approximate parity.

The opponents of a balanced approach to the reduction of the level of military confrontation are speculating on the themes of "excessive armament" and the "advantages" of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in quantitative and geostrategic aspects. This gave rise to unconstructive demands by the West on the unilateral elimination of the "overwhelming superiority of the Russians" in practically all types of conventional arms and forces stationed in Europe. The decision of the Soviet Union on the reduction of its armed forces by 500,000 men in the next 2 years knocked the ground out from under speculation of this kind. The reduction will amount to 12 percent of the strength of the armed forces.

Sensible politicians and military people in the West assess our initiatives positively. At the same time, NATO leaders are continuing to assert that even after carrying out such a reduction "the Warsaw Pact will still have a great advantage in conventional armed forces in Europe." It is quite obvious that certain militant circles in NATO are distorting the true picture and are making quantitative methods absolute.

Meanwhile, the quantity of arms and armed forces has long since exceeded the scope of the measures necessary by the opposing sides. This quantity developed into a qualitative state that permits the destruction of civilization many times over. Today there is a greatly increased danger from conventional weapons. For the destructive consequences of war using conventional weapons became practically comparable with the results of nuclear war. War using conventional forces only, if unleashed, can be disastrous for Europe, considering the high population density and the presence in its territory of a large number of nuclear power plants, chemical enterprises, large-scale hydroelectric stations and other facilities representing a great danger to the lives of people in the event of their destruction.

Thus, the continuation of the arms race has long ago become senseless. The new political thinking makes it possible to explain this precisely. It requires not a quantitative but a qualitative assessment of the military strategic balance.

In our view, the qualitative criteria of the strategic balance of the sides should be understood to be indicators that would give a comprehensive characterization of its essence and content.

Proceeding from this, parity is sometimes understood to be the achievement of such a qualitative state in the correlation of the military forces of the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO that guarantees the possibility of inflicting unacceptable losses on the aggressor in a counterstrike.

The capability of inflicting unacceptable losses on an aggressor is an objective factor in strategic stability in the relations between the two sides. At the same time, today the level of the capability to inflict such losses is, according to various assessments, more than sufficient. In the article "Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World," M.S. Gorbachev noted: "Soviet and American scientists recently made a special study of the question of the interrelationship between strategic stability and the size of the nuclear arsenals and came to the common opinion that 95 percent of all nuclear arms of the United States and USSR could be eliminated without in any way violating stability. The argument against the strategy of 'nuclear deterrence,' which gives rise to a mad logic, is fatal. We think that there is no need to keep the 5 percent either. And then there will be a qualitatively different stability." The current conclusion about the suicidal policy of the aggressor flows from such a reality. There would be neither victors nor vanquished in a global nuclear conflict.

The irrational level of military confrontation indicates that within certain limits the military power of one of the sides can change in the direction of a quantitative reduction without violating the qualitative state of military balance and without lowering the level of security of the state. This position is reflected in different ways in the consciousness of the Soviet people. In the course of a study of the attitudes of the Soviet public by the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, for example, it was determined that 5 to 7 percent of those questioned think that there is no need for the Soviet Union to be as strong as the United States. More specific questions reveal the logic of such an approach: inasmuch as the nuclear power of the East as well as the West allows them to destroy one another many times over with certainty, the scrupulous maintenance of the equality of strength is senseless and will only slow the disarmament process. Analogous opinions have repeatedly been stated in the pages of several of our press organs. At the same time, 70 to 80 percent of Soviet citizens favor an equality of strength between the USSR and the United States. This indicates that our public is aware of the indisputable fact that security must be equal for both sides.

There is now discussion in our press about our actions in response to the arms race undertaken by the United States after the establishment of parity in the 1970's. Some authors assert that we always acted correctly, whereas others subject some of our actions to doubt. It is possible that in this stage we should not have acted under the principle of "action-reaction-counterreaction-action" but that it was above all necessary to undertake a weighed analysis of the achieved level of equilibrium. But the

consequences of the achievement of military strategic parity between the USSR and the United States were not analyzed in depth and comprehensively. In the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, we were clearly too direct in our response to the arms race unleashed by the West. We should have shown more initiative in finding political means, have been more energetic about attracting the peace-loving public to our side, and have been more convincing in showing the danger of the arms race. Such work was done, of course, but it is clear today that there were not enough specific steps taken that would have been understood by millions of honest people on the planet and would have received their support.

Thus, the unacceptability of nuclear damage is the necessary qualitative criterion of parity. But the current level of confrontation is a balance of fear. It cannot be viewed as an adequate condition for equal security in relations between the USSR and the United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO. Another extremely important qualitative criterion—reasonable sufficiency for defense—can meet such requirements.

Sufficiency as an indicator of the correlation of forces has a multidimensional significance. It can be defensive and reasonable as well as offensive (that is, be understood as military superiority). It is precisely in this last sense that many in the West are still treating sufficiency. The term "sufficiency" has long been in use in NATO countries.

In essence there, this means not equal security for the sides but the striving to upset the military balance. Proceeding from such a false premise, a star wars program is being developed and they are planning the "compensation" and "modernization" of arms. In striving at all costs to support the decayed myth of the "Soviet military threat" and to curb the process of lowering the level of the military balance, the propaganda machine of the West is picking up speed. British Secretary of State for Defense George Younger recently declared the following: "The Soviet efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from Europe are more of a threat to our security than a strengthening of trust on the continent." Reports have appeared in the American press to the effect that the U.S. Strategic Air Command is finishing the elaboration of a draft new operational plan for the waging of nuclear war under the conditions after the signing of the INF Treaty. Based on the fact that new weapon systems are appearing in the Pentagon arsenals, the plan also specifies new targets for strikes in the territory of the USSR. In turn, the Congressional Budget Office put together a report that examines several possible versions for the improvement of the NATO armed forces during the time after the INF Treaty went into effect. Such an understanding of sufficiency, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with the concepts "reasonable" or "defensive."

As for our literature, it has different points of view on reasonable sufficiency as an essential criterion of parity. Some authors are proposing the abandonment of the race

to maintain parity imposed on us by the West, a parity that is treated as the quantitative equality of the military power of the sides (see: A. Adamovich, and G. Shakh-nazarov, "New Thinking and Inertia of the Process," DRUZHBA NARODOV, No 6, 1988). Others assert that because parity is bipolar, the limit of sufficiency is determined by the United States and NATO. It can be raised, which is a countermeasure to the increase in the military potential of the other side (see: P. Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 10, 1987).

In the first case, the authors, pointing out the necessity of renouncing the understanding of sufficiency as quantitative equality, do not reveal possible versions of our actions in response to the arms race in the countries of the West. In the second approach, the understanding of sufficiency is essentially predetermined by the actions of the other side. But as everyone knows from the history of the achievement of military strategic parity, by no means do we always have adequate justification for copying the actions of the other side. The current level of the balance of nuclear potentials is so high that it creates an equal danger for each side. The continuation of the arms race inevitably increases the military risk and can increase it to the point where even parity will cease to "work" as a factor for the military-political deterrence of imperialist aggression.

An essential criterion of sufficiency for strategic nuclear forces in the current stage is the capability **not to allow an unpunished nuclear attack against our country under any circumstances, even the most unfavorable.** And clearly this must be understood under defensive sufficiency. Consequently, today it is necessary to talk about raising the viability of that part of nuclear forces that is necessary to inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor in a counterstrike. Symmetrical as well as asymmetrical actions are possible here.

With respect to time, this measure is indeed dictated to a considerable degree by the opposing side and by its attitude toward nuclear deterrence as a principle. In contrast to us, the West has not yet renounced nuclear deterrence. As then Secretary of State G. Shultz declared at the end of last year, "until some alternative system of security becomes feasible, we must continue to rely on nuclear means of deterrence. Our objective in the foreseeable future must be to strengthen nuclear deterrence and its effectiveness at the lowest and most secure force levels."

Nevertheless, in giving priority to political means, it is important to strive along with the other side to lower the military balance to the lowest possible level, from which nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction must be fully excluded. Only then will sufficiency be truly reasonable.

As for our side, the concept of sufficiency has already been made the basis of the program for the formation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The major steps taken in the reduction of our armed forces in Europe and Asia are convincing evidence of this.

By 1991, six tank divisions (5,000 tanks) will be withdrawn from the GDR, CSSR and Hungary and disbanded. It is planned to reduce the troops in these countries by 50,000 men. The personnel strength and number of arms in the European part of the Soviet Union are also subject to reduction. Altogether the Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft in this part of the USSR and in the territory of our European allies. During these 2 years, there will also be a significant reduction of the grouping of the USSR Armed Forces in the Asian part of the country. In agreement with the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, a significant part of the Soviet forces temporarily located there will return to their homeland.

These are our approaches to reasonable sufficiency. The United States and NATO are still not responding adequately to the unilateral actions of the USSR. It appears that it is becoming more and more clear to world public opinion where policy is inspired by reason and where it is inspired by madness. And it is obvious that the unilateral steps of the Soviet Union in this area are greatly complicating the maneuvers of the supporters of the continuation of the arms race in the West.

With the increasing mutual interest in the problem of reducing the level of military confrontation and with the advancement of the concept of reasonable sufficiency for defense, such a criterion of the factual parity of the sides as **the qualitative structure of the armed forces and arms of the USSR and the United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO** is more and more clearly becoming paramount.

The noticeable improvement of the relations between the West and the East has greatly intensified the discussion of the structure of parity, especially in the area of the balance of conventional forces and arms. Militaristic forces, distorting the essence of the matter, keep talking about the supposed offensive nature of the structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and about the defensive nature of that of NATO.

In trying to prove what cannot be proved, NATO leaders are relying on a metaphysical method. For decades they have been manipulating the estimates comparing individual types of arms. Their favorite technique is speculation about the quantitative advantage of the Warsaw Pact in tanks. But what is needed for an objective evaluation of the structure of parity in Europe is not a one-sided but a comprehensive approach. In the opinion of specialists, it is now not so much tanks that personify the offensive potential and singular strike force but strike aviation with its powerful armament, speed and large operating radius, in which NATO has the advantage. The picture is analogous in the sphere of the naval forces.

With the appearance of U.S. sea and air-based cruise missiles, the NATO threat to the Warsaw Pact flank is increasing substantially. And it is essential to exclude this threat in the disarmament process. Consequently, the potential threat arising from the excessive military power must be examined from the ground, sea and air. It is no accident that the military planning of the United States includes the "integrated battlefield" concept and operates under the well-known doctrine of "follow-on force attack," which is evidence of the striving of certain forces in NATO to maintain the "status quo" of their forward-based strike forces and systems, primarily the aircraft of the U.S. Air Force based at land airfields and on aircraft carriers.

In considering the various approaches to the existing structures, the Soviet Union invites representatives of the NATO countries to balance them, proceeding from the priority of common human values. In inviting the other side to participate in dialogue, the USSR is simultaneously demonstrating the unity of the political and military technical sides of its defensive military doctrine. Qualitative changes are already taking place in the structure of the armed forces and arms of the Warsaw Pact. All Soviet divisions still remaining in the territory of our allies are being reorganized. They are being given a different structure, which is becoming unequivocally defensive after the large-scale withdrawal of tanks from them. Assault landing and river-crossing equipment, which is associated in Western Europe with the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, is also subject to withdrawal. It is the West's turn for action.

The **human factor** is an extremely important qualitative criterion in the assessment of the current correlation of forces. This problem is even more complicated and multifaceted. For it is precisely the individual who realizes the possibilities of military equipment and who has a decisive role in its utilization. Essentially, in resolving the problem of the maintenance of the military strategic balance, the human factor, in particular the personnel training level of the armed forces of the sides, is by no means always considered.

At the same time, with the formation of the new political thinking, there is a change in the relationship between class and common human interests. Whereas for a long time we gave priority to the class approach in accordance with the prescription: "Whoever is not with us, is against us," which frequently cost us dearly, now, when it is a matter of the survival of the human race and the prevention of nuclear war, common human values are becoming paramount in relations between states. And this not only does not contradict the class interests of socialism but, on the contrary, constitutes the highest expression of these interests.

Therefore, in speaking of the human factor, today it is necessary to talk not about parity but about our unquestionable superiority. This has to do primarily with the infliction of unacceptable damage to a possible aggressor

precisely in a counterstrike. The realization of a counterstrike in retaliation raises a mass of moral and psychological as well as temporal problems and requires a qualitatively new and higher level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR in comparison with the aggressor. Qualitative balance on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defense does not preclude the possibility of defending our values with quantitatively smaller armed forces. This also puts greater demands on the human factor and the combat readiness of troops.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the objective interrelationships and interdependencies in the world dictates the necessity of a continuing search for ways to ensure the balance of interests on the basis of equal security of the sides. But it is well known that interests, including the fundamental interest in the survival of humanity, are manifested through the actions of people. In this connection, we are not excluding but proposing an intensification of contacts in the area of military activity. Noteworthy are the existing military ties at various levels between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As such contacts increase, more sober assessments are made of the real level of training and professionalism of the military personnel of both sides.

Thus, after visiting our military units, high-ranking military leaders of the United States, FRG and several other NATO countries gave high marks to the professional training of Soviet military personnel. And we have evaluated the military personnel of the other side. At the same time, these are only external, empirical observations that do not reflect the essence of the problem. Here it is difficult to determine the equality or inequality of the professionalism of military personnel a priori. It appears that with the further intensification of contacts it will be necessary to resolve this problem. The preconditions for its realization are being established in the process of the reciprocal exchange of observers at Warsaw Pact and NATO exercises. It is clear that some thought must be given to how to proceed further along this path.

These are a few considerations in regard to the elaboration of the criteria of military strategic parity. Of course the author does not claim that his opinions are indisputable. Some assertions and conclusions may be controversial with respect to the formulation of the problem. For the process of the qualitative support of military strategic parity at lower and lower levels is complex, many-sided and contradictory. It is essential to see the different possibilities and alternatives for its development in historical reality. But one thing is certain. The new political thinking requires a departure from stereotypical, quantitative, and black and white evaluations of the correlation of forces of socialism and capitalism.

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East-West Economic Cooperation Does Not Lead to 'Convergence'

18070581 Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS* I
SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian
No 1, Jan-Feb 89 pp 31-45

[Article by Yuriy Vitalyevich Shishkov, doctor of economic sciences, professor and sector director of IMEMO [Order of the Labor Red Banner Institute of World Economics and International Relations] of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Perestroika and the Signs of Convergence"]

[Text] The call, "More socialism!" has recently entered our everyday life and our programs. While instilling hope it simultaneously gives rise to the question—more of what kind of socialism? After all, we ourselves and all our friends and enemies in the entire world have considered the USSR to be a socialist country. Thus there is some initial confusion here—what does this mean?

Especially concerned were those who accepted at face value everything that was written for many years about socialism in our textbooks, propaganda literature and the press. Many people still believe that the society that has developed in our country is the manifestation of the ideas of the founders of Marxism-Leninism concerning the first phase of the communist system. Let us recall the indignation of economist L. Popkova and her response to the proposal that perhaps we had not at all built that socialism that we had been bequeathed. "It is the one! Do you hear—the one! It is precisely the one because the other, 'the merchant'—is not socialism at all," she assured readers of *NOVIY MIR* (1, 1987, No 5, p 240). An attempt was made to vindicate an essentially similar position in the notorious "letter" of N. Andreyeva. This point of view has supporters among vuz instructors as well as in other circles. From the podium of the February 1988 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee we heard angry criticism of those who "become hysterical about the historical consequences of the Soviet epoch, who talk themselves into saying that we did not build the right socialism..." (2, 18 Feb 88). Let me ask the question—if we built "the right one," why has perestroika been necessary?

Others do not deny that in practice things did not turn out in the way Marx and Lenin conceptualized them, but they justify it by the extreme conditions under which socialism had to be built in the USSR. I. Klymkin, for example, on the basis of thorough historical excursions, strives to prove that under the given conditions there was no other path to take. "The hand, listening to reason, gives a positive response, yet the soul keeps suffering with the unanswered question—but just perhaps things could have been different? Firm reason is implacable—no, there they could not have been any different" (1, 1987, No 11, p 181). This approach is manifested to some degree in the term "real socialism" (in contrast to ideal socialism, theoretically deduced). After all this

term has the following subtext—real life is more complex than the best theory and this is why real socialism is not that which was imagined but that which we were able to achieve.

But evidently the majority of theoreticians and practical workers proceed not only from the fact that the socialism we have built is not the kind that was projected by the founders of Marxism-Leninism but also from the fact that this socialism is subject to urgent revolutionary purification of deformations and to a return to the genuine ideas of socialism. In connection with this a question is raised about "a clear difference between the essence of socialism and historically-limited forms for implementation" (2, 5 April 1988). In essence, the problem has to do with removing all layers foreign to socialism from the economy, from the political system and from the ideology and with maximally bringing together "real" and "ideal" socialism, of course with a consideration of contemporary achievements in human civilization. "Yes, we are rejecting everything that deformed socialism during the 1930's and which resulted in its stagnation during the 1970's," emphasized M. S. Gorbachev in a speech at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. "We want a socialism that is purified of the layers and distortions of past periods and that at the same time has inherited all the best from the creative thought of the founders of our teaching, all that has been implemented through the labor and efforts of the people and that reflects their hopes and despair. We want a socialism that absorbs all progressive experience of world development and depends fully on the achievements of man's progress" (3, 1988, No 10, p 57).¹

This purification from distortions with the application of progressive world experience is proceeding, as we know, in the direction of democratization of the economic, political and spiritual lives of our society. Administrative decentralization and the rendering of extensive initiatives and economic independence for labor collectives are planned and have already begun in part. Economic reform foresees the development, within certain limits, of market relations and competition without which it is impossible to eliminate the monopoly of departments or individual enterprises or to achieve a systematic improvement in product quality or a decrease in wholesale and retail prices. The further development of various forms of cooperation and lease contracts and the creation of joint-stock enterprises and so forth is planned.

It is not difficult to note that these and other management forms being introduced in our country are very similar to those that are used in the capitalist world. This is understandable; after all, progressive world experience, which we cannot but consider, is the experience of highly developed capitalist countries. In other words, in the near future we will see one of the variants of "merchant socialism," which according to the logic of people like Popkova, Andreyev and others like them, is not socialism at all. And what then? It is clear—the

restoration of capitalism, for in the black and white understanding of the world by dogmatists the world split into socialism and capitalism already in 1917 and since then has existed in an antagonistic counterbalance of "either, or."

No matter how paradoxical, the idea that market relations will almost certainly result in the transformation of socialism into capitalism is shared by some ideologists of anti-communism, namely the more aggressive Western authors of the theory of "convergence" of the two social systems. Incidentally, we should not be surprised about this kind of coincidence—extremes, as we know, do converge. This is especially true if the basis for these extremes is a misunderstanding of the social nature of historic structures and of the nature of their interaction in the modern whole and interrelated world.

The radical reforms that are being carried out in our country not only have frightened the native defenders of "socialist principles" but have also raised the hopes of convergence theorists, whose ideas were especially popular in the West during the 1950's-1960's. It is curious to recall their arguments.

What is the Essence of the "Convergence" Theory?

This theory was developed during the post-war decade when it became clear to sober-thinking Western intellectuals that, first, socialism is not a disappointing error of history as they had previously thought but a fully realistic variant of social structure and second, that it is impossible to dispose of it through military force because it is sufficiently strong to respond in kind. Out of the understanding of these two truths the search began for a "third path"—either the development of a hybrid half-capitalist, half-socialist social system or, even better, a transformation of Stalinist-type socialism initially into its more liberal form and then into capitalism as a social structure that is more adequate, in their opinion, for contemporary conditions.

On this background various variants of the "convergence" theory began to be developed.² Without placing as our goal the extensive survey of all these variants, let us present only the characteristic positions of the more prominent authors.

The most aggressive direction is related to hopes for the transformation of socialism into capitalism. It is usually associated with the name of the author of the "Non-Communist Manifesto," American scholar W. Rostow. In the early 1960's he presented the theory of "stages of economic growth." Its essence has to do with the fact that man's evolution is determined first and foremost by the level of technical and economic development. Any society, in his opinion, passes through five steps or stages, each of which is characterized solely by the society's level of technological development. He intentionally ignores the socio-economic aspect. In this approach it turns out that socialist countries simply have

not yet reached the technological level that is characteristic of the leading Western countries. When they do rise to this level their economic priorities and political and economic values will change on their own, and these countries will stop being different from capitalist countries—"with the arrival of the era of mass consumption communism by all probability will die off" (4).

It is true that W. Rostow himself did not speak about "convergence." But pragmatists drew a conclusion from his ideas—in order to transform socialist countries into respectable capitalist countries it is necessary to "help" them to more quickly reach the stage of "mass consumption." It is precisely this conclusion in a slightly modified form that became the basis for the policy of "building bridges" proclaimed by U. S. President Lyndon Johnson in May 1964. This was 1.5 years after the Cuban Crisis, which showed clearly that it is impossible to solve a historical dispute by means of the threat of nuclear war. It is necessary to build a bridge over the abyss separating the U.S.A. from Eastern Europe, he said, in order to "open the minds of a new generation for Western civilization" and "to show the prospects for progress in Eastern Europe."

Well-known American anti-communist ideologists Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington wrote honestly at the time that "most so-called convergence theories actually postulate not convergence but the absorption of the opposite system" (5).

The proponents of this interpretation of "convergence" have not converted even now. In 1983, for example, a book entitled, "The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000," was published in the West. It was prepared by a group of experts for the joint economic commission of the U.S. Congress. It promulgates the thesis that the technological modernization of the Soviet Union is possible only after a rejection of the main features of socialism. "If the USSR is fated to remain a world power," writes one author, M. Goldman, "it must assimilate new technology, but its assimilation...will endanger the entire Soviet system" (6).

Some Western theoreticians have leaned toward the conclusion that under the influence of the NTR [Scientific technical revolution] and other present-day realities both competing social systems, mutually influencing each other and borrowing positive experience from each other, must become more alike. In their opinion this tendency in the final analysis results in the development of a "mixed" society which is characterized by the traits of capitalism and socialism simultaneously. The originator of this theory is considered to be the not unknown Pitirim Sorokin, in the past one of the leaders of the rightist Socialist Revolutionary Party who emigrated abroad in 1922 and who later became a professor at Harvard University (U.S.A.). As long ago as the 1950's he brought forth the idea of a "hybrid society" as a result of the coming together of "the values in capitalism and communism." He felt that with time an integrated type

of society would develop. "This type will be intermediate between capitalist and communist orders and ways of life. It will unite the more positive values and will be free of the serious shortcomings of both" (7).

Among the many followers of this vision of the future let us note only the great Dutch scientist, Jan Tinbergen, who wrote: "The economic systems of East and West are moving closer to some kind of middle so that as a result a kind of 'mixed system' develops that will enable us to better achieve a social optimum" (8). According to him, this will occur as a result of the fact that of the four basic principles of capitalism (private property, economic incentives and the profit motive, the market system and government non-interference) society will accept only the first three, and of the four basic principles of socialism (a large degree of equality, workers' control over production conditions, economic planning, and public ownership of the means of production) it will accept also only the first three. He was concerned about optimization of the degree of government regulation of the economy—he felt that in the West it was inadequate but that in the East it was excessive. "Both systems are moving in the direction of a certain optimal state, in the direction of a system that will be better than pure capitalism or pure socialism in the previous sense" (8).

Some Western scholars and columnists approach reform in socialist countries from such points of view. According to the opinion of American economist B. Neumann, for example, since 1988 Hungary has been developing into a new kind of society—the first hybrid of socialism and capitalism in the world (9). Why? Simply because as of 1 January 1988 the VNR [Hungarian People's Republic] has introduced a new system of direct taxation of individual income and indirect taxation (of the added cost) that is very close to the taxation system of capitalist countries. Also, more scope is being provided for the action of market mechanisms.

Some authors of the "convergence" theory express themselves more carefully, avoiding the conclusion regarding the mixed system. They simply verify that the drawing together of socialism and capitalism in the development of production forces unavoidably leads to an increase in the similarity of organizational forms of management, the needs of people, political structures and so forth. One of the most prominent representatives of this point of view is the well-known American economist J. K. Galbraith. He attaches "great significance to the tendency of convergence of industrial societies no matter how different their national and ideological pretensions are" (10).

In his opinion, this tendency is related above all to the large scale of contemporary production which is written into the system of market relations completely differently than small scale production and which presupposes the unavoidability of state regulation of prices, wages, training of cadres and so forth. "Large organizations, no matter where they are, are characterized by the same moving forces," he states in one of his new books. "The

contemporary capitalist organization and the developed socialist organization are not in opposition to each other. In the broad sense they are moving in one direction—not toward the unavoidable rule of the market but toward establishing common needs in technology and mass production, toward the development of a corresponding planning organization and toward analogous stimulating forces" (11). Neither in the aforementioned quotes nor in articles or interviews does J. K. Galbraith attempt to mark the end result of this kind of movement "in one direction." For him it is important that the growing similarity of economic structure and mechanisms gives rise to mutual understanding and trust and pushes farther and farther away the inexplicable enmity toward a different system that is characterized by the fact that in the U.S.A. the word "socialism" has been seen as a swear word.

A similar position has been occupied by the great French sociologist R. Aron, who presented the concept of a "single industrial society." In his numerous works on this subject he has noted the different aspects of the rapprochement of socialism and capitalism but he has not postulated the unavoidable evolution of these two systems into some sort of mixed hybrid. "If we examine only economic structure, the 'convergence thesis,'" he wrote, "presupposes either the coming together of the statuses of property and of the methods for regulating and redistributing income or the shading of differences, which *will not be eliminated*" (italics mine—Yu. Sh.) (12). In his opinion, despite the growing similarity along a wide circle of aspects differences between these systems will remain; moreover these differences will remain considerable.

Despite a significant difference in the content and end political goals of different branches of the "convergence" theory, all of its theoreticians proceed in one way or another from the development of the society's production forces and of its material-technical base and on this basis build their vision of "convergence" itself. But even historic materialism, as we know, takes as the foundation for the development of society the evolution of its technological method of production. "In acquiring new production forces, people change their production method, and with the change in production method and in the method of securing their lives, they alter all their social relations," wrote K. Marx in "The Poverty of Philosophy" (13, Vol 4, p 133). The difference is that bourgeois theoreticians see this dependence of social relations on the development of production forces in a simplified way and one-sidedly whereas Marxism provided the theory of an economic basis and the superstructure of society as a whole system and has revealed a complex dialectic involving direct and reverse ties with production forces. Only this method enables us to understand why in the contemporary interrelated and interdependent world, on the one hand, the similarity of methods of production organization and of methods of management of different peoples increases unavoidably

and why on the other hand the socio-economic multi-structure of the world-wide economy is maintained and is even intensified. But before expounding on the reasons for this seeming paradox let us let the orthodox critics of the "convergence" theory have a word.

Criticism, Mixed in With Dogmatism and Excessive Security

From the very first steps of this theory all of its variants were greeted "with hostility" by our scholars and propaganda and repudiated wholesale and retail. How could it be otherwise in a society which for many decades indulged in a distinctive self-hypnosis and which believed (or more precisely, tried to believe, sometimes with all its might) in the indisputable advantages of real socialism and therefore in a certain predestined exclusivity of the socialist structure and its production relations. Hundreds of books and thousands of articles confirmed that everything we have is not the same, but better, than "theirs." Even the division of labor was presented as principally different than "there." Everything was vigilantly demarcated from above down. The absoluteness of this kind of world view was subtly ridiculed during the 1960's by A. T. Tvardovskiy. His immortal Vasilii Terkin, who once found himself in another world, discovered "our that world" and "their that world."

Under circumstances in which there was a fanatical worship of the exclusivity of socialism was it possible to tolerate the thought of any elements of similarity with capitalism, and even more, of an increase in this similarity? Of course not. Our ideological "crusaders" plunged into battle with Western heretics despite the helplessness of their arguments. Academician M. B. Mitin, for example, wrote in the early 1970's, "The ideologists of 'convergence' assure us that capitalism is developing in the direction of socialism, and socialism—in the direction of capitalism. It never occurred to these 'learned' men that now, when two different social worlds exist on the planet, two social systems that are radically different from each other, there also exist two developmental processes that differ radically from each other" (14). As proof he presented...figures on the forestalling pace of industrial development in the USSR as compared to the U.S.A. without considering that in Japan this pace has been even greater than in the USSR and that in general growth pace is a worthless argument for proving "radical differences" in the type of development.

Blind faith in "radical differences" automatically gave rise to the ideological reaction of rejection or, rather, revulsion at just the mention of the word "convergence" without delving either into its direction or into the political positions of a particular author. Thus J. K. Galbraith fell into the group of malicious ideological opponents of socialism, as did many other Western scholars who tried to understand the objective tendencies of the coming together of several elements of the two

systems. In this indiscriminate criticism a considerable role was played by the Stalinist repression cultivated over decades and by the fear of universal suspicion—the important thing was to make sure no one suspected you of having sympathy for bourgeois theories.

Those Soviet specialists who deal with economic relations between East and West found themselves in an especially ticklish situation. After all, these are *joint* relations. How are they possible if there is a total “radical difference” between socialist and capitalist production relations? But that is just part of the problem. Worse is the fact that convergence theorists-pragmatists place great emphasis precisely on the development of East-West ties in their plans to “turn” socialism into capitalism.

In the early 1970's many different solutions were published in the West on this subject. One of the most cunning belonged to West German economist B. Gempfer, author of the model of the multi-step “co-integration” of socialist and capitalist integrated associations. The topic under discussion in essence was “convergence” by means of recruiting socialist countries into the system of extensive economic interaction with the West (15). Something had to be juxtaposed to this and an explanation was needed as to why despite truly extensive interaction both systems retain their independence.

Some, for example, suggested a consideration of the fact that the concept of “socio-economic system” with its foundation and superstructure, basic production relation and so forth belongs to national-government economic complexes. Then economic relations in the “inter-country” space appear to be deprived of the feature of production relations, and consequently they are transformed into a socially-amorphous relations, into a no-man's land where the interaction of basically different production relations takes place and where thanks to this such relations can remain themselves without drawing nearer each to the other.

But first of all, in Marxist philosophy the “socio-economic system” is a historic and not a geographic category. The successors to this system develop on the scale of all mankind, although extremely unevenly time-wise in different regions. Second, any economic relations between countries by nature are production relations. It is enough to carefully read “Das Kapital” in order to become convinced that its author categorizes both the division of labor (including international) and exchange (including international) in production relations and in general that he utilizes the concepts of “economic relations” and “production relations” as synonyms. “...Relations expressed by money, like all other economic relations, like the division of labor and so forth, are production relations,” taught K. Marx (13, Vol 4, p 110, 133; Vol 16, p 26; Vol 25, part 2, p 385; Vol 46, part 1, p 477).

Others thought that whereas production forces, production relations and elements in the superstructure participate directly in interrelations between countries with a single type of socio-economic system, in the economic interaction between socialist and capitalist countries the middle link of this triad does not participate directly, it is as if it falls away. “Interrelations between capitalist and socialist economic systems, regardless of whether they are implemented on a bilateral or world (?) level,” wrote V. I. Filippov, “occur on two of three aforementioned ‘levels’: on the level of production forces...and along the lines of state foreign affairs (16, p 224). Otherwise we would have the “interaction of basically different production relations,” and “direct unification of mutually-repulsing elements” is impossible. After all, “private capitalist property in any of its different forms and public property are mutually-exclusive phenomena; they negate each other” (16, p 222).

If they cannot interact with each other directly they need a middleman. Even with the simple act of purchases and sales on the world market, where it would seem that there is a direct contact between socialist and capitalist production relations, “each of the aforementioned types of commodity-monetary relations are special and their ‘joining’ requires special mediating actions on the part of the socialist country” (16, p 223).

It is not difficult to note that this attempt to find a compromise between moss-covered theoretical dogmas and actual reality has lead to an impasse. Economic ties among the countries of various systems have had to be announced politically but at the same time they had to be placed into some non-economic vacuum in which the “middle link,” i.e. the system of production relations, is completely absent. Yet today in this vacuum there is no place for even a rapidly-developing form of cooperation such as joint enterprises belonging to socialist and capitalist partners or the development of *common* property based on these enterprises because private capitalist and public property, as has been proclaimed, mutually exclude each other. We must suppose that joint companies, even if they do exist, do not do so within our earthly system of coordinates but in some kind of anti-world.

Others tried to get out of the problem by referring to a well-known point in K. Marx's “Introduction” to “The Economic Manuscripts 1857-1859,” which states, “*Secondary and tertiary, generally derivative, transferred, are not primary production relations. The role that is played here by international relations*” (13, Vol 46, part 1, p 46). In arbitrarily interpreting the conceptual tie between the first and second sentences of this excerpt of Marxist thought, some Soviet economists attempted to build a cascade model of interaction between “primary” production relations (by which they mean intra-country relations) of different social systems. They said that primary, socially-colored production relations within capitalism and socialism do not interact directly because secondary, tertiary and other relations transferred

beyond national boundaries lie between them. Thanks to this a unique buffer system develops that does not allow primary relations to touch, to influence each other or to draw closer together.

E. P. Pletnev "advanced" especially far in this field, having created the intricate "metasystem" in which the national economies of socialist and capitalist countries interact economically with each other not directly (as happens in reality) but only through their corresponding world economic systems (17).

The mechanism of social sterilization of primary (national) production relations invented by him is, briefly stated, as follows. Crossing national boundaries, primary production relations immediately acquire a new "transferred" quality, a quality of being separated from home production, as a result of which they are transformed from production relations into "contact relations" (18). Then they are subject to further emasculation within the framework of the corresponding world economic system. "Ties between two systems," he asserts, "differ in quality from interrelations between participants (we must assume, in economic life—Yu. Sh.) within the framework of each system. They assume ahead of time preliminary "filtration" and "weighing" via economic laws in their own world" (19). Only after passing through this unique sanitation system, filtered and "weighed via economic law" within one's own world system "contact relations" are sufficiently neutralized within the class plan to come into contact with relations that have been similarly emasculated in the opposite social system without any consequences in the area of "convergence." The author of this purification system proudly emphasizes that his concept "does not leave a loophole for the ideas of convergence" (17, Part 1, p 17).

The fear of falling into the "convergence" swamp has led him to an impasse. The entire system of intermediate stages between "primary" production relations in socialism and capitalism exist only in his imagination for in real life economic ties and the corresponding production relations develop *directly* between socialist and capitalist partners, bypassing the "metasystem" step. Let us look, for example, at ties between the automobile plant in the city of Tolyatti and the Fiat firm in Turin. Each of these partners, being a product and at the same time the bearer of various systems of production relations, is not only in direct contact with the other but also co-participates in the concrete relations of production, exchange, distribution and consumption that are developing between them, and the two world economies with all their "filters" and sanitation systems do not have a place in these relations in any way. But what about joint ventures on the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries? After all, "primary" production relations in socialism do not overstep boundaries at all and consequently are not transformed into "transferred," "torn away" or "contact relations." If we follow E. P. Pletnev's logic, here we have not simply a "loophole" but a gaping breach for "convergence."

It is not difficult to find some common features in all the examined attempts to tie the old dogma to real life. First, in all cases the system of production relations of a particular type is understood as some sort of monolith devoid of internal structure and therefore painted the same in all its parts (aspects) in the corresponding social colors—one in only socialist colors and the other in only capitalist. Second, in all cases this system of relations is studied from a geographic position—as confined to within the national boundaries of a particular country.³ Third, in all cases one can see a clear inability to tolerate direct contact with production relations of various types. Evidently the fighters against the idea of "convergence" have truly believed that through direct contact these relations can be transformed into "radically distinct" relations.

But then a delicate question arises: If this is actually so, why shouldn't we follow this path to transform dying and stagnant capitalism into socialism? Why hinder the enriching influence of our society on its antipode? There is only one answer—our ideological "crusaders" themselves do not believe in the stability of their own structure. They are protecting it so carefully from direct contact with the capitalist system precisely because they are afraid that under such circumstances socialism will not survive. In other words, they essentially share the viewpoint of the most reactionary wing of convergence theorists. As they say, if you go off to the left you will return from the right.

The Structure of Production Relations and the Mechanism of Interaction Between Two Socio-Economic Systems

The false hopes of this wing of Western convergence theorists relating to the possibility of the transformation of socialism, as well as the "idea" of our fighters against this ideological heresy, are based to a large extent on ignoring the internal structure of the system of production relations by both sides.

The political and economic literature most often turns to the functional structure of production relations—production, distribution, exchange and consumption. This undoubtedly is an important structural cross-section, characterizing these relations from the point of view of phases of public reproduction. But it does not say anything about the hierarchical system of authority of deep and essential production relations that express the social nature of the given production method and its external manifestations, those concrete relations in which the given method of appropriations is economically implemented. K. Marx's "Das Kapital" consistently reveals how capitalist appropriation is implemented in economic management relations by means of the mechanisms of competition, the average profit norm, production costs and the distribution of profits among the business owner, the banker, the merchant, the landowner and so forth; as well as the role played in this by the division of labor in manufacturing and then in the

factory. Moreover, in order to understand the conditions for interaction of production relations of different production methods precisely this kind of "cross-section" of these relations is important. In contrast to the first, *reproduction* relations, let us call these *social* relations.

Extensive literature is devoted to an analysis of the structure of production relations from this aspect; various points of view come into conflict with each other. Some economists include among production relations only those that directly express *appropriation* relations (ownership of the means of production) (20). As has already been noted above, this kind of narrowing of the category of "production relations" contradicts the way in which K. Marx understood it—he places the equal sign between production relations and "economic relations."

Others include in this category not only appropriation relations but also *management relations*. "The method of appropriation or the relations of appropriation (of property) and the social structure of a society determine the makeup of all social relations," writes L. I. Abalkin. "The method of management, or management relations, reveals the mechanism for the organization of public production by means of which the given type of appropriation is realized" (3, 1983, No 14, p 30). Management relations have a place on the micro-, the meso-, and the macro-levels, defined in each of these instances by different proportions of purposefulness (systematic character) and spontaneity, by different degrees of interference in economic processes by the government and other such characteristics. There are relations between people dealing with an organization of public reproduction that yields the maximum useful economic results at a minimum social cost.

At the same time on the micro-economic level, i.e. within the framework of production units, in which the direct labor process is implemented, and in part on the meso-level, i.e. in large economic associations, organizational production relations cannot be reduced solely to management relations. Here an important role is played by relations that develop in connection with the efficient organization of the labor process itself on a particular technical basis. Outside of these relations there can be no labor process, which as we know has two indivisible aspects—the material-technological (the interaction between man and nature) and the economic (the interaction between people in the process of creating material well-being) (13, Vol 25, part 2, p 385). These relations form a special subsystem of *organizational-technological* production relations. Their function is to facilitate the more effective unification of live labor with the means of production within the very process of production itself by means of the effective division of labor, the combination of technologically interrelated processes and so forth. Together with the corresponding production forces these production relations create a technological method of production.

All three subsystems of production relations are closely linked and interrelated but do not create a monolith and develop to a significant extent according to their own rules. Thus, organizational-technological relations are directly determined by the development of production forces, and first and foremost by the level of production and by the general quality of man himself. They depend only indirectly on the nature of ownership of the means of production and on other special features of the appropriation method which can favor the development of these relations or, on the contrary, interfere with them. Management relations are determined by means of the condition of production forces as well as by the means of appropriation and also have an internal logic for development. A particular method of appropriation in principle is determined by the nature of the technological means of production although to a large extent it depends on specific class relations and political events. History knows of many cases in which the new technological production method beats a path within the framework of the old system of appropriation conditions for a long time.

With a consideration of such a triple-link structure of production relations let us look at how various types of production relations interact within the system of the all-world economy.

Let us begin with the organizational-technical subsystem. To the degree that the level of development of production forces within the world socialist and world capitalist economies are similar, their organizational-technological relations are similar as well. Thanks to this the exchange not only of material production forces but also of the experience of organizing direct production processes, "know how" and so forth is possible and is developing more and more extensively. Without this kind of compatibility "inter-system" deliveries of entire production combines—metallurgic, automobile, chemical and so forth—would be impossible.

Moreover, the countries of various systems collectively utilize material production forces such as international means of communication and transportation and social production forces such as the international division of labor, international production cooperation and so forth. Here, naturally, not only compatible but even joint organizational-technical production relations develop.

In the process of expanding the economic interaction between East and West there will undoubtedly be further growth in similarities and compatibility of organizational-technological relations as the gap between levels of development of production forces (first and foremost in levels of production and general quality of workers involved in intellectual and physical labor) narrows as well as as a result of the borrowing of the experience of production organization. This kind of rapprochement is just as proper as technical progress itself. Negating this rapprochement that has been noted by Western economists just because some of them drew the wrong, too

far-fetched, conclusions is as absurd as negating cybernetics or genetics on the basis of the fact that someone is haunted by the idealistic foundations of these sciences.

As for socialist and capitalist management methods, they too cannot but have traits in common if only because they derive genetically derived from the same foundation. After all every subsequent management method, like every subsequent technological production method, stands on the shoulders of its predecessor. K. Marx noted that the economic categories of capitalist society and "the understanding of its structure, provide...the opportunity to look into the structure and production relations of all dead forms of society, out of the elements and fragments of which this capitalist society was built. Some not yet removed remnants of these fragments and elements continue to exist within bourgeois society, and those things that were just hinted at in previous forms of society have developed to their full significance and so forth" (13, Vol 46, part 1, p 42).

In the same way socialism, and in the given case its economic relations, includes certain capitalistic elements, some in significantly weakened form and others in the form of much more developed systems. The former include market relations that developed long before capitalism and that reached their heyday within its depths. The latter includes government regulation (including in the form of state enterprises), which under socialist conditions was further developed and which moreover, it is now apparent, has turned out to be hypertrophied to a large extent reduced to the absurd.

In this way, both forms are similar in the means of management. This similarity is increasing, as it should, as there is a drawing together in the levels of development of production forces in socialist and capitalist countries.

Under the conditions of perestroika this rapprochement is especially noticeable because economic reform has been called upon to eliminate the distortion that developed still in the 1930's within the Soviet economic mechanism in the direction of government regulation and to reestablish within certain limits the unjustifiably ignored market mechanism, i.e. to place production economic relations in accordance with the level of development of our production forces. In turn capitalism has borrowed a great deal from us, especially during the post-war period, in the area of centralized redistribution of financial and material resources, government planning and so forth.

Doesn't the drawing together of economic methods conceal a threat that socialism will be transformed into capitalism? No, it does not since it does not affect the social foundation of our structure or its method of appropriation. "Not the movement of goods, capital and even work force, but the social concept of the processes occurring at the time make the market socialist or capitalist," notes A. N. Yakovlev. "The boundary passes

not along the lines of forms of vital activity in society, not along the lines of equipment and the means of this activity. It passes along the lines of the determination of the actual place of man in society—is he the highest goal of society or the source of the retrieval of profits" (2, 11 Aug 88).

Here we have approached that subsystem of production relations that determines the social image of any system—that method of appropriation, the legal expression of which is the relationship of ownership to the means of production. It is precisely this that determines the basic and other specific (structural) economic laws of the given society, and that also is the basis for the forms in which other (interstructural) laws operating in this society are manifested. Specific economic laws in turn develop a type of internal carcass for the given structure and permeate and bind together all three subsystems of production relations into one.

At the same time appropriation relations express the most deeply rooted material interests of the ruling class and therefore are closely tied to various aspects of the superstructure, and first and foremost to the political. It is precisely to it that the Leninist formula applies—"Politics is a concentrated expression of the economy" (21). All of the resources of the superstructure—ideology and morals, law and administrative methods of influence, diplomacy and, if needed, the army—are mobilized for the protection and reinforcement of these relations.

By virtue of these special characteristics, appropriation relations are a guarantee of the firmness of the fundamental precepts of a given production method in its interaction with others. If appropriation relations are preserved, the corresponding class coloring and all other aspects of the given system of production relations are preserved. In turn appropriation relations remain basically unchanged while government power remains in the hands of the same class.

Of course some changes in non-essentials, in so-called peripheral layers of appropriation methods, are completely possible without a loss to the ruling class. There was a time when the main method of self-augmentation of capital was the absolute supplemental cost, and the work day lasted 12-16 hours. With time it became understood that intensive exploitation of hired labor is more effective than the extensive method, and the work day and work week were even curtailed. Moreover, with the development of a complex factory technology it has become necessary to give hired workers and their children a proper education. And since the illnesses of such well-trained and expensive personnel bring losses to capital, the bourgeois society concerned itself with the development of health protection and the payment of assistance for illness. Finally it took upon itself, it is true under the pressure of an organized working class and to some degree under the influence of the example of socialist countries, various forms of social security and

assistance that forced business owners to deduct up to 44-50 percent of total expenditures for wages into a centralized fund. In other words, from the point of view of relations between labor and capital bourgeois society has forged a considerable path from the 17th century to the present in the search for its own economic and long-term socio-political advantage, but it can hardly be considered complete.

Certain changes are taking place within the socialist method of appropriation. This is especially noticeable in the village. For decades kolkhozes, fulfilling the "first commandment," were forced to give away to the state almost the entire harvest of grains according to fixed, depressed prices, and kolkhoz farmers received symbolic wages in work-days for their labor. Beginning in the mid-1950's this semi-feudal system of distributing income in agriculture moved step by step into the past and today truly revolutionary changes are taking place. The destruction of hidden forms of income levelling for production collectives is occurring in industry, construction and the service sphere. In cooperatives this kind of destruction is especially visible. This gives rise to a fear in some people. Aren't we returning to a capitalist order? Aren't we cultivating a new class of exploiters?

What can we say about such vigilant guards of our social image? First, all of these changes do not encroach upon the foundation of the socialist method of appropriation (from each according to his ability, to each according to his labor, excluding the exploitation of man by man), and on the contrary strengthen it. Similarly, the aforementioned changes in the capitalist society do not shake the foundation of the appropriation method characteristic of it. Second, these changes are not imposed upon us from without, are not grounded directly in the contact of the socialist system of production relations with the capitalist but dictated by internal conditions related to the development of our society, by a recognition of the fact that the previous system of management and income distribution brought not only the economy but also the moral foundation of our society to an impasse, to catastrophe.

Third, the vigilant guards should have thought about where the danger to socialism is coming from. O. R. Latsis showed that Stalin, having transformed our society into barracks-like socialism, created a real opportunity to appropriate someone else's labor (22). Such opportunities never remain unused. Already during the period of Stalinism the nomenclature elite began to develop in our country. Without creating material well-being and services, it receives them not according to its own labor. Another non-socialist layer appeared—plunderers and bribe-takers of all suits and ranks—and in the 1970's formed a mafia structure that permeated society from top to bottom. It also redistributed a certain part of national income to its advantage. No matter how paradoxical, the rottenness of appropriating someone else's unpaid labor developed in our country not from private ownership of the means of production but from the

hypertrophied development of state ownership that is not on the level of our production forces and, arising from this, from excessive centralization in economic management by administrative methods.

Does this mean that there is no danger at all to socialist countries in the extensive development of economic ties with capitalist countries? No, it does not. With the extensive entry into the world economy, any country whether socialist, developing or capitalist can find itself to be so dependent on foreign supplies and foreign sales markets that an accidental or intended violation of these ties results in destabilization of the national reproduction process with all the economic, social and political consequences arising from it.

Cases in which the United States and other Western countries used foreign economic dependence to destabilize the economic lives of Poland, Nicaragua and Chile (during the time of President Allende's governing) are well known. However, we should not confuse these methods of economic warfare with notorious "convergence." This kind of muddle only interferes with the scholarly elaboration of one of the urgent problems of the contemporary interrelated world—the problem related to the economic security of the country. Its solution lies not in inventing theoretical tricks resembling those that are presented in section two but in the ability to precisely calculate the tolerable limits of dependence of specific branches of the economy of every country on outside ties with particular countries, in the search for optimum diversification of foreign economic ties and in the development of an international climate of mutual trust, disarmament and so forth.

Thus, by virtue of the fact that there is a drawing together in levels of development of production forces in the leading socialist countries with those of leading capitalist countries, the similarity of many aspects of socialist and capitalist production relations increases properly and unavoidably. Here the authors of the "convergence" theory are not sinning against the truth although they experience this regularity purely empirically. For the given historic level, a drawing together of management methods is also occurring as deformations resulting from running ahead and other errors are eliminated in socialist society. But in and of itself and increase in the similarity of organizational-technological and economic relations and even in "peripheral" appropriation relations does not attest to the transformation of one of these socio-economic systems into the other or to the formation of some kind of mixed system. Here convergence theorists clearly pass off the desired for the real, and their zealous opponents in turn blindly believe in this and fight against windmills.

Until basic production relations protected by all means that are at the disposal of the ruling class are destroyed, the given socio-economic system remains in its original form. The basic production relation is a type of social genetic code that allows the public body to preserve

deep, essential features of the given type with all the modifications of structure and function. An objective drawing together of this structure and function in the public bodies of socialist and capitalist types does not eliminate basic differences dictated by their corresponding social codes.

Perestroika and new political ideas have enabled us to see the entire problematics of the existence and interaction of the two socio-economic systems in a realistic light, having thrown off the primitive concept of "either...or." In the era of nuclear arms this is a deadlock variant. As J. Galbraith wittily noted, "...after nuclear war even the most possessed ideologists will not be able to see the differences between capitalism and communism" (23). With the new approach the future is seen not in confrontation between the two social systems but in their growing mutual trust, mutual understanding, more and more extensive economic, political and spiritual interaction and healthy competition for the best path toward a better future for mankind.

The course of this competition itself and the nature of the transition from capitalism to socialism under conditions of the contemporary whole and interrelated world are changing considerably. As the authors of the theses in "Social Progress in the Contemporary World," justifiably note, a prolonged historical period of such competition on the basis of the assimilation of the achievements of the NTR and the constant borrowing of experience from each other is ahead. "It is completely evident that the interaction of two public systems cannot be simplistically presented as a transition of today's capitalism into today's socialism or their 'convergence' on the same unchanged foundation. Before us there truly is a *serious theoretical problem of radical renewal and of extensive changes in the socialist system and in the capitalist system in the course of their long development under conditions of competition and cooperation*" (3, 1988, no 7, p 86).

This kind of developmental model presupposes the unavoidable mutual influence of competing socio-economic systems and the borrowing of each others' experience and, this means, their growing similarity. The result of such mutually-enriching development will evidently be the development of different forms in the first phase of communist development in different parts of the world.

Footnotes

1. Another position also exists. Created after the counterrevolutionary upheaval and perfected by Stalin in 1927-1937, the social structure is not socialism but rather a specific model of feudalism covered by socialist attributes. Without disputing the right of Yu. N. Afanasyev, P. Karp and several other authors to their point of view we nevertheless feel it necessary to set it aside, so to speak, beyond the parentheses of this article since our main subject is the theory of "convergence" of socialism

and capitalism in the forms in which they exist. An analysis of the extent to which these traditional forms respond to the real content of both social systems would take us far beyond the limits of this subject.

2. This term is borrowed from the natural sciences. In biology convergence (from the Latin "convergere" means to comply, to draw nearer, to come together at one point) means the appearance in organisms of similarities in the body build and functions based not on their common origin but on adaption to relatively similar living conditions. In medicine convergence is the coming together of the lines of vision of a pair of eyes.

3. E. P. Pletnev's departure from this principle is only seeming—according to him when production relations go beyond national boundaries, they cease to be that and become "contact relations."

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17. See the introduction in the book, "Two Systems of the World Economy: Antagonistic Unity." Moscow, 1983; ME I MO, 1985, No 7, pp 106-113.

18. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, 1984, No 2, p 116. On the subject of the incorrect interpretation by him of the term "contact relations," used by the founders of Marxism in a totally different sense, see ME I MO, 1987, No 9, pp 79-80.

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SEGODNYA, No 10, Oct 88**

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Economic Experiment in China's Fujian Province
18070122 Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in
Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 10-12

[Article by Yu. Onishchuk: "China. Experience of Fujian Province"]

[Text] After flying around 2,000 kilometers, the silver CAC Boeing landed at the airport of Fuzhou, the administrative center of Fujian Province. In just a couple of hours we had been relocated from the Beijing spring to the beginning of the coastal summer. We researchers from the Scientific Research Institute of Economic and Technical Cooperation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations had flown to China to study its experience in the operation of joint enterprises. The trip to the southern province of Fujian was organized by our Chinese colleagues from the Research Institute of International Economic Cooperation.

"Guests from the USSR are still rare here, but we hope that we will be visiting one another more often as the cooperation between our countries develops on a broader scale," we were told by the man who greeted us, Lin Minqiang, member of the Fujian Province Committee for Foreign Economic Contacts and Trade and chief of the foreign investment division.

We learned from conversations with Chinese colleagues that he was right and that we were the first Soviet specialists to come to the special economic zone (SEZ) in the city of Xiamen to learn about the Chinese experience and to study the possibilities for Soviet-Chinese cooperation in the PRC's southern provinces.

It is a fact that Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation has been concentrated in China's northern and northeastern regions to date. Now the possibility of moving south is being considered. Soviet organizations have displayed an interest in making investments in the SEZ's and the regions of the PRC's technical-economic development.

The special economic zones were created to serve as something like "windows" to the outside world. Capital, modern technology, and managerial experience pass through them for subsequent use in other parts of China. The SEZ's have preferential tax (almost only half as high as in the rest of the country) and customs regulations for foreign capital, especially capital connected with export-related production. Foreign investors have been granted broad powers in the hiring of manpower, the setting of wages, and the organization of production.

Product Quality and the Market

"Fujian Province was one of the first in the PRC to begin trade and economic cooperation with other countries after the declaration of the 'open-door policy' in 1979," Lin Minqiang told us. "Trade and Economic relations

have now been established with more than 100 states. The industrial product increased annually by around 12 percent between 1980 and 1985. These indicators are higher than national figures. The high rate of economic growth has continued into the current, seventh 5-year plan (1986-1990). It is closely related to the encouragement of foreign capital investment and the acquisition of the latest foreign technology and equipment.

"Fujian Province (not counting the Xiamen special economic zone) has concluded agreements on the establishment of 1,273 enterprises with the use of foreign capital," Lin Minqiang continued. "Total capital investments in these projects will amount to 1.2 billion dollars. China's share of the capital is equivalent to 660 million. At this time, 591 enterprises are already operating. They employ 58,000 people. Direct foreign investments are used in various forms. For example, 550 joint enterprises and 438 industrial cooperatives are being established, and 35 other enterprises are being established solely with foreign capital. Foreign firms are also remodeling and modernizing old Chinese plants and factories with the aim of converting them for the manufacture of modern goods. Deliveries of new equipment and technology were envisaged in 97 percent of the contracts signed in 1987. In all, contracts envisage the transfer of 859 million dollars' worth of new technology over 9 years. In 1987 the export product of the joint Chinese-foreign enterprises was equivalent to 92 million dollars. Work has begun on the establishment of 90 trade firms and some industrial enterprises abroad, primarily in the Southeast Asian countries. Manpower is being exported for 461 projects abroad in accordance with contracts negotiated by the central government."

In Fuzhou we visited a TV picture tube plant, built jointly with a huaqiao (this is what the overseas Chinese are called) proprietor from the Philippines. The enterprise's authorized assets total 280 million yuan. The huaqiao's share is 25 percent. Accounts are settled with him by deducting products or currency from profits in proportion to his share of authorized assets. The plant produces 500,000 black-and-white and 300,000 color picture tubes a year. About 200 people work there around the clock in three shifts. All of the modern equipment was bought in Japan. The products meet world quality standards. The picture tubes for black-and-white television sets are sold mainly on the domestic market, and 30 percent of the tubes for color TV sets are exported to the Southeast Asian countries. The enterprise is managed by a joint board of directors.

"Picture tube quality control is important here," stressed Chen Jiabao, the energetic 40-year-old deputy general director of the plant. "After all, only high-quality products can compete in foreign markets. We invited Japanese specialists to come here in order to secure the efficient operation of the equipment. Their duties also include the training of Chinese engineers, technicians, and workers. We plan to work autonomously in the future. We can already produce black-and-white tubes without the foreigners."

We also went to the Mawei technical-economic development zone in Fujian Province. We traveled there from the center of Fuzhou on a modern highway and drove through a tunnel drilled through rock and past an old Buddhist pagoda and sea port.

The Mawei technical-economic development zone has existed since 1984. Its total area is around 4.4 square kilometers. There are several industrial enterprises, a sea port, and two power plants here. The amount invested in the development of the zone totaled 110 million dollars in the last 4 years. Eighteen enterprises have been built, and eight of these are joint enterprises. Just as in other parts of the province, huaqiao account for most of the foreign investments. Now this zone has contacts with 20 states, mostly in Asia. The main areas of industrial development are electronics, measurement and optical instrument production, and precision engineering. This emphasis, however, has not precluded the establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises in other industries, using modern technology and producing goods for export.

A wallpaper factory we visited is one of these enterprises. In essence, it is a single shop with an area of around 200 square meters. The wallpaper production line was bought in Xianggang. It can produce 5 million square meters a year. The factory began operating 3 months after the deal was concluded with the Xianggang entrepreneurs. The equipment was installed in a completed building with all of the necessary supply lines connected. The equipment is operating at full capacity. The factory is manned 24 hours a day by 135 workers in three shifts.

In the Xiamen SEZ

The road from Fuzhou to Xiamen passes through the heartland of the province. Through the windows of the bus we saw neatly tended peasant plots alternating with new construction projects in Quanzhou, Tunan, and other district centers.

Xiamen is a beautiful coastal city, one of the largest in Fujian Province. It has an area of 1,516 square kilometers, including the suburbs, and a population of over a million. The city is in the coastal subtropical zone. Bananas, pineapple, and citrus fruits are grown on the outskirts of Xiamen. The area of the Xiamen SEZ, located within the city limits, is 131 square kilometers. Around 350,000 people live here.

The industrial construction in this zone began in October 1980. Contracts have now been signed on the construction of 315 industrial enterprises with a total investment volume of 1.5 billion dollars. Foreign capital will account for 500 million of this total. Some 194 enterprises have already been turned over for operations. Industry, tourism, and trade, including foreign trade, are the main areas of the zone's economic development. Capital investments in industrial projects constitute 54 percent of the total. The leading industries include

electronics, light industry, the chemical industry, precision engineering, and construction materials production. The main foreign partners are firms and companies in Singapore, Aomen, Xianggang, Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Italy.

According to Chang Yi, the deputy director of the Xiamen SEZ committee on economics and trade, all of the enterprises built with foreign participation are operating at a profit. Joint enterprises make their own decisions on whether to purchase raw materials and components in China or abroad. All of the conditions connected with the participation of foreign partners in the operation of industrial facilities are stipulated in a contract. The most common form of management is a joint board of directors, with members appointed in line with the share of invested capital. All routine matters connected with enterprise operations are settled by the general director. Priority is assigned to the training of skilled personnel. Several Chinese usually work along with foreign specialists at each joint enterprise to learn from the experience of participating in the installation, adjustment, and operation of equipment.

Tax privileges are promoting the expansion of foreign investment. The profits of enterprises in the zone are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. Furthermore, an enterprise is exempt from taxation during the first 2 years after it begins operating and pays only half the rate for the next 3 years. The rate of taxation is below 10 percent for enterprises exporting more than 70 percent of their product. Joint enterprises importing raw materials, components, accessories, and necessary equipment from abroad are exempt from customs duties. After foreign partners have paid their taxes, they can transfer their share of the profits abroad, and the Chinese share of the profits can be reinvested for the development of production or can be distributed at the discretion of the board of directors.

Combination of Progressive Experience and Tradition

There are many points of view with regard to the prospects for the development of special economic zones inside and outside China. In the opinion of several Western experts, within the next decade the SEZ's can be expected to achieve the Chinese leadership's goal of operations in world markets and solvency in foreign currency, but only if the emphasis is on "traditional" spheres—agriculture, fishing, and the production of manufactured goods with relatively low technical input—rather than on advanced high-technology industries. Our Chinese colleagues told us that many cadres in SEZ's and open cities share this opinion. Some of what we saw and heard in Fuzhou and Xiamen corroborates this. The traditional branches of the economy are undergoing intensive development here: fishing, the processing of seafood, and the food industry. Many modern production units have been established in Fuzhou and

the Xiamen SEZ and are using state-of-the-art technology for the processing and packaging of seafood and agricultural products. These goods are exported on a broad scale and there is always a high demand for them in foreign markets.

Many specialists believe, on the other hand, that the development of high-technology production and the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology should be the top priority in the SEZ. We saw a clear illustration of this when we visited an enterprise of the Xiamen Electronics Company.

In 1987 this enterprise produced 1.3 million color television sets, 1.2 million cassette recorders, and accessories for these items. The company produces high-quality items which are always in demand in the domestic and foreign markets. We saw a precise and efficient system of production organization and a conscientious attitude toward labor in the workers and employees. We were most impressed by the speed with which the enterprise was built and production was brought up to full capacity, especially when we measured it against the performance of Soviet agencies. Deputy General Director Li Shiyong told us that talks with a huaqiao from Xianggang on the creation of the company and the construction of the plant began in 1984. That same year a contract was signed and a joint company was created with capital assets of 20 million dollars. In 1985 the main buildings were erected by Chinese organizations and equipment from Japan, England, and the United States began to be delivered. The technical plans were drawn up by Chinese specialists in conjunction with the partner from Xianggang at the same time that the buildings were being erected and the equipment was being delivered and installed. The plant began producing goods at the end of 1985 and was operating at a profit the next year. Therefore, this enterprise, with its technologically complex equipment, was established and began operating within less than 2 years. There is no question that this experience is extremely valuable to Soviet organizations, if we compare the amount of time it takes to design and build enterprises of this kind in our country and in the PRC or with the aid of Soviet organizations abroad.

The plant is now manned by 3,000 workers and employees working in two shifts. It orders components from Japan and Xianggang, but most of them are made in China. Over 70 percent of its products are exported to the United States, England, Canada, Iceland, and the Southeast Asian countries. The plant has a center for the training and advanced training of personnel. Specialists plan to modernize the plant's equipment on their own, and they have taken the most efficient approach possible to the matter: They are not striving primarily for the development of a new generation of television sets, such as the flat-screen models, because they realize that it would be extremely difficult to compete with Japanese firms. Their main purpose is to enhance the quality, modernize, and lower the cost of their existing products in order to strengthen their position primarily in the

voluminous markets of Southeast Asia and of China itself. There is no question that these products, which might not be the latest models but are inexpensive and of high quality, will be in demand even in certain segments of the market of the developed capitalist countries. Another large enterprise we visited in the Xiamen SEZ is the Chinese Ceramics Company. It produces various kinds of ceramics, tiles, and bathroom fixtures. A 20-year contract on the establishment of a joint enterprise with a U.S. firm was signed in 1984, and the first items were already being produced a year later. Credit was extended on preferential terms for the purchase of equipment. The factory's production facilities cover an area of around 75,000 square meters. It employs 1,100 Chinese workers and engineers and 8 foreign specialists. The enterprise has three main shops: for the production of dishes and ceramic items (11 million units a year), bathroom fixtures (280,000 units a year), and ceramic tile (110,000 square meters a year). Almost all of the products are exported—to the United States, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia. There is a steady demand for the factory's dishes, vases, and figurines of animals, dancers, and Buddha in world markets. The traditional ancient arts of ceramics and porcelain ware are organically combined here with modern technology. It is precisely the national roots of the factory's products that secure the demand for them in Western countries. This is probably the best example of the tangible results of the combination of advanced foreign experience with Chinese traditions.

After summing up our impressions, the information we gathered, and the conversations we had, comparing and contrasting various statistics, and investigating the results which have been achieved and the problems which have not been solved yet, we arrived at some definite conclusions about the positive nature of the reforms in the PRC, based on the encouragement of foreign investment and use of foreign technology for the purpose of the economic development of Fujian Province and the Xiamen SEZ in particular and of the entire republic in general. The establishment of joint enterprises and the work on small and large construction projects have been extremely efficient and have taken only a few months. The organization of production at the enterprises we toured is efficient and balanced. Chinese workers and engineers are distinguished by a sincere desire to make maximum use of foreign experience.

In addition to seeing the success in the economic development of the Xiamen SEZ, we also noticed some problems, which we feel are also typical of other SEZ's and coastal regions. The use of Chinese-made components and spare parts for imported equipment and the replacement of this equipment with local models present serious difficulties. Articles in the Chinese press, for example, have acknowledged the fact that many of the parts for production lines imported from Japan are not produced in China, and this has made the PRC completely dependent on the Japanese firms supplying it with this equipment. These purchases have been absorbing substantial quantities of currency for a long time.

Some enterprises are suffering from a shortage of skilled personnel. Some managers and employees do not have enough specialized economic knowledge to manage enterprises. It is difficult to find highly skilled workers for joint enterprises. This impedes their efficient operation.

Problems exist, but they are being solved by Chinese specialists. During meetings and conversations, our Chinese colleagues expressed a willingness to develop Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation in the coastal regions and special economic zones with the appropriate Soviet organizations, enterprises, and departments. The possibility of acting on these proposals will depend largely on the ability of Soviet organizations to accomplish the reorganization required for work under the new conditions in China today.

Trade Relations, Capitalism in Developing Countries

18070122 Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 14-18

[Article by Yu. Aleksandrov, doctor of economic sciences: "Commercial Relations and Capitalism in the Developing Countries"]

[Text] The profound restructuring of the social sciences, the need for which is being realized more and more clearly each day and was recently reaffirmed at the 19th all-union party conference,¹ will require the encouragement of vigorous debates on all of the fundamental problems in the study of the social process. After all, debate is essential to the normal existence of any science.

The prospects for capitalism in the developing countries are now among the most relevant topics in the Soviet social sciences. The accelerated growth of capitalism in many countries in the developing world in the 1970's and 1980's is a commonly acknowledged fact, but it is the kind of fact that requires analytical interpretation because it was not (and we must admit this) predicted as a certainty by our science. In fact, prevailing opinion held that capitalism in these countries was "deformed," "defective," and (and we feel this is the main thing) would reach certain hard and fast limits in its development; in other words, it would not be able to transform pre-capitalist structures, supplant the traditional sector, employ the overwhelming majority of manpower, and thereby establish itself as the predominant method of production in the foreseeable future. Capitalism in the future was seen as a nidus—as a structure confined to the modern sector of the economy and opposed to all of the structures based on the traditional sector.

In our opinion, the acceptance of this point of view would have been tantamount to an acknowledgement of the inevitability of the imminent collapse of capitalism due to its inability to extend commercial relations to all other structures and the connections between structures. Furthermore, commercial relations would have had to be

replaced by various non-commercial mechanisms of redistribution. All of this would have presupposed capitalism's lack of means to create adequate internal prerequisites for stepped-up development in the local socioeconomic environment.

Let us take a closer look at this thesis. Is it possible, for instance, to calculate (regardless of how complex the calculations might be) the ability of capitalist production in the developing countries to "assimilate" the majority of the economically active population within the foreseeable future? This is a mistaken assumption, and not because the procedure of quantitative measurement is underdeveloped. Calculations are always dependent on theories of capitalist development.

In the case in question, the "assimilation" of Eastern labor resources by capital is effectively equivalent to the increase in the number of jobs in the modern sector of the economy. This means that the calculation procedure is based on theoretical approaches which essentially equate the development of capitalism with the expansion of the sphere of industrial employment. In this case, researchers overlook the fact that the inclusion of labor resources in the sphere of capitalist exploitation is a historical process which goes through specific stages, one of which is the development of commercial relations—eventually to the point of comprehensive coverage. This is why the prospects for the growth of capitalist employment can be studied only in connection with trends in the establishment of a basis, consisting of commercial relations, for the entire economic structure of the developing countries. Consequently, the verification of the accuracy of views on the fundamental question regarding the capitalist method of production's ability to become predominant in the developing countries necessitates the disclosure of the analytical premises and line of reasoning which underestimate capital's ability to transform pre-capitalist structures.

In the 1970's the stepped-up integration of the developing countries into the world capitalist economy (WCE) led in our science to the renunciation of the view of capitalist development in these countries as a purely internal process, slowed down but not stopped by neo-colonial exploitation and the most tenacious of pre-capitalist relations. This was replaced by the idea that the prospects for capitalism on the periphery of the WCE were limited. This conclusion was the result of the scientific analysis of the rapid growth of the traditional sector and the mass pauperization of small-scale producers on the one hand and the relatively limited development of capitalism on the other within the confines of the theory of dependent capitalist development in the "Third World." The reasons for this were seen in capital's undermining of the productive forces in the traditional sector by making extensive use of usurious rental methods of redistributing the social product in order to establish itself on the periphery. In this way, capital perpetuated the pre-capitalist structures while dooming them to degradation. Pre-capitalist relations began to be

seen as anomalies and by-products of the expanded reproduction of world capital on the periphery of the WCE. This was seen to reflect the inherent dualism of the WCE, the centers of which were in opposition to the periphery.²

The growth of the capitalist structure in the developing countries, however, soon necessitated a more vigorous investigation of the internal conditions of capitalist development in these countries. The ideas about the dualism of the center and periphery, which were part of the theory of dependent capitalism in the WCE as a whole, were extended to socioeconomic issues in the developing countries. The common belief was that the unequal nature of the developing countries' relations with developed capitalist countries presupposed the systematic sale of the products of their traditional sector at prices below their value and direct intra-economic outlays. This would contract the sphere of commercial transactions and allow various monopolies to overwhelm the commercial economy. This led to the logical assumption that trends in the transformation of pre-capitalist structures would be set strictly by outside forces and not by the influence of commodity and money mechanisms, and this should preclude the establishment of a common basis of commercial relations for the entire structure.³

Later, increasing importance was attached to the nature of the technology used in the modern sector in the developing countries because it was assumed that trends in the development of productive forces and socioeconomic processes on the periphery of the WCE would depend ultimately on the dynamics of productive forces in its centers. This kind of technology, borrowed from the centers, would be capital-intensive and labor-saving technology in general, and this would be contrary to conditions in the developing countries, with their shortage of capital resources and "population explosion." This led to the conclusion that the development of a modern capitalist sector in these countries would require special man-made conditions to secure the accessibility of capital resources and to bring them in line with labor resources in a balance conducive to capitalism. This line of reasoning gave rise to the idea that the disintegration of the modern and traditional sectors of the economy would be a mechanism of capitalist development in the East, creating and maintaining the balance of primary production factors required by capital.

The ideas which provided the momentum for the birth of the "dualistic" theory reflected important trends in capitalist development in the East (and, to some extent, in the entire "Third World"), connected with the direct formation of the industrial sector.⁴ Later, however, all aspects of socioeconomic processes began to be viewed through the prism of these trends. The result was the view of the traditional sector's future that reinforced the earlier pessimism of the theory of dependence with regard to the prospects for its capitalist transformation: The degradation of this sector, which would be expanded

by the effects of the "population explosion," would have an unyielding functional relationship to the growth of the capitalist modern sector. The traditional sector should continue to exist for an indefinite period of time as the sphere for the concentration of overpopulation—"a natural result of the general law of capitalist accumulation under the conditions of economic underdevelopment and the population explosion."⁵

The conclusions drawn from the "dualistic" theory ultimately present a picture of an extremely distinctive socioeconomic structure in the developing countries. One element is the capitalist structure within the confines of the modern sector. Its growth is promoted by the redistribution of scarce economic resources from the traditional sector, which it dominates outside the economy, and by its protection from the pressure exerted by surplus labor resources. It is also thought to require protection from "non-equivalent exchange" in trade with the centers of the WCE. The development of small-scale production is seen as a way of partially alleviating increasingly acute internal social conflicts, but this kind of production is usually thought of as being competitive only to a limited extent and therefore needing support through a system of redistributive mechanisms. The traditional sector—the sphere of the concentration of overpopulation—needs this support even more.⁶

The stability of this system, which functions on the basis of the reciprocal redistribution of resources between all of its elements, can only be secured by a centralized government employing non-commercial economic leverage. It lacks the necessary conditions for the progressive development of commercial relations and, consequently, for the establishment of capitalism as the prevailing method of production. Furthermore, because the growth of capitalism presupposes the degradation of productive forces in the traditional sector, this ultimately undermines its own viability and exacerbates the social crises leading to its collapse. The developing countries themselves will completely oppose the centers of capitalism in the WCE as a result of the inadmissibility of commercial relations as a basis for economic contacts and as a result of the capitalist order's lack of viability. All this, in turn, leads researchers to the assumption that these countries will inevitably make the "right choice" in favor of socialism.⁷

Therefore, the conclusion that capitalism cannot transform pre-capitalist structures in the developing countries stems objectively from two theoretical premises: 1) "modern technology" is equated with "technology of capitalist production in the centers of the WCE"; 2) the main role is assigned to the redistribution of economic resources through non-commercial channels. Both of these points of view eventually suggest that trends in the development of productive forces throughout the WCE are set exclusively by the dynamics of these forces in its

centers. Technical progress, which promotes a savings in live labor by enhancing its productive potential, is commonly regarded as a determining factor in the development of productive forces.

This approach absolutizes the tendency of capitalist production to replace live labor with machines—a tendency which is being assigned more significance than capital's objective desire to transform productive forces throughout the society in accordance with its own laws. The tendency toward the accumulation, concentration, and centralization of capital, regardless of local conditions, is also absolutized and, as a result, the autonomous role of small-scale production and social division of labor as factors in the development of productive forces and prerequisites for the establishment of commercial relations is underestimated.⁸ By the same token, there is an emphasis on the importance of destroying pre-capitalist small-scale production for the purpose of capital's possession of the limited economic resources (for example, land) used by these production units while simultaneously repulsing the surplus labor resources in the traditional sector.⁹

These are some of the conclusions derived from the prevailing beliefs about trends in the development of productive forces in the WCE. Now let us see what common assessments of productive forces in the developing countries add to this. The very opinion that the development of capitalism in the East is connected exclusively with capital-intensive and labor-saving technology effectively labels the East's colossal labor resources as an economic resource of limited mobility which is largely useless to capital and which diverts part of potential total accumulations (so-called demographic investments) for its expanded reproduction in the traditional sector. This results in a misunderstanding of the connections between productive forces in the modern and traditional sectors and, consequently, the pre-capitalist societies. It is no coincidence that the contemporary socioeconomic problems of the developing countries are studied largely in isolation from their economic history.

As part of this process, pre-industrial technology is placed in absolute contrast to industrial technology. The connections between various historical types of productive forces disappear, and the common logic of their development, stemming from the human being's central position in this system as society's main productive force, is disrupted. The possibility of participation by the traditional sector's manpower in economic development is seen only in conjunction with technical machinery. There appears to be a gap between the spheres of pre-industrial and industrial labor: These forms of labor only appear to coexist until pre-industrial labor is supplanted by industrial labor.¹⁰ An important connecting link in the process by which the traditional sector's manpower is included in the sphere of economic growth is lost—the development of social division of labor and the commercial economy.

In this way, the common Eurocentric approach to productive forces in the WCE leads to a disregard for the prerequisites for economic development in the productive forces of the traditional sector of Eastern countries, especially labor resources and social division of labor. This disregard turns to underestimation when the productive forces begin to be viewed as particularly backward entities. It is our conviction that this point of view is a hypothesis which has never been proved.

Any theories categorically linking the functioning of capitalist production in developing countries with the disintegration of advanced and backward spheres of the economy—regardless of whether they draw distinctions between the centers and periphery of the WCE or between modern and traditional sectors in Eastern countries—have basic premises leading unavoidably to the conclusion regarding this kind of “depreciation.” After the pre-capitalist economy has turned into the traditional sector of the modern economy in the developing countries, this “depreciation” is supposed to occur, first, because “excessive” population growth has an adverse effect on the balance between labor and other economic resources; second, because the labor resources do not meet capitalist hiring requirements in mechanized industry; third, because of the labor-saving trends in the modern sector; and fourth and finally, because traditional productive forces become relatively archaic¹¹ when advanced productive forces make their appearance in the modern sector.

This kind of “inflationary” process causes researchers to view labor resources in developing countries as a passive element of productive forces, a real economic resource only in a limited sense until it has been transformed by capital. Under these conditions, the need for capitalist production to rely exclusively on scarce economic resources and to repulse surplus labor of the traditional type seems absolutely obvious. The connection between this point of view and the belief described above in the socioeconomic structure of developing countries as a system supported by the reciprocal redistribution of economic resources among its various elements through non-commercial channels is completely self-evident.

These are, in our opinion, the roots of the technical approaches connecting the establishment of capitalism in the developing world primarily with its mobilization of scarce economic resources and therefore, despite all stipulations to the contrary, suggesting that it is incapable of transcending the boundaries of just one element of a multistructured economy. In contrast to this, we will now take a look at the fundamental potential capitalism turned out to have for the transformation of pre-capitalist structures in Eastern countries.

The enhanced mobility of capital within the confines of the WCE as the socioeconomic homogeneity of this economic system grows more pronounced is an important stimulus of increased activity by capital in the developing world. As a result of this, the technology

which is rapidly renewed under the conditions of the technological revolution is more and more likely to be geared to specific quantitative and qualitative features of manpower in various parts of the WCE based on the capitalist criteria of efficiency. Economic progress ceases to be identified solely with the accumulation of capital and the rise in the capital-labor ratio.¹² Modern capitalist production is distinguished by an inherent tendency to move from “resource-devouring” to “resource-conserving” technology. The efforts to assimilate the abundant labor resources of the East instead of its scarce resources are indisputably one side of this process. Some examples are the new forms of organizing labor-intensive production at the enterprises of TNC’s and the “green revolution” in agriculture. The bases of these technologies were cultivated in the developed capitalist countries, but they were engendered by conditions present throughout the WCE.

The transformation of pre-capitalist structures by capital is stimulated less by the direct establishment of labor-intensive production units than by the development of division of labor, mediated by commercial relations, at all levels of the economy. This, along with the rising capital-labor ratio in the modern sector, increases the productivity of social labor and the size of the per capita social product. For this reason, the capitalist assimilation of labor resources is not simply a matter of expanded hiring in the modern sector. The system of social reproduction—as a whole and in individual economic structures—is simultaneously engulfed by commercial relations. The development of the capitalist method of production is then reflected not only in the spontaneous growth of productive capital but also in its domination of all commercial relations and consequent limitation of spontaneous tendencies in small-scale commercial production. Two questions are of fundamental importance in this context: First, does the traditional sector have adequate prerequisites for the development of commercial relations, and second, can the sphere of commercial relations become the basis for the extensive development of capitalism “from below”?

The existence of huge manpower reserves in the traditional sector appears to be an important overlooked prerequisite for the development of commercial relations—a factor commonly assumed to play a negative role in the development of commercial and capitalist production.

To make use of these reserves, however, capital has to seek ways of enhancing the mobility and productivity of labor resources in the traditional sector, and in the Eastern countries capital has been able to make some progress in this area in conjunction with governments since the early 1970’s.

The new stimuli turned out to be extremely effective largely because capital had already had time to perform substantial preparations for the mobilization of the traditional sector’s labor resources. During different

stages of its expansion, the extremely low mobility of land and labor resources in this sector stimulated investment in real estate and usurious trade operations and consequently was less likely to promote the establishment of capitalist relations than the expansion of capital-modified usurious rent relationships entailing the exploitation of the immediate producers. The low mobility of labor resources and their unsuitability for industrial hiring simultaneously created a shortage of labor for capitalist production and encouraged the development of labor-saving technologies, most of which were borrowed from capitalist countries.

In this way, what seemed to be all of the necessary prerequisites for the development of capitalism according to the "dualistic" model were established, and it is true that this was a distinct trend in the Eastern countries, but only as a specific tendency characteristic of the earlier stages of capital's transformation of an alien socioeconomic environment. At that time the commercialization of the traditional sector's product by commercial capital only stimulated the development of commodity production in this sector to a limited extent. Conditions were inadequate for the relatively quick disintegration of pre-capitalist structures by commercial relations. This was impeded by the partial degradation of productive forces in the traditional sector under the influence of the uncompensated removal of the social product, particularly in the atmosphere of "population explosion." This degradation was reflected, for example, in the fragmentation of small-scale farming, the increasingly severe overpopulation of rural communities, and the deterioration of the physical properties of labor resources. As a result of this, the further development of commercial relations in the traditional sector turned into an almost insoluble problem.

Possibilities for progress in this area finally arrived in the 1970's with the new labor-intensive technologies for small production units and, in particular, with the "green revolution." The new technologies signified the achievement of a specific stage in the synthesis of trends in the development of productive forces in the centers and periphery of the WCE. They use capital-related production factors of the era of technological revolution (for example, highly productive strains of agricultural crops), but these factors are used primarily not to save labor but to enhance the productivity of land as a scarce production factor. Because they are also highly labor-intensive, all of this promotes heightened economic activity by labor resources in the traditional sector. This is accelerating the integration of the socioeconomic structures of Eastern countries on the basis of commercial relations extending more broadly to all elements of reproduction in the traditional sector. The mobility of its accumulated manpower reserves is increasing considerably. Therefore, the traditional sector is not being liquidated or devastated by the modern sector but is playing a stronger functional role in the development of commercial production and the entire social-reproductive organism.

Consequently, the current accelerated growth of capitalism in the developing countries is due largely to accumulation in the modern sector and to the stimuli for commercial relations in the traditional and "informal" sectors of the economy. By setting common (market) values for all production factors and enhancing their mobility (especially in the case of labor resources in the traditional sector, which was previously suffering from steady overpopulation), these relations are helping capital "put down roots" in the local socioeconomic system. Productive capital is surmounting the boundaries between economic sectors more decisively, and the mass base for it in the traditional sector is being expanded.

It is apparently the sequential nature of this process that gives rise to the basic stages of capitalism's establishment in the "Third World," and in this sense it cannot be regarded as a "poly-stage" process, despite the constant coexistence of various historical forms of capital. In the East we are witnessing a different sequence of capitalist development than in the Western countries. During the first stage capital infiltrates an alien socioeconomic environment with natural economic reproduction. This is a period of widespread pre-bourgeois forms of capital (trade and usurious) in the traditional sector and clearly defined signs of disintegration in the modern and traditional sectors. Capitalism entered the second stage after it found an opportunity to draw the traditional and informal sectors into commercial relations with the tendency toward the enhanced productivity of social labor in these sectors and thereby expanded the base for this labor in small-scale production.

Can we assume that all of this has created all of the necessary internal prerequisites for the establishment of capitalism as the prevailing method of production in the developing countries? It appears that the development of a commercial economy throughout the multistructured system in the 1970's and 1980's promoted considerable progress in the spread of capitalism in breadth and depth. Nevertheless, it will still have to surmount certain obstacles in order to establish itself as the prevailing method of production. One of the main internal problems for capital in the developing countries will consist in establishing a balance of production factors more conducive to capitalism throughout the economy, especially in the traditional and informal sectors. The ability of commercial relations to engender capitalism "on a mass scale" is not typical of these relations in general, but only when the commercial economy reaches a specific stage. For example, when V.I. Lenin underscored this ability, he was referring primarily to the specific conditions of post-revolutionary Russia and the countries of developed capitalism.¹³ In the Eastern countries the entire sphere of commercial relations is still carrying the heavy load of the pauperization of small producers and a relative surplus of manpower; commercial production is distinguished by excessive fragmentation in its lowest links and this impedes the enhancement of the productivity of social labor.

Capital (national and world capital) is vigorously striving to surmount these limitations by means of the integration of modern and other sectors of the economy, the creation of new technologies with a view to the achievements of the technological revolution and conditions in the developing countries and, finally, the use of government support for small-scale commercial production. The speed of this process is not uniform, however, and it is slowest of all in the countries with severe overpopulation. The complexity of the problem is attested to by the example of certain countries in Latin America which have progressed so far along the capitalist road in general, such as Brazil and Argentina, but in which the integration of the modern and traditional sectors is entailing considerable difficulty.¹⁴

Capital's need to surmount some unfavorable economic factors in the developing countries indicates that these countries cannot be regarded merely as backward in comparison with the developed capitalist countries, lagging behind them only in quantitative parameters of economic and social development. There are also qualitative differences. In the terminology of contemporary political economy, this can be defined most precisely as "economic underdevelopment." In our opinion, surmounting the economic underdevelopment of the "Third World" countries will necessitate sequential changes in the objective features of the economic environment that are complicating the complete integration of the social-reproductive and structural systems on the basis of commercial relations.

Footnotes

1. "Resolution of 19th All-Union CPSU Conference 'On Progress in the Implementation of 27th CPSU Congress Decisions and Objectives in the Intensification of Perestroika,'" PRAVDA, 5 July 1988.

2. "Razvivayushchiesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy" [Developing Countries: Natural Trends, Tendencies, and Prospects], edited by V.L. Tyagunenko, Moscow, 1974; V.V. Krylov, "Distinctive Features of the Development of Productive Forces and the Reproductive Process in Developing Countries," in "Ekonomika razvivayushchikhsya stran: teorii i metody issledovaniya" [Economies of Developing Countries: Research Methods and Theories], Moscow, 1979, pp 152-185.

3. "The institutional factor is becoming one of the most important in the development process, and the liquidation of the traditional sector is connected with the transformation of social relations by means of cardinal measures changing the bases of the social organization of society" ("Vostok. Rubezh 80-kh godov. Osvobodivshiesya strany v sovremennom mire" [The East on the Threshold of the 1980's. Emerging Countries in Today's World], Moscow, 1983, p 63).

4. This theory of capitalist development was based on ideas about the distinctive nature of the industrial revolution in the East (G.K. Shirokov, "Promyshlennaya revolyutsiya v stranakh Vostoka" [The Industrial Revolution in the Eastern Countries], Moscow, 1981) and about the modern role of pre-capitalist social institutions in the East as an element of the mechanism contributing to the disintegration of the modern and traditional sectors (A.P. Kolontayev, "Dinamika i struktura zanyatosti naseleniya Indii" [Dynamics and Structure of Employment in India], Moscow, 1983).

5. "Razvivayushchiesya strany v sovremennom mire: Yedinstvo i mnogoobrazie" [The Developing Countries in Today's World: Unity and Diversity], Moscow, 1983, p 27; also see "Vostok. Rubezh 80-kh godov. Osvobodivshiesya strany v sovremennom mire," p 80.

6. See, for example, "Razvivayushchiesya strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsialnyy progress" [Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress], Moscow, 1983, pp 594-595; "Traditsionnyye struktury i ekonomicheskii rost v Indii" [Traditional Structures and Economic Growth in India], Moscow, 1984, pp 246, 250-251.

7. See, for example, Ya.N. Guzevatyy's statement that "the choice of dependent capitalist development, with its colossal rate of unemployment and partial employment, poverty, and hunger, is becoming completely unacceptable to the emerging countries.... By the same token, there is a particularly urgent need for a transfer to the socialist orientation in the interest of stepped-up social progress" ("Trudovyye resursy Vostoka. Demografo-ekonomicheskiye problemy" [The East's Labor Resources. Demographic-Economic Issues], Moscow, 1987, p 293).

8. For a discussion of the potential for the development of productive forces on the basis of small-scale production in agriculture, see A.V. Chayanov, "Ocherki po ekonomike trudovogo selskogo khozyaystva" [Essays on the Economic Aspects of Labor-Based Agriculture], Moscow, 1923.

9. See, for example, "Traditsionnyye struktury i ekonomicheskii rost v Indii," pp 244-252.

10. "Razvivayushchiesya strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsialnyy progress," p 357.

11. For a discussion of the latter, see V. Krylov, "Labor Resources and Employment in Africa," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1979, No 8.

12. B.I. Slavnyy, "Nemarksistskaya politekonomiya o problemakh otstalosti i zavisimosti v razvivayushchemy mire" [Non-Marxist Political Economy on the Problems of Underdevelopment and Dependence in the Developing World], Moscow, 1982, pp 199-207.

13. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 274; vol 41, p 6.

14. I. Zorina and V. Sheynis, "Brazil and Argentina in Today's World," *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH-DUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, 1987, No 8.

Iran's Khomeini Profiled

18070122 Moscow *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA* in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 20-24

[Article by S. Aliyev: "Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini"]

[Text] As soon as the rumors that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had left Iran began circulating in Tehran in the morning of 16 January 1979, spontaneous celebrations were launched everywhere. The evening newspapers in the capital came out with huge headlines: "The Shah Is Gone!" The Iranian monarch was forced to leave after protracted confrontations between the revolutionary masses and the shah's regime.

The shah left Tehran when the revolutionary movement was reaching its peak. At the end of 1978 the peasants, the most politically passive segment of the Iranian public, joined the mass demonstrations, and the army began disintegrating as more and more soldiers and junior officers went over to the people's side. The revolution was acquiring a genuinely national character. Shahpur Bakhtiar, the bourgeois liberal whose appointment as premier had been approved by the Majlis (parliament) just before the shah's departure, was unable to win the recognition of the opposition. The erosion of the shah's regime grew more pronounced with each day.

"The Imam Is Here!"

The evening editions of the leading Tehran newspapers came out with another huge headline on 1 February 1979: "The Imam Is Here!" Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, who had become the indisputable leader of the movement against the shah through the vigorous efforts of the Shiite clergy and the peculiarities of the Iranian situation, had returned to Tehran on a special flight from Paris with his closest advisers. The very next day, Khomeini, who had been greeted by several million inhabitants of Tehran and residents of the provinces who had made a special trip to the capital, went to the Bekhesht-e Zakhra cemetery, the final resting place of the people who had lost their lives in the revolutionary demonstrations of 1978 and 1979.

The Iranian documentary film of the Ayatollah Khomeini's first speech in the cemetery to a multitude of his supporters accurately records the most important details of this historic event. The "Great Ayatollah," who began to be called imam by his followers after he arrived in Tehran, took one look at the huge crowd of Iranians and knew that they would be in his power from that time on. The documentary record of this meeting shows how the

former leader of the opposition effectively became the leader of the one of the most important states in the Middle East literally within just a few minutes. Khomeini saw the collective jubilation of the crowd of people as acknowledgement of his supreme position in the spiritual and political leadership of the country. Throwing off the shackles of the cult of the shah, the Iranians then created a new cult honoring Khomeini.

Who is Khomeini and how did he reach the pinnacle of power?

Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini was born on 24 September 1902 in Khomeyn, a city located 220 kilometers southwest of the Iranian capital. His grandfather Said Ahmad was born in Kashmir. During a pilgrimage to Iraq he met and made friends with an Iranian landowner from Khomeyn. Said Ahmad married the man's daughter and settled in Khomeyn. His son Mustafa received a religious education in the well-known Shiite center of An Najaf (Iraq) and then became the leading clergyman in Khomeyn after his return. Ruhollah was Mustafa's youngest son. He was not even 5 months old when his father was killed by the relatives of an inhabitant of the city who had been executed on Mustafa's orders for breaking the Ramadan fast.

Ruhollah received his elementary education at home. When he was 19 he went to Arak and became a taleb (student) in a madrasa. In 1922 he moved to Qom, where he continued studying various Islamic subjects. In 1925 he met a rich religious leader in Tehran and married his 10-year-old daughter soon afterward. This marriage played a perceptible role in Ruhollah Khomeini's life by strengthening his financial status. In 1937 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca and then stayed in An Najaf for a long time on his return trip. It was here that Khomeini made friends with members of Ikhvan al-muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood), a militant Muslim organization. He also perfected his knowledge of Arabic in Iraq and studied the works of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideologist al-Banna, which were banned in Iran.

In 1938 Khomeini returned to Qom. Judging by all indications, his acquaintance with the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood made a strong impression on him. In a short work published in 1942, Khomeini harshly condemned the anti-clerical and anti-Shiite tendencies in Iranian social life. In particular, he vehemently attacked the journalistic articles of prominent Iranian historian Akhmad Kesravi, who had developed the idea of some kind of "pure religion" as an alternative to Shia. Kesravi openly criticized Shiite clericalism.

In the 1940's Khomeini did much to consolidate the material and financial basis of the top-level Shiite clerics in Qom. He made frequent trips to remote parts of the country to ask merchants, craftsmen, and other strata of the population to "perform their religious duty"—to pay their Shiite taxes.

Khomeini's vigorous political activity during that period is also attested to by his meeting with the shah. In 1946 the previously mentioned Kesravi was brutally murdered in the Ministry of Justice building where he worked by members of Fedayan-e Islam, a militant Shiite organization. The members of this organization intended to promote the "rebirth of Islam" by annihilating the "enemies of Islam" and the "servants of imperialism." Many authors believe that the organization's decision to kill Kesravi was influenced by the treatise Khomeini had published in 1942. It is indicative that Khomeini was a member of the delegation of five mullahs who traveled from Qom to the capital to ask the shah to set aside the death sentence of the man directly responsible for murdering Kesravi. The shah agreed to receive one of the mullahs. It was Ruhollah Khomeini. An indicative detail of the meeting is that when Khomeini arrived at the shah's palace, he was warned to remain standing while he waited for the monarch and to sit down only after he had been invited to do so by the shah. When Mohammad Reza entered the room a half hour later, however, he saw that Khomeini had already taken a seat. The monarch followed his example. The shah satisfied the clergy's request and the execution was canceled.

Khomeini's political activity was less noticeable during the years of the movement for the nationalization of the English oil company in Iran (1949-1953). During these years Khomeini was preoccupied with his work as a teacher in the theological madrasa in Qom and was writing a book on the Shariat. He also had secular concerns. Khomeini and two of his brothers earned a large income from their land holdings. According to one of his biographers, Amir Takheri, the land belonging to the Khomeini brothers was already being worked by around 3,000 tenant farmers at that time. The same author reports that Khomeini the property owner was distinguished by noble characteristics: He distributed a large part of his income as scholarships to madrasa students attending his classes.

Advancement to Center Stage

Khomeini's loud and even sensational advancement to the center of the political stage took place at the beginning of the 1960's. Even before the Iranian leadership had begun instituting the agrarian and other reforms known as the "white revolution," a bill on province and governorate anjumans (councils), giving women the right to vote, had been drafted and sent to the Majlis for ratification. The bill named the "sacred book," and not the Koran, as the sacred item on which candidates for anjuman membership would be sworn in. This implied the possibility of using the Bible or other "holy scriptures." The Shiite ulama from Qom saw these innovations as a threat to the interests of Islam and to themselves. The bill was published in newspapers on 8 October 1962. In telegrams and letters to the shah and Prime Minister A. Alam, mullahs said that the bill was

contrary to the spirit and letter of the Iranian Constitution and the basic principles of the Shariat. Ruhollah Khomeini was one of those who refused to make compromises with the palace and government. His letters to Prime Minister Alam were extremely vehement. In one of them Khomeini wrote: "You intend to divest the Koran of its official status and...give our enemies a chance to betray Islam and Iran."

This was soon followed by a new conflict between the Shiite ulama and the court. The shah actively supported an idea put forth by the liberal wing of ruling circles with the support of the United States—the idea of instituting reforms to stimulate the development of capitalist relations in Iranian rural areas. The agrarian reform the government planned to institute was expected to eliminate large semifeudal land holdings and would also hurt the interests of the high clergy. Prominent mullahs unanimously expressed dissatisfaction with the agrarian reform, with the authorities' policies on culture and everyday life, and particularly with the new family legislation extending certain political rights to women and envisaging the development of bourgeois practices at the expense of tradition, Westernization on a broader scale, and the more intense propaganda of the monarchy and the pre-Islamic civilization in Iran. The Shiite ulama believed that measures to strengthen the power of the Pahlavi monarchy would gradually weaken their own position. The mounting opposition feelings among the Shiite religious and political leaders not connected with the government were given strong momentum at that time by the shah's broader military and political contacts with the West, especially the United States, and secret friendly contacts with the leaders of Israel. As the authoritarian features of the shah's regime grew more pronounced, relations between the opposition Shiite clergy and the court acquired antagonistic features. The first overt expression of opposition feelings by the clergy took place in 1963, and by this time the Ayatollah Khomeini had become one of the prominent leaders of this group. The ulama were the ideological leaders of, and active participants in, the June uprisings which were brutally suppressed by the authorities.

After the events of June 1963 the shah and his closest advisers established firm control over the activities of the ulama. In spite of repeated arrests, however, Khomeini continued his vehement attacks on the shah's regime. Khomeini's public condemnation of some laws passed by the Iranian parliament and ratified by the shah had great repercussions in 1964. These laws granted American advisers diplomatic immunity and envisaged an American loan of 200 million dollars for the purchase of weapons and materiel. In the statements Khomeini made in this connection, he called the actions of the shah's regime another serious step toward Iran's loss of its own sovereignty and its transformation into a state dependent on the United States.

In November 1964 Khomeini was arrested and was then exiled to Turkey. In 1965 he was allowed to move to Iraq, where he settled in An Najaf. Relations between

Iraqi leaders and the shah of Iran were unfriendly in the second half of the 1960's and the early 1970's, and this gave Khomeini a chance to resume his opposition political activity.

In An Najaf Khomeini presented a series of lectures, reflecting his sociopolitical views, to madrasa students at the end of the 1960's. Although his views on various issues changed during the course of the revolution of 1978-1979 and after he took power, his beliefs about the political role of Islam, about the Islamic state and the position of the clergy in it, were the same beliefs he had expressed in those lectures, which were published in the early 1970's.

What are the most significant elements of Khomeini's political views?

Political Views

The idea of restoring the power of Islam occupies a prominent place in Khomeini's political views. He feels that the main reason for the extreme backwardness of the Muslim countries is the spread of the Western politico-military and economic influence in the Muslim world. He asserts that the Muslims would be able to escape the dominance of the West and the "superpowers" if, first of all, the broad masses and underprivileged classes could rise up in a struggle against the foreign oppressors and, second, if political solidarity could be established between Muslim nations. Khomeini has stressed that the struggle against the dominance of foreign powers should be combined with a struggle against the rulers and groups in the Muslim world who are actually serving the foreigners. Although Khomeini is usually referring to the West when he speaks of colonialism and imperialism, he nevertheless includes the USSR and PRC among the "superpowers" against whose power and influence the Muslims must fight. Khomeini, just as many other ideologists of radical or fundamentalist Islam, believes that the liberation of the Muslim countries from the influence of the West and the East will ultimately aid in turning them into a powerful political camp with the potential to play an extremely important role in world politics.

One of the most significant components of Khomeini's views is his idea about the clergy's role in government. The Prophet Muhammad, Khomeini maintains, established the laws of Allah on earth. The Shiite imams are the legitimate heirs of the prophet. Khomeini also includes the *faghi*—acknowledged Muslim theologians—among the direct and full-fledged heirs of Muhammad. Citing remarks by the founder of Islam, Khomeini asserts in the treatise "*Valayat-e faghi*" that the *ulama* are "Muhammad's direct heirs."

In other words, Khomeini believes that the birth of a truly Islamic state will be possible only if the inherited functions ("*falayat*") of the *faghi* are reinstated—i.e., if supreme power is concentrated in the hands of the

ulama. This belief is reflected in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). One of its articles says that the institution of the "*valayat-e faghi*" principle is an essential condition for the establishment of a truly Muslim form of government.

How did Khomeini and his colleagues manage to assume leadership of the popular masses who stormed the shah's regime and to create a new political structure, essentially corresponding to the clerical-theocratic doctrine described above, by basing their political views on traditional Shiite thinking?

This phenomenon is probably a result of the peculiarities of the political situation in Iran, which allowed Khomeini's supporters to seize positions of leadership in the popular movement. An equally significant role was played by the subjective factor, especially Khomeini's own image and his personal contribution to the opposition politico-ideological current which cannot be called anything other than Khomeinist. The image of a religious leader living a simple, modest, and even ascetic life, who had suffered greatly at the hands of the authorities for his courageous condemnation of the shah's pro-imperialist and anti-national policies—this image seized the imagination of the broad masses and inspired them to wage an uncompromising struggle against the despotic regime.

Even before the beginning of the revolutionary events in Iran, when Khomeini was living in An Najaf, he devoted a great deal of time and energy to preparations for the role of political leader. He carefully studied the history of the Muslim countries. He simultaneously worked on improving his diction to get rid of his provincial accent, learned new social and political words and phrases, and tried to improve his style of public speaking. Khomeini attached equal importance to the democratization of the content of statements addressed to the masses. In An Najaf, and to an even greater extent during his stay in France (from 6 October 1978 to 1 February 1979), Khomeini took the wishes of participants in mass anti-government demonstrations into consideration and paid closer attention to sociopolitical issues in his speeches and sermons: the need to improve the difficult life of underprivileged strata, to eliminate the authoritarian power of the shah, to liberate Iran from imperialist domination and consolidate its political sovereignty, and to sever relations with Israel, South Africa, and Sadat's Egypt. Khomeini's ability to express the feelings of the masses, feelings engendered in the wave of revolutionary demonstrations, did the most to turn Khomeini into a symbol of struggle against the shah's regime.

Iran's bourgeois leaders obviously misjudged Khomeini and they were particularly mistaken in their assessment of his attitude toward liberal segments of the bourgeoisie. They learned, however, that although Khomeini would not reject the assistance of the liberals and army leaders, he had no intention of defending their political interests. He allowed bourgeois liberals to take part in

the activities of the Council of the Islamic Revolution, the provisional government, and other organs of power only on specific terms (they had to withdraw from their own organizations) and only as long as they did not reveal any pro-capitalist, pro-Western interests or attitudes.

When Khomeini returned to Iran after the fall of the shah's regime, he first went to Qom in a display of reluctance to participate directly in governing the country. At the same time, he made certain that the political process would not escape his control. He did not participate directly in drafting the new constitution, but he ultimately made certain that it clearly stipulated his views on the supreme authority of Muslim theologians. This idea is combined in the basic law of the IRI with political institutions of a bourgeois nature (a parliament, a president, a cabinet of ministers, etc.). The rights of the government and parliament are severely restricted by the extraordinary powers and privileges granted to the "leader" of the IRI, who is Khomeini, and an assembly of experts, consisting of 12 authoritative Shiite ulama, without whose authorization bills passed by the Majlis cannot become law. Supreme authority is essentially acquiring the nature of dictatorship by the ahunds (mullahs).

As Khomeini and his political-religious associates consolidated their supreme power, they displayed increasing intolerance for groups and currents participating actively in the revolution but not agreeing completely with Khomeini's views. When Khomeini decided to eradicate U.S. influence and gradually remove bourgeois liberals from positions of power, he showed no reluctance at first to rely on the support of leftist democratic forces. He skillfully took advantage of disagreements between leftist democrats and pro-Western liberal groups in his own interest. During this stage of changes, the ayatollah and his colleagues displayed perceptible tolerance for leftist democratic organizations which did not oppose the new regime, but when the process of removing liberals from the system of public administration had been completed at the beginning of the 1980's, the leader of the IRI found an excuse to accuse leftist organizations, which had been quite loyal to him, of betrayal and of secret collaboration with the Soviet Union. This paved the way for the systematic repression of members of the Iranian People's Party (Tudeh).

In the belief that the model political structure established in Iran could function only under the uncontested authority of Shiite ideology, Khomeini published an ukase in June 1980 on a so-called Islamic cultural revolution in the country. This document ordered the Islamization of instruction in schools and in specialized and higher academic institutions. In the broader context, the "Islamic cultural revolution" envisaged measures to bring all spheres of social and cultural life in line with Shiite standards and beliefs. The establishments created

to carry out this order have prepared and published an entire series of textbooks in which philosophical and social ideals are presented in line with the teachings of Khomeini and Shia.

Khomeini associates his own political doctrine with the idea of the Muslim renaissance. The restoration of the Muslim world's earlier power, in the opinion of Khomeini, will require stronger Islamic solidarity in the struggle against the influence of what he calls the "super-powers of the East and West." He wants Iran to offer maximum moral support to the extremist petty bourgeois movements operating in other countries under fundamentalist Islamic slogans. The export of the ideas of the "Islamic revolution" has become an important component of IRI policy. In several of his statements and speeches, Khomeini has developed the idea of the need for the spiritual and political unification of Muslims. Regarding national movements as something dividing the Muslim peoples, Khomeini has advised the integration of the Muslim world on the basis of a single ideology—of course, a Shiite-Khomeinist ideology.

Khomeini is convinced that the dissemination of the Iranian experience could turn the Muslim countries into a united politico-military system with the potential to pursue an autonomous foreign policy, free of foreign influence.

A Refusal To Face Reality

The Khomeinist ideas about the unity and solidarity of the Muslim countries are not consistent, however, with many of the foreign policy actions of the IRI, especially its leadership's attitude toward the war with Iraq until recently. Saying that the broad-scale hostilities were initiated by the Iraqi side, Khomeini refused to accept Baghdad's proposal to negotiate a truce. Nevertheless, common sense finally prevailed. Iran agreed to recognize UN Security Council Resolution 598, requesting the warring sides to agree to a cease-fire without delay.

In the religious propaganda which is being conducted intensively in Iran, extreme fanaticism and asceticism are closely interwoven with the cultivation of imamite Shia's traditional martyrdom for the faith, for the sake of a "divine kingdom" on earth meeting Muslim standards. Thousands of Iranian young men and even children who were deceived by this propaganda sacrificed their lives in the many years of fratricidal warfare. It effectively provided the United States and its allies with an excuse for a buildup of air and naval forces in the Persian Gulf and the approaches to it, which perceptibly increased the danger of the internationalization of the conflict.

This naturally makes us wonder why Khomeini was so adamant in advocating the continuation of this warfare. Did he realize that Iran had reached an impasse?

The Iran-Iraq conflict has been complicated by the clash between two politico-ideological currents: fundamentalist Shiite Islam on one side and Arab-Iraqi nationalism on the other. The continuous expansion of petty bourgeois movements painted in Islamic hues in the Muslim countries is reinforcing Khomeini's illusions and feeding his excessive confidence in the viability of his political views. Because Khomeini has so much faith in the religious dogmas he has politicized and is so convinced that he is right and that he has been chosen for a special mission, it is unlikely that anyone or anything could make him change his mind. And who among his associates would try to do this? The waves of the Islamic movements are keeping the imam from seeing the distinct outlines of the future behind them.

The enchanting prospect of an Islamic renaissance is also keeping Khomeini from taking a realistic look at the internal situation in Iran. When Khomeini took power, he and his closest associates promised that they would consolidate the country's sovereignty and lead it onto the road of economic autonomy. "Laborers and the underprivileged" were promised radical improvements in their financial and social status. Other promises concerned the reduction of differences between urban and rural conditions, self-sufficiency in food supplies, the eradication of illiteracy, the provision of all families with housing, and the improvement of public health services. All of these declarations were recorded in the Constitution of the IRI, which said that the exploitation of some people by others would be eliminated in the country. Under the conditions of protracted war, however, the social problems in Iran have not been solved and have even grown more acute.

It would be wrong to ignore the fact that Iran's independence was strengthened when the Khomeinists took power. The direct Western intervention in Iranian policymaking ceased. The domination of the Iranian economy by the United States and the transnational corporations came to an end. All treaties, agreements, and contracts with the United States were declared null and void. The pro-Western grand bourgeoisie and the generals of the shah's army were exiled. All of the large industrial banks were nationalized. The CENTO pact collapsed as a result of Iran's withdrawal. Iran broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and South Africa, and later with the United States as well.

At the same time, the social revolution which had begun and which was so necessary to the popular masses gradually lost speed. As the new regime grew stronger, Khomeini concentrated on the Islamization of all facets of social and cultural life because he felt that this was essential for the creation of a Muslim society of social justice. By 1980 the authorities had suppressed the agrarian reform, citing the war with Iraq as the reason for this action.

The powerful state sector which had grown so strong in the Iranian economy in the 1970's retained its position under Khomeini. In fact, its role and functions in the

economy and the social sphere are much stronger. At the same time, by erecting serious obstacles to impede the development of big private capital, the Khomeini regime has inhibited the growth of private economic capitalism; the influential conservative group of ulama represented by the members of the Assembly of Experts systematically rejects all bills of a bourgeois-democratic nature the Majlis approves. The further expansion of the social and economic functions of the state sector is being blocked in the same way.

At the beginning of 1988 Khomeini tried to lessen the friction in the upper echelons of government by sending President Sayyed Ali Khamenei of Iran a message to inform him that the Iranian Government has the broadest powers and is authorized to investigate and settle all matters pertaining to the society and the state.

Khomeini's formal explanation was designed to put some limits on the powers of the Assembly of Experts, which had frequently given the government no chance to function normally. We can agree completely, however, with the political scientists who feel that the deadlock in Iranian policy—domestic and foreign—cannot be surmounted as long as conservative theologians retain positions of leadership in the country. Within the context of conflicting petty bourgeois and idealistic religious views, the attempts to solve problems connected with the further development of the society, to avoid the genuine democratization of property relations, and to eliminate politico-ideological disagreements by means of repression from above will ultimately fail. Many of the conflicts which led to the sociopolitical crisis in Iran at the end of the 1970's are now tearing the country apart once again.

Role of Working Class in "Newly Industrialized Zones"

18070122 Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 26-19

[Article by I. Shin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] As we know, when V.I. Lenin was discussing the establishment and development of the capitalist structure, he stressed that "the process is the same, but it takes different forms."¹ Different sets of historical circumstances are the reason for the distinctive features displayed by the general trends of capitalist development in each specific case and for the many different varieties of capitalist structures. One such variety, in our opinion, is the phenomenon of the "new industrial nations" (NIN). In this article we will take a look at the "Third World" countries and territories which have reached a high level of capitalist development within a relatively short time (within two decades on the average), such as Hong Kong (Xianggang), Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea.

Which factors contributed to the birth of the East Asian "new industrial zone"? First of all, there was the transition from import-replacement to the development of

export sectors and the reorientation of industrial production from the limited domestic market to the foreign market. This, however, required a substantial increase in capital investments and the use of more advanced production technology, which led to imports of capital and technology. In this way, the export strategy and the "open-door policy" promoted the intensive integration of the Far Eastern states into the world capitalist economy.

A group of features typical of the laboring public in the East Asian NIN's played an important role. These are the low cost of labor, guaranteeing a high profit margin, the workers' level of education, which is relatively high for developing countries, and some sociopsychological features developed under the influence of the Confucian code of ethics (a strong sense of discipline, allegiance to hierarchical superiors, etc.).

These factors and conditions did much to speed up the development of production forces in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. Furthermore, the main productive force in society—the working class—underwent a significant qualitative and quantitative evolution. The working class of the "new industrial zone" in East Asia began growing rapidly in the early 1960's. By the middle of the 1980's it represented the largest social group in these societies (with the exception of South Korea, where petty bourgeois strata predominate): In Hong Kong workers represented 50.5 percent of the entire employed population (in 1981), in Singapore they represented 37.8 percent (1983), in Taiwan the figure was 40.3 percent (1985), and in South Korea it was 25.9 percent (1985). The growth of the industrial proletariat was particularly intensive (9-11 percent a year on the average). Now the overwhelming majority of workers (up to 90 percent) work in the industrial sector, and only 1 out of 10 is employed in agriculture or in the service sphere.

Small property owners and the members of their families are the main reserve for the growth of the working class in the NIN's. Many workers come from the ranks of the rural poor, and their level of education is usually lower than that of urban workers. Because of this, they are usually concentrated in small enterprises. In Hong Kong and Singapore the working class is growing because of the addition of petty bourgeois elements from neighboring states. Emigrants from the PRC and the countries of Indochina live in Hong Kong, and emigrants from Malaysia and South Asia have settled in Singapore. In recent years people have been coming to Singapore from Hong Kong, South Korea, Macau, and Taiwan. It is interesting that less than 60 percent of the inhabitants of Hong Kong, according to the 1961 census, were born there. Most of the rest are from the PRC and came to Hong Kong just after the popular revolution in 1949 or during the period of the "Cultural Revolution." In the second half of the 1970's there was a new wave of emigration to Hong Kong, this time from Vietnam, including huaqiao and the remnants of the Saigon army. The first foreign workers arrived in Singapore in 1968,

when the domestic labor market had been virtually depleted and there was a manpower shortage in labor-intensive sectors specializing in the production of export goods. Between 1970 and 1980 the percentage of foreign specialists and workers in the employed population rose from 2 to 11 percent. Emigrant labor was mainly used in sectors not requiring highly skilled labor.

Another reason for the rapid growth of the working class in the "new industrial nations" is the intensive inclusion of women in national production. In the last two and a half decades the percentage of women in the economically active population has risen from around 20 to 35 percent in Taiwan and Singapore, from 39 to 46 percent in Hong Kong, and from 29 to 38 percent in South Korea. The biggest increase has been seen in the processing industry and trade. The electronics, textile, and garment industries, where most of the workers are women, are distinguished by a high rate of personnel turnover: The overwhelming majority of these workers are young women who generally quit their jobs after they get married.

It is significant that many of the workers in the countries of the "new industrial zone" are employed in large-scale production. Hong Kong, where small businesses predominate, is probably the only exception. In Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, large production units have absorbed around 60 percent of the labor army.

The high concentration of workers in production has been accompanied by a high level of territorial concentration in South Korea and Singapore. In South Korea most of the workers are concentrated in the country's four main industrial centers—Seoul, Inch'on, Pusan, and Taegu. The situation in Singapore—the city and the state—needs no explanation. In Taiwan the level of territorial concentration is somewhat lower because of the even distribution of industrial productive forces. Most of the industrial enterprises are still in rural locations, and half of the Taiwanese workers therefore work in rural communities.

The production and territorial concentration of workers in the "new industrial zone" is the reason for the social heterogeneity of the working class. In addition to the growing nucleus of skilled labor, there are several transitional groups: the semiproletariat (in Taiwan and in South Korea, where many peasants are employed by rural industrial enterprises), the worker-craftsmen (in all of the East Asian NIN's, but especially in Hong Kong), etc.

This social heterogeneity is reflected in the differentiation of workers by wage levels. The main criterion is the level of skills. This is the principal reason for the substantial property distinctions between different groups. The groups on the two extreme points of the scale in terms of skills and, consequently, wages are the workers of modern high-technology production units,

most of which are large enterprises controlled by foreign or local capital with a high level of production concentration and with a labor force consisting mainly of young men, and the workers of small workshops, where most of the labor is manual and the production technology is quite simple. The workers in this sector are frequently connected to their bosses by patriarchal bonds. Most of them are single young women. The substratum of middle-aged and elderly people is quite large in rural areas.

As a result of these differences in wages, a skilled worker in Taiwan, for example, is paid 35 percent more than a common laborer. The difference is approximately the same (40 percent) between the wages of the worker at a large enterprise and his colleague in a small workshop. In South Korea and Hong Kong the respective indicators are 25 and 34 percent. The difference in the wages paid to men and women can range from 30 to 50 percent in the "new industrial nations."

Ethnic discord between the native population and workers of other nationalities is the cause of more pronounced social heterogeneity in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (but, of course, to differing degrees). In Taiwan, however, the situation has been changing in the last decade: The problems connected with social inequality have superseded conflicts between local and mainland Chinese. In Singapore the tension in ethnic relations is escalated by the government's discriminatory policies. Problems are also aggravated by the authorities' harsh treatment of foreign workers (but not of highly skilled specialists). Ethnic problems are most acute in Hong Kong, where the local population treats emigrants with extreme hostility because it regards them as the cause of such acute social problems as overpopulation, the pressures of social inequality, the colossal unemployment, the rising crime rate, etc.

The ruling regimes in the "new industrial nations" are trying to intensify the social heterogeneity of the workers and impede the development of class consciousness by subordinating it to the cultivation of Confucian standards and patriarchal stereotypes.

In our opinion, the governments of the NIN's are relying most heavily on two methods. The first consists in limiting the already negligible opportunities of the working class. They are passing new laws which severely restrict strikes, collective bargaining, trade-union activity, etc. This method is used in conjunction with a second method, consisting in the creation of a supra-class, corporative worker mentality and the integration of workers into the "new Confucian society." The level and scales of this influence differ in the "new industrial nations" of this region.

It is most comprehensive and concentrated in Singapore, where the state is using virtually every means at its disposal for this purpose. The relatively high wages (the highest in the region), the construction of inexpensive housing, the development of a large network of public

health and education establishments, the organization of trade-union cooperatives, the use of the mechanism of financial incentives by selling enterprise stock to workers and thereby creating the illusion of "profit-sharing," etc.—these are the main elements of the economic foundation of the Singapore Government's policy on labor. With the aid of these political and ideological levers, it has established complete control over the working class and the trade unions.

After crushing the leftist current in the labor movement at the beginning of the 1960's, the authorities in Singapore decided to turn the trade unions into an instrument of ideological pressure under the auspices of the National Trade Unions Congress (NTC). At an NTC conference in 1967, the government and the ruling People's Action Party issued an appeal to the trade unions to "acknowledge the priority of economic development" and support the program of industrialization. The NTC leadership tried to substitute "national" interests for class interests by assuring the regime that the trade unions would act as the government's "partner" in the creation of an "integrated society" and by announcing that the main purpose of the labor movement would hereafter be the "enhancement of labor productivity." The system of financial incentives was "set in motion" at the same time: A network of NTC joint-stock enterprises was established to offer the members of the organizations belonging to this central labor congress certain privileges (dividends, privileged access to some goods and services, etc.), bonuses were established for higher labor productivity (only for NTC members), etc.

This caused a rift between the NTC leadership and most of the rank-and-file members, who were dissatisfied with the reformist degeneration of the congress and its resulting conciliatory stance. In the middle of the 1970's there were several large demonstrations by the working class in Singapore, during which this dissatisfaction was expressed quite clearly. The workers were supported by the leaders of several sectorial trade unions. The government responded by imposing more severe restrictions on the labor movement. Changes were made in the NTC charter in 1978 to concentrate power in the hands of the secretary general of the congress. Under these conditions, the sectorial trade unions became extremely dependent on his stance. Besides this, non-union members were allowed to occupy positions of leadership. This allowed the government to control the trade unions directly by planting its own officials in them.

In 1979 the new secretary general of the NTC decided to reorganize the trade unions by liquidating the large and influential organizations and creating small corporative ones. As a result, the membership of the NTC decreased from 236,000 in 1979 to 180,000 in 1985. In October 1985 the authorities launched a campaign to increase the NTC membership—again with the use of financial incentives. As a result, the number of members rose to 200,000 in 1986.

All of the instruments of economic, political, and ideological influence the ruling circles in Singapore are employing to exert pressure on the working class have been quite effective. According to official data, not one strike has been recorded in the country since 1978.

The working class in Taiwan and Hong Kong is also distinguished by civic passivity. The workers here have demonstrated for higher wages, severance pay, etc., but the influence of the authorities in these NIN's over the working class is not as comprehensive or sweeping as in Singapore.

The regime in Taiwan exerts primarily ideological pressure, using the powerful Kuomintang network and the news and propaganda media (the trade unions here constitute a network only in the nominal sense). Slogans are propagated at enterprises, such as "Your firm is your family," "Work for the company as you would work for yourself," "Regard your boss as the head of your family," etc. This kind of paternalistic demagoguery has a definite effect on the overwhelming majority of workers. This is a result of their Confucian philosophy, which has been perpetuated by the abovementioned distinctive features of the territorial distribution of the working class in Taiwan.

In Hong Kong the authorities influence the working class primarily with the aid of economic leverage (this country ranks second among the developing countries in the region in terms of wages). The administration's pressure is countered by the leftist trade unions, united in the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions. In the 1970's their strength was undermined considerably by government repression. As a result, the left wing of the movement became perceptibly less active. Under these conditions, the initiative was seized by the so-called "neutral" trade unions (consisting mainly of civil servants), and their position is rapidly growing stronger. Within just 3 years (1979-1982), the proportion of Federation of Trade Unions members among all organized workers declined from 67 to 58 percent. The proportion accounted for by the members of "neutral" trade unions, on the other hand, rose from 23.5 to 31.5 percent. The right wing of the labor movement also grew: Members of the Trade Union Congress of Hong Kong represented 11 percent instead of 9.5 percent. The growing influence of the "neutral" trade unions, fighting primarily for higher wages, has been accompanied by the predominance of the trade-unionist mentality among Hong Kong's workers.

In South Korea, just as in Taiwan, ruling circles have relied mainly on the ideological pressuring of the proletariat. To this end, they have used the so-called "Movement for a New Countryside," which was organized by the regime in 1970 and was initially addressed to the peasants and then, in the middle of the 1970's, to virtually all strata of the population. Its purpose is "national consolidation" for the sake of "common

national interests." The South Korean regime's attempts to integrate the working class in a system of "universal prosperity" of the Confucian type, however, have obviously failed.

The extremely difficult working conditions of South Korean workers (the lowest wages and the longest work week in the NIN's), the cruelty of the ruling regime, and some other factors are the reasons for the higher "temperature" of domestic politics and for the quicker elevation of the class and political consciousness of the country's working class.

In South Korea the pro-government trade unions are opposed by a strong alternative movement for independent trade unions. It came into being spontaneously in 1970 and has its own coordinating center—the South Korean Workers Mutual Assistance Committee, established in 1984. The committee's goal is the organization of the country's proletariat in a struggle for the establishment of truly class-based trade unions.

The South Korean workers' strike movement is growing. Furthermore, this tendency has acquired a fairly stable nature.² In summer 1987, under the conditions of the rapid growth of the democratic movement in South Korea, the struggle of the working class took on unprecedented dimensions. Around a hundred labor conflicts were recorded in just 3 months (from April to July). In August the strike movement reached its culminating point: All of the leading industrial centers in South Korea were swept by a wave of strikes that month, with hundreds of thousands of workers taking part in them.

There are some important qualitatively new features of the strike movement. These include, for example, the solidarity strike (which took place in Seoul in June 1985, when the workers of six companies organized a sit-down strike in support of the picketing members of a clothing factory union), or the first "common campaign" (national strike) held at the same time for the revision of existing labor legislation.

These examples are closely related to another tendency in the development of the South Korean labor movement—the intensification of its political nature. The demands of workers are no longer confined to the sphere of economic interests, although these issues, we repeat, are extremely important to South Korean labor because there is no official minimum wage and no unemployment compensation in South Korea. The slogans of the workers' struggle are becoming increasingly political. During one of the largest demonstrations (at the beginning of the 1970's), independent trade unions came into being spontaneously as a form of struggle. The first union was organized by the striking workers in Chongyo, Seoul's industrial district. Ever since the middle of the 1970's workers have been demonstrating for the democratization of public affairs. During the summer demonstrations of 1987 they demanded the elimination of the dictatorial regime.

The National Democratic Front of South Korea (NDF), an offshoot of the Revolutionary Unification Party (RUP), a Marxist party established in 1964, is assisting in the political organization of the working class. For more than 20 years the RUP had to operate underground. When the democratic movement in the country entered a new phase in the middle of the 1980's, the party decided to expand its social base. The main goals of the NDF are an anti-imperialist, national-liberation revolution and the removal of the ruling elite, the members of which represent the interests of American imperialism and the comprador monopolist bourgeoisie.

The leftist students, whose views are similar in many respects to the Marxist philosophy, have been influencing the development of the labor movement since the beginning of the 1980's. The students have organized illegal political enlightenment groups among the workers and are conducting education and propaganda work.

The ideological influence of the bourgeois liberal opposition has also played a definite role in the development of the working class' political awareness. This has been seen most clearly in South Korea, where the opposition bourgeois liberal parties and the Christian churches (especially the Catholic churches) have been operating quite successfully among the workers.

Therefore, the class and political development of the South Korean proletariat (which has made the greatest advances in the "new industrial zone") attests to the birth of a tangible political force, resolved to take an active part in the country's democratic movement. The working class of the NIN's as a whole, however, is experiencing a phase of quantitative growth and is acquiring a class consciousness.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 180.

2. Between 1976 and 1980 the number of strikes increased 4.2-fold, the number of strikers increased 7.4-fold, and the number of strike days increased 3.6-fold. Between 1980 and 1980 the number of strikes increased by one-third, the number of strikers decreased by almost 40 percent, and the number of strike days remained approximately the same.

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Selected Articles from AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 12, Dec 88

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Trends in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 pp 2-5

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences P. Tsvetov: "The New Political Thinking in the Asian-Pacific Region"]

[Text] The Soviet Union, in its desire to seek all-encompassing international peace and security, is devoting more and more attention to the Asian-Pacific region. This region of the planet, the largest in population and with the prospect of becoming a center of world economics and politics in the next century and, at the same time, burdened by the arms race and a whole series of unsettled conflicts and unresolved problems, came into contact with the new political thinking two years ago, when CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, speaking in Vladivostok, set forth the Soviet program of restructuring relations in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Its aim is to achieve peace, security and collaboration in the region. Its principal elements are the political settlement of regional conflicts, a halt to the nuclear arms race, the creation of nuclear-free zones, restrictions on the activity of naval fleets in the Pacific and Indian ocean basins, reductions in armed forces and conventional arms, the elimination of military bases on foreign territory, confidence-building measures in the military realm and the setting up of equal and mutually advantageous collaboration among countries.

The next stage in the application of the new political thinking to the Asian-Pacific region was the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to India in November 1986. The Delhi Declaration, proclaiming the principles for achieving the innermost aspiration of mankind—a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons—was signed in the course of the visit. Among the most important of its principles are the following: peaceful co-existence as the universal norm for international relations, human life as the highest value, non-violence as the foundation of the life of the human community, mutual trust and understanding, the

right of every state to political and economic independence and the shifting of military spending to providing for social and economic development.

The New Proposals of the Soviet Union

Speaking in Krasnoyarsk on 16 Sep 88, M.S. Gorbachev advanced a new package of ideas and proposals aimed at reducing confrontation and military opposition in the Asian-Pacific region, developing trust and good-neighbor relations in the region and turning it into a zone of peace and collaboration. The Vladivostok program was further developed in Krasnoyarsk, and the adherence of the Soviet leadership to the new political thinking and openness in international affairs was affirmed. Issues of ensuring peace, unraveling knots of conflict and bridling the arms race were advanced to the fore in Krasnoyarsk as they were in Vladivostok.

In striving to advance the cause of general Asian security, the Soviet leadership has introduced seven new proposals:

- not to increase the quantity of nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union, the United States and other nuclear powers have at their disposal in the Asian-Pacific region;
- to hold consultations of the naval powers of the region on not enlarging navies there;
- to discuss on a multilateral basis the issue of reducing the confrontation of fleets and aircraft in regions where the shores of the USSR, the PRC, Japan, North Korea and South Korea are close together;
- to reject the use of some facilities on foreign territory by the naval forces of the USSR and the United States;
- to develop joint measures for averting incidents in the open sea and in the airspace over it;
- to hold, no later than 1990, an international conference on turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone;
- to discuss the issue of creating a negotiating mechanism for considering the proposals of the Soviet Union and any other states on issues of ensuring security in the Asian-Pacific region.

To this series of initiatives could be joined the proposal to create a center for international collaboration for the peaceful utilization of space based on the Krasnoyarsk radar. This step has great significance for the prospects for global disarmament. It is well known, after all, that the United States, asserting that the construction of this radar station is a violation of the ABM Treaty, is impeding the Geneva negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

Speaking in Krasnoyarsk, M.S. Gorbachev also addressed the prospects for the collaboration of the peoples of the Asian-Pacific region in such spheres as ecology, the preservation and development of national traditions and the fight against natural disasters. Questions of the economic ties of the Soviet Far East and Siberia with the states of the Asian-Pacific region occupied a large place in the speech. It seems that these innovative proposals and far-reaching measures for making the foreign economic ties of these regions of the USSR more dynamic require the separate and detailed analysis of economists and scholars.

Question of the relations of the Soviet Union with individual states in the Asian-Pacific region were also considered in the Krasnoyarsk speech. In the face of the distinctive nature of the approach of the USSR to each of our foreign-policy partners, common to all is a genuine aspiration to improve and develop mutually advantageous relations and respect national interests. The Soviet leader came out in favor of including "popular diplomacy" more boldly in the everyday life of Asia and the Pacific. He proposed the creation of a regional center for cultural contacts among peoples for this purpose. Joint humanitarian research could be conducted and contacts among the citizens of different countries accomplished within the framework of this social organization with national divisions.

Krasnoyarsk has become an important stage on the way to peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region. The new proposals testify to the determination of the Soviet Union to achieve a real shift in the situation in the region along with its readiness to take important steps on the road to detente. A clear projection of general approaches to global problems can be discerned in the ideas, addressed first and foremost to the whole Asian-Pacific community.

It is at the same time dispiriting that Washington hurried to say "no" to the Krasnoyarsk proposals. Without any reasoning whatsoever. Without counter-proposals. Without analysis. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston Sigur and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Richard Armitage, in their article in the NEW YORK TIMES, demanded of Moscow no more or less than some "entrance fee" for its peace proposals. It could be thought that the authors of the article do not know what changes are occurring in the world that have allowed M.S. Gorbachev to come forward with the new proposals.

The initiatives advanced in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk were not created out of thin air. "We have comprehensively interpreted the lessons of the past and the realities of today," said M.S. Gorbachev, "and have taken into account the ideas and initiatives, of course, of the socialist countries of Asia."

The approaches of the socialist states to issues of a military and political nature are of paramount significance today, when the chief task of mankind is to survive, to preserve civilization.

On the Road Toward the Settlement of Conflicts

Regional conflicts, even today depriving innocent people of life, are evil. They could become an even greater evil if a global conflict starts from them. And such a danger exists. Whence the importance of eliminating them in the shortest possible time.

Movement toward the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict has been noted in recent months. In the summer of 1987 the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea advanced a policy of national reconciliation and declared its intention to settle the Kampuchean problem by political methods. Two meetings were then held between the Chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, Hun Sen, and the leader of the opposition forces, Sihanouk. The "informal meeting" of the four Kampuchean sides to which Vietnam, Laos and six other members-countries of ASEAN were joined that was held at the end of July 1988 in the Indonesian city of Borog was an important event. Negotiations between Hun Sen and the leaders of two opposition groups—Prince N. Sihanouk and Son Sann—were concluded on November 8. The participants consented to the convening of an international conference on Kampuchea.

The movement in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict is first and foremost the result of the realistic approach of Vietnam and the PRC and the flexibility in their diplomacy. The acceleration of the realization of the plan to withdraw the Vietnamese volunteer units from the PRK has great significance in this regard. The seventh and largest withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchean territory began in the summer of this year. The Vietnamese military presence is being reduced not only by half quantitatively (by 50,000 men), but also qualitatively—the Vietnamese military command has been evacuated, and the Vietnamese servicemen remaining in Kampuchea are being transferred to the command of the PRK Ministry of Defense. The date of the complete withdrawal of the limited contingent has also been announced for the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990.

A Vietnamese-Thai dialogue on the Kampuchean problem is also being joined. Vietnamese diplomacy has taken advantage of visits to Thailand this year by SRV Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach for this purpose. The easing of tensions in Vietnamese-Thai relations will be aided by the decision not to station Vietnamese troops closer than 30 kilometers from the Kampuchean-Thai border. A unique reduced-armaments zone will arise along both sides of the border as the reciprocal step of Thailand.

The SRV and the PRK, demonstrating a genuine interest in establishing peace and good-neighbor relations in the region, are prepared to accept the assistance of the non-aligned movement, as well as the governments of individual countries, in the search for ways to settle the Kampuchean problem.

Unfortunately, not everything in the resolution of the Kampuchean question depends on the SRV and the PRK. The inflexible approach of some figures in the Khmer opposition, behind whom stand foreign forces, are impeding the process of national reconciliation. Direct negotiations between China and Vietnam, for which the latter has called repeatedly, could play an important role in resolving the Kampuchean problem, as was mentioned by M.S. Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk.

"The difficult situation on the Korean peninsula remains," noted M.S. Gorbachev on 16 Sep 88, "although signs of reaching a dialogue between north and south have begun to be discerned here as well." The Korean People's Democratic Republic is actively coming forward with proposals to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The government of North Korea is continuing to work on advancing the initiatives promulgated in January of 1984 on replacing the truce agreement in Korea with a peace treaty with the United States, as well as devising a declaration of non-aggression between north and south. A number of new proposals were advanced in 1988 as well.

The socialist countries of Asia have thus constantly demonstrated their goodwill and adherence to the settlement of disputes using exclusively political means and via dialogue.

For a Nuclear-Free Future

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the existence of mankind today. This is well understood in the socialist countries of Asia. And not only do they understand it, they are also taking the corresponding steps in the interests of a nuclear-free world.

It is well known that the socialist nuclear powers—the USSR and China—have officially declared that they will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons. The leaders of both states have also declared that their goal is the banning and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. And as is well known, the Soviet Union is already acting in that spirit, eliminating its intermediate- and short-range missiles in Asia, as well as in Europe, in complete accordance with the Soviet-American treaty.

Nuclear-free zones could become a real step toward a nuclear-free world. An understanding of this has impelled a widespread international campaign to create them which has not circumvented the Asian-Pacific region. The socialist countries of Asia are taking an

interested role in this process. New evidence of that is the presence of their representatives at the International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones that was held on June 20-22 in Berlin. NRPL [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Politburo member and acting President of the LNDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] Phoumi Vongvichit, speaking at the meeting, noted that it is of a burning topical nature "because the creation of nuclear-free zones responds to the intimate aspirations of peoples." The head of the Chinese delegation—the deputy chairman of the People's Political Consultative Council of China, Zhou Peiyuan—noted that the demand to create nuclear-free zones "reflects the just aspiration of the corresponding regions and countries for removing the threat of nuclear war and preserving peace and stability."

The USSR and the PRC have joined the protocols of the Raratonga Treaty, which declares the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. They have thereby taken on the obligation of not employing nuclear weapons and not threatening their use against the countries taking part in the South Pacific Forum as well as not allowing any nuclear explosive devices in the effective zone of the treaty. I remind you that the United States, Great Britain and France, to which the states of the South Pacific also appealed, have refused to do so.

The ASEAN idea to create a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, like the Raratonga Treaty, has also received a positive reaction from socialist countries of Asia.

The task of de-nuclearization is no less topical for the northern part of the Pacific than for the southern part. The United States has reserves of nuclear weapons on South Korean territory alone whose total explosive power is 13,000 kilotons. The nuclear-weapons delivery systems located on the southern part of the Korean peninsula are of a strategic nature by design, since they could strike targets in the neighboring socialist countries and not just in North Korea.

As early as in March of 1981, the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, along with the Socialist Party of Japan, published a declaration in which the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northeastern Asia was proposed. In June of 1986, the government of North Korea proposed in a special document the holding of negotiations with Washington and Seoul on the issue of removing nuclear weapons from South Korea in the interests of transforming the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. (There are no nuclear weapons on North Korean territory, and the republic observes the obligations arising out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it has signed.) These proposals, despite the support of broad world opinion, however, are receiving a negative answer from those to whom they are first and foremost addressed. Both Washington and Seoul do not want to dispense with the "nuclear umbrella" over South Korea.

The socialist countries of Asia have persistently come out in the international arena against shifting the arms race into space or improving all types of weapons of mass destruction.

For a World Without Weapons and Wars

The problem of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons is being discussed as heatedly as questions of nuclear disarmament in today's world. And this is understandable. Mankind cannot live peacefully if after the elimination of atomic, hydrogen and neutron bombs there remain mountains of conventional weapons, and the more so if more advanced non-nuclear weapons in targeting precision and destructive power come to replace the current models. This is understood overall in the Asian-Pacific region as well. But the situation in this part of the globe—where the United States is not ceasing its military preparations, where many border and territorial disputes have not been settled, where anti-government activity is often of an armed nature, where banditism and piracy are far from relics—objectively impedes the widespread acceptance of the idea of reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons.

The position of the socialist countries of Asia is positively singled out on this issue nonetheless, especially against a background of growth in military spending and the overall militarization of the capitalist countries of the region (for example, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore among others). Detente and a reduction in the level of military confrontation have been facilitated not only by the steps of the Soviet Union that are well known to all (for example, the intensively implemented withdrawal of the Soviet limited troop contingent from Afghanistan and reductions in the number of Soviet troops in Mongolia and along the Soviet-Chinese border), but also by some actions by the other socialist countries. One million people have been demobilized from the ranks of the People's Liberation Army of China. The number of units of the Vietnamese People's Army in Kampuchea and Laos, at the invitation of the governments of those two countries, has declined appreciably as the result of their return to the homeland. A significant quantity of units and subunits of the Korean People's Army were transferred to the construction of domestic economic facilities in 1986.

I would like to note in connection with the last example that the use of the labor of servicemen and military equipment in the national economy is quite widespread in China and Vietnam. Proof of the real possibility of reducing the armed forces can be seen in this as well. An army in which some of the personnel are engaged in non-military activities could easily be reduced at the expense of those units. This is confirmed by the proposal of North Korea that was made in July of last year for the stage-by-stage reduction of the armies of North and South Korea to 100,000 men over 1988-91 linked with a corresponding stage-by-stage evacuation of American troops and their nuclear arms from South Korea.

There would be greater opportunities for the process of disarmament in Asia if an atmosphere of trust were established in the region, if a different system of relations among states predominated. The initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic to create a mechanism ruling out the use of force in relations among the states of Asia and the Pacific would aid in this to a certain extent. This proposal, first advanced in 1981 at the 18th MNRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Congress and affirmed at the 19th Congress in 1986, envisages the creation of a legal treaty mechanism that would legally consolidate mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of state boundaries, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, non-application of force or the threat of force, settlement of disputed issues by exclusively peaceful means and development of mutually advantageous collaboration in the practice of mutual relations among the states of the region. The provisions envisaging the active efforts of states to reduce military confrontation and restrain the arms race and for disarmament should occupy an important place in this mechanism, according to the idea of our Mongolian comrades. This Mongolian initiative has received a favorable reply from many of the countries of Asia, including the USSR, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and North Korea.

The incarnation of the proposal of the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea that was sounded at their meeting in August of 1986 in Hanoi could serve in the future as a step toward a world without wars and weapons. The essence of it is the creation of a framework for peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia that would guard the region from foreign aggression, interference and threats. The three countries of Indochina are ready to collaborate with the ASEAN member nations and other states in the region as well, as all countries seeking peace in Southeast Asia, so as to transform that region into a zone of peace and stability in accordance with the principles of peaceful co-existence.

The Laotian People's Democratic Republic recently came forward with a new initiative relating to Southeast Asia. Its representative at the aforementioned "informal meeting" in Bogora set forth a platform of seven points aimed at creating a new system of relations among the countries of the region. These proposals envisage turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality, friendship and collaboration free of nuclear weapons, the non-participation of the countries in the region in military alliances, intolerance of the use of one's territory by other states for military purposes and the non-utilization of the territory of others for confrontations with other countries, the resolution of conflicts and contradictions by peaceful means and the expansion of all-round collaboration. The proposals conclude with a call for the permanent member states of the UN Security Council to respect and guarantee the implementation of those principles.

* * *

The peacemaking activity of the socialist states of Asia is a reality of our times. Its constructiveness, activeness and harmony are a pledge for ensuring the security of the

Asian-Pacific region and turning it into a zone of peace, good-neighbor relations and collaboration, which would have a positive influence on the situation on the planet overall. The diplomacy of the Asian socialist countries is already making its contribution to improving the international climate.

The Soviet Union has a positive perception of the initiatives of the socialist countries and renders them every sort of support and listens attentively to them, as well as to the peace-loving ideas of any other government, by the way. It should be emphasized at the same time that what has been proposed at Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk is not a "compulsory program" for all. It is an invitation to joint discussion of variations for solving problems. A concrete proposal was made in Krasnoyarsk in this regard—hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of all interested countries (or those that want to come) to discuss initial approaches to constructing new relations in the Asian-Pacific region.

Peace and harmony in Asia, as well as on the planet overall, can be achieved only on the basis of a balance of the interests of all states and only through the joint efforts of all peoples.

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Lebanon's Communist Party Leader Hawi Interviewed

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 p 12*

[Interview by AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA correspondent Anatoliy Ubilava with Lebanese Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary George Hawi: "George Hawi: 'For a Unified, Democratic Lebanon!'"]

[Text] *Our correspondent for the Near Eastern countries, Anatoliy Ubilava, met and talked with Lebanese Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary George Hawi, whose statements are published below.*

The Lebanese crisis is much worse. Among the factors that have brought it to this must be cited first and foremost the occupation of our territory by Israel, hatching plans to dismember the country along religious and communal lines. One also cannot dismiss the political maneuverings of the United States, which looks at Lebanon through the prism of its own selfish interests, wishing to ensure its influence in the Near East. This year, which could become the year the Palestinian problem is solved, Washington tried to take advantage of the complicated situation in Lebanon to undermine the positions of Syria, exhaust the PLO and the Lebanese national-patriotic forces and support the plans to break up Lebanon in any way possible. All of this is being done

under the guise of trying to facilitate peace in the country, although it is obvious that American interference is only aggravating the crisis.

Another negative outside factor is the activity of Arab reaction, which is financing extreme rightist forces within Lebanon. These forces, also linked to Israel, do not want democratic reform or the removal of their social and class privileges arising out of secular affiliations and giving them the opportunity of abusing power for personal enrichment.

It cannot fail to be noted that the national-patriotic forces of Lebanon have most regrettably been unable to overcome their differences and present a united front against the plots of the rightist forces, Israel and the United States.

All of these factors in the aggregate hindered the holding of presidential elections in the country in August of this year. Literally at the last moment, the former president of Lebanon, Amin Gemayel, declared the formation of a cabinet whose majority was comprised of the military instead of the constitutional government headed by Salim al-Huss. Half of its members—Muslims—immediately resigned, and the monopolization of power by any single group, in this case the Christians, in and of itself contradicts accepted norms and traditions in Lebanon. That is why the patriotic forces consider the military government to be illegal and schismatic. Eminent political and public figures of the country, including former presidents, parliamentary deputies and ministers, gathered in an extraordinary conference and called upon Salim al-Huss to implement the full range of authority right up to elections for a new president.

A meeting was held soon afterward in the residence of the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, at which representatives of the communist and other progressive Lebanese parties were present. As the result of a discussion which lasted six hours, any schismatic plans were categorically rejected, and a program of joint actions aimed at achieving the unity of Lebanon, the preservation of its Arab affiliation and its development along the democratic path was devised. The participants in the meeting came out in favor of holding presidential elections in the near future, which would help put an end to the schism and would facilitate the mobilization of Lebanese forces that are against the fratricidal terror and in favor of a peaceful solution to the crisis. These forces are ready to fight, however, if it is foisted upon them by the fascist rogues that are using weapons with the approval of Israel, Arab reaction and imperialist circles in the United States.

A settlement is possible only via the achievement of unity among the national-patriotic forces of Lebanon, who enjoy the support of fraternal Syria, the progressive movements of other Arab countries and the states of the socialist community.

The Lebanese communists are striving in the current situation to achieve a cessation of the Israeli occupation, the unity of the country, the replacement of its political regime with a new and democratic one and the implementation of socio-economic reforms.

One of the most important tasks of the Lebanese communists is to render assistance to the Arab people of Palestine, their heroic uprising on the occupied territories and their fight for self-determination and the creation of their own state on their native land. We also feel it is our duty to assist the peace movement around the world and support the new approach to the solution of the urgent problems of mankind proposed by the Soviet leadership. These are not slogans, but the practical incarnation of communist principles for strengthening peace on the planet.

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Asian-African Solidarity Meeting Seeks Basis for Global Economic Security

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 p 13*

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Granovskiy under the rubric "The Motto—Solidarity": "Problems of International Economic Security"]

[Text] An imposing international meeting dedicated to problems of global economic security was held in Moscow from 22 to 26 Aug 88. It was organized by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa and the journal SOUTH.¹ Scholars and public figures from 18 socialist, capitalist and developing states, as well as representatives of international organizations, took part in it.

The participants in the meeting expressed the unanimous opinion that ensuring global economic security is one of the most decisive elements of an all-encompassing system of international security. They spoke of the necessity of spreading the current spirit of constructive collaboration into international economic relations.

Analogous approaches have also appeared in evaluating the essence of global economic security. They consist of seeing that all countries have the opportunity of taking part on an equal footing in international economic relations and refrain from any actions that inflict harm on the legal interests of other states. Various points of view were expressed on the initial sphere of activity of the system of international economic security. While the director of the Development Center of the Organization for Economic Collaboration and Development, uniting various capitalist countries, Louis Emmerige, proposed being limited just to a few problems on which a mutually acceptable agreement could be reached comparatively quickly, a number of participants came out in favor of imparting a universal nature to this system. UNCTAD

General Secretary K. Dadzi defined global economic security as the predictability and reliability of international economic relations under conditions of interdependence, equality and justice, and emphasized the harmony of this concept with the proposals of the Group of 77 on a new international economic order.

The discussion revealed the undoubted interconnection between ensuring international economic security and disarmament. The possibility of allocating some of the funds freed up in the process of reducing military spending to render economic assistance to the developing countries was thus noted.

The problems of the expedient boundaries for the international regulation of economics and the removal of protectionist and other barriers in international trade elicited animated debate. The eminent Brazilian economist S. Furtado noted that the internationalization of business life has largely undermined the possibility of economic regulation at the national level, and he called for a strengthening of regulation at the international level.

A number of the participants in the meeting at the same time expressed concern for the fact that the creation of supra-national bodies would inflict harm on the less developed members of the world community. Much attention in this regard was devoted to raising the role of UN institutions in international economic regulation, the use of consensual approaches to decision making and the democratization and universalization of existing international financial institutions, first and foremost the IMF and the World Bank. A number of foreign participants emphasized in particular that the USSR's joining of these organizations, as well as the GATT, would give a more universal nature to them.

The obstacles on the road to expanding international economic regulation on a democratic basis that exist in the developed capitalist countries were revealed in detail in the presentations of the American publisher Shirley Schvenninger.

The participants in the meeting were unanimous in the opinion that international economic security is inconceivable without the elimination of discrimination and arbitrary actions in international economic relations and the rejection of embargoes, technology and trade blockades, trade wars and other sanctions, with the exception of those cases where such sanctions are directly envisaged by the resolutions of the international community. The strengthening of protectionism in the developed capitalist countries was subjected to serious criticism. Some participants called for a comprehensive liberalization of the state regulation of international economic relations. These views were subjected to criticism in particular by the British MP Stuart Holland, who convincingly demonstrated the groundlessness of calling for

the developing countries to return to "free trade," long repudiated by the developed world, and the necessity of the broad regulation of foreign economic ties by the state.

One of the central problems drawing the attention of the meeting's participants related to ways of resolving the debt problem. Various scenarios for resolving it were proposed. The exceedingly well-known economist Dragoslav Avramovich proposed the institution of a six-year moratorium on debt principal payments and limitations on payments in hard currency to two percent annually (plus 0.5 percent into a joint insurance fund for the developing countries), which would, in his opinion, make it possible to stabilize the debt problem over the span of that period. American scholar Susan George came out in favor of conversion to debt and interest payments in local currency with deductions of the total payments into national economic-development funds, which should be managed by public organizations rather than government officials. While the majority of the proposed prescriptions elicited critical observations, the participants were unanimous in that the debt payments should be determined proceeding from the actual ability of each country to pay on the debt without undermining its programs for national economic construction.

The processes of restructuring and their effects on international economic relations elicited enormous interest from the participants in the meeting. These problems were illuminated in detail in the presentations of Soviet participants I.D. Ivanov, M.S. Kapitsa, S.M. Menshikov, M.I. Pankin, T.V. Teodorovich, G.K. Shirokov and V.A. Yashkin.

The participants in the meeting came out in favor of continuing the dialogue on problems of international economic security and proposed holding a non-governmental international congress on these problems in Moscow in 1989.

Footnote

1. This journal, published in London, is one of the most authoritative and well-informed on the economic problems of the developing countries and international relations in the Third World.

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Vietnam's Private Sector in Economic Development

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 pp 14-17*

[Article by Yevgeniy Leng under the rubric "In the Countries of Socialism": "Vietnam—The Private Sector and Common Interests"]

[Text] The river wave was hitting the sides of the fishing junks moored at the bank. A middle-aged person in poor peasant dress was passing by the night. Putting a

bundle of rags under his head, he stretched out straight along the bottom of the boat. But he only got a little sleep: the man kept opening his eyes and listening for the slightest whisper. He knew the police were looking for him.

Those who were well acquainted with the Ho Chi Minh City resident Le Cong Than would hardly have recognized the one-time successful owner of an electrical shop in the poor and unshaven fisherman hiding in the Saigon River. But it was he, an indigenous southerner who went to the north after the partition of Vietnam in 1954 and took active part in the fight to unite the motherland. Le Cong Than returned to Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, immediately after the liberation of the south in 1975. There he opened a small business, but he was accused of earning too much money and violating some directives. And then, six years later, fearing arrest, Than "became a fisherman." He spent over half a year on the junk, which served as his home and means of existence.

Today Le Vong Than is the director of a large private company with capital of 400 million dong. The last six years have been for Vietnam a time of re-evaluation of the role of the private sector in the country's economy. In the old days, as was noted at the 6th Communist Party Congress of the republic held in 1986, sometimes called the "congress of renewal," "there was haste and a desire to dissolve non-socialist institutions in the economy and quickly transform the private-capital sector into the state sector... The standard methods for doing this were shock-work and coercion, chasing after quantity and ignoring quality and efficiency." The communist party has not only acknowledged the error of its approaches of the past to non-socialist institutions in the economy, but has also made serious policy corrections in relation to them.

At the Thuan Kieu Restaurant

The tongues of flame lick the browned sides of the chickens and pork ribs sizzle in the pan, spreading an appetizing aroma. The kitchen of the restaurant in Ho Chi Minh City is located right in the center of the room so that diners can follow the actions of the cooks with their own eyes. You wait no more than ten minutes: service is fast here, and the courses offered taste excellent.

The Thuan Kieu is a mixed state and private enterprise. It is located on the street of the same name in the 11th district of the city and is not interesting for its trademark courses alone. It is a successful example of the "inclusion" of the private sector in working to improve the sphere of public catering.

The story of how the restaurant opened is quite simple. Ngo Cuc Minh, in the past the owner of a small snack bar, decided to "expand" and proposed the creation of a new enterprise, based on share ownership, to the hotels and public-catering company. The proposal was

accepted. Minh and the state company each invested 50 percent of the initial capital needed to lease the accommodations and procure the equipment. The enterprise personnel were assembled through the personnel department of the public-catering company of the 11th district. The wife of Ngo Cuc Minh became the head cook. The art of good cooking has long been revered in Vietnam, but it was not that easy to find a good chef. The pay of the restaurant's director is thus a little over half that of the head cook. It is true, of course, that Minh's income is not limited to the pay.

"Our company supplies basic products—rice, sugar, pork and a number of others—to cooperatives and private enterprises," notes Le Nguyen, who heads public catering in the 11th district. "And moreover at state prices, which helps counter inflation. But the cooperatives and entrepreneurs buy the rest on the market."

The Thuan Kieu Restaurant has 25 tables, each seating four or five people. The blades of the ceiling fan chase off the tropical heat. Kerosene lights burn along with electric ones—in case of a power failure. Interruptions in the electric-power supply are still a typical feature of life in Ho Chi Minh City. The walls of the restaurant are decorated with documents awarded to the restaurant for success in its work: the enterprise has become one of the leading ones in the sector in labor productivity. Judge for yourself: the Thuan Kieu operates from six in the morning to nine at night without a lunch break. There are 47 people on the staff of the state-and-private restaurant, including ten cooks, five assistants and 20 servers. The personnel work on two shifts.

"People come here to eat quickly and well for a moderate price," said Ngo Cuc Minh. "There are just two courses on the menu: broiled chicken with rice and pork ribs. There is also a limited selection of vegetable appetizers. The Thuan Kieu is a non-alcoholic establishment, but if a guest brings a bottle of beer from the shop next door, we won't object. There are a little over a hundred seats in the restaurant. About four thousand people are our guests each day."

Yes, that number would be the envy of any Moscow restaurant with way more space. And how is the profit divided up?

"In half," answers the director of the state-and-private restaurant. "After the payment of all accounts and wages to the employees (the size of them, by the way, depending on the overall amount of receipts), the net profit is divided (50 percent) between me and the company for the 11th district. After that I pay the state another half of what I receive in taxes. Twenty-five percent of the net profits thus remain at my disposal. I maintain a home and help my parents with that money. And I have a large family: eight children."

"And how are your relations with the collective structured?"

"All the workers of the Thuan Kieu are members of a trade union," said Ngo Cuc Minh. "They are on the rolls of the trade union of the hotels and public-catering company for the 11th district. But we have had practically no disputed issues come up here. The people see I work ten hours a day. The question of dismissing this or that employee is resolved only with the consent of the collective of the personnel department of the public-catering company."

State-and-private enterprises are becoming an important constituent element of the national economy of the SRV, especially in the south. They produce finished products, they feed and sew, they offer consumers hundreds of types of various goods. The involvement of private funds helps the state to solve various economic problems more quickly. The creation of private, state-and-private and cooperative types of production makes it possible at the same time to increase the number of jobs, which is of no small importance under conditions where unemployment exists.

"The various sectors of the economy," emphasized Phan Van Khay, a member of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee and chairman of the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, "understandably do not exist regardless of each other, they are linked thanks to the division of labor and cooperation. We are trying to employ forms such as mixed enterprises of the state and private sectors or collective, private and family farms flexibly. It would signify a slowing of the growth of productive forces to reject these economic forms or display excessive restraint."

The Bankers are Making Decisions

The economic situation in Vietnam over the period that has passed since the 6th Communist Party Conference is characterized by active searches for the most rational forms for managing the national economy and by bold and non-standard experiments at enterprises and economic institutions in different cities and provinces of the country. The creation of the Bank for Trade and Industry (BTI) in Ho Chi Minh City was perhaps one of the most radical steps of the city leaders in the realm of finance and credit.

There are now five institutions in the economy of Vietnam. The practices of the economic life of the republic at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s showed that it is was very difficult to achieve the desired results through administration and orders. The mechanical transference of this or that small private enterprise onto a state footing or the creation of branches of various departments on the basis of some cooperatives often only led to new unprofitable enterprises landing on the shoulders of the ministries.

The Bank for Trade and Industry of Ho Chi Minh City, created in October of 1987, is intended to provide credit services to enterprises, cooperatives and companies representing all types of productive relations in today's Vietnam. It is a joint-stock enterprise. Half the capital was offered by the SRV State Bank, and the rest came from various departments and private individuals who purchased shares of stock, the price of each of which was equivalent to several months' salary for a skilled worker.

"Before our bank opened, the credit and finance institutions of the republic mainly served the enterprises of the state sector," related the first deputy director of the BTI, Chan Anh Tien. "Almost no attention was devoted to cooperatives or private production. And after all, they are components of the republic's economy in which a considerable share of national income is created."

The bank holds an annual meeting of stockholders at which one share of stock is equal to one vote. The administrative council elected at the meeting holds regular sessions on all of the most important issues. Routine business is conducted by the director of the BTI and a representative of the republic's State Bank named by its general director.

"At first," emphasized Tien, "we were engaged in short-term credit. And we had already achieved pretty good results. Many partners for us appeared quickly. The fact that the BTI pays eight and a half percent profits on each share each year speaks for itself. True, the quite high level of inflation in the country must be taken into account therein. But be that as it may, the creation and first steps of the new bank were approved by many specialists and directors of enterprises and cooperatives. BTI credit has allowed several important types of production to expand. Furthermore—and this is very material—the bank has been able to attract the free funds of the population, which are now being used for the further ascent of the national economy of the republic."

Before deciding on allotting credit to the next applicant, an authoritative associate from the BTI travels to the enterprise or cooperative for a detailed familiarity with the state of affairs. After that he reports his opinion to the directorate. The Saigon-10 cooperative was thus recently granted credit of 35 million dong for expenses necessary to improve the quality of the furniture they produce that goes for export to the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The food company for the 1st district of Ho Chi Minh City received a major loan—220 million dong—for the development of pig breeding. A cooperative auto-repair shop took a loan to procure new equipment. But an enterprise that decided to start up the production of fireworks for the New Year was refused credit.

"That is far from the most urgent need of the economy of Vietnam," BTI Director Chan Anh Tien substantiates his position.

Many specialists, by the way, explain the success of the BTI by the fact that its personnel include many experienced specialists. Over half of them were working at finance and credit organizations even before the liberation of South Vietnam. BTI Deputy Director Shon had earlier held far from the last post in the National Bank affiliated with the puppet government. His colleague Vo Minh Tam had worked in the French Commercial Bank since 1956, and by the time of the victory of popular power he had moved up to head teller. Both Shon and Tam, however, are united by a loyal attitude toward the changes that have occurred in Vietnam since the creation of the unified state. Today the past is not an obstacle to being named to important positions, even if yesterday you did not support the revolution. The main thing is a readiness to devote one's strengths and abilities to overcoming the difficulties that the Vietnamese economy is experiencing.

And nonetheless, the reaction of the public to the creation of the Bank for Trade and Industry is not unequivocal. Some are asserting that the purchase of shares of stock in the BTI by private individuals is making people already not poor even more substantial. Voices are also being sounded against "rentiers under the conditions of the construction of socialism."

"I do not think that point of view is fair," said Chan Anh Tien. "Socialism, after all, is not abolished by interest on deposits in banks or savings banks. And the use of the free funds of the population in the interests of developing the national economy of the SRV is a factor that cannot fail to be taken into account. The fulfillment of the economic program advanced by the 6th CPV Congress will serve to increase the welfare of all the people and raise national income. That means that the benefits from our work will ultimately be palpable not just for those who bought BTI shares alone. One also cannot forget herein about the risk factor associated with buying our shares. What if we go bankrupt?"

The question of the social consequences of the creation of the BTI remains open to debate. One thing is yet clear: its activity is bringing income into the state coffers and facilitating the revival of not only the state, but other institutions of the economy as well.

"Not everybody took to it right away," noted Chan Anh Tien. "There were attempts to influence the directors with administrative-orders methods and bureaucratic pressure. Every time we answered that we cannot turn back to yesterday. The BTI is an economically accountable organization, all decisions here are made by the bankers, guided by economic expediency, the social utility of this or that undertaking and concern for the interests of the shareholders."

There are always many people in the spacious hall of the Bank for Trade and Industry of Ho Chi Minh City. An elderly man with glasses and a thick briefcase in his hand came up to one of the administrators.

"I am a representative of a private sewing shop," he said. "I would like to apply to you for credit."

"Have a seat, please," was the courteous reply. "Let's talk in a little more detail..."

Return the "Missing Links"

The morning flow of vehicles on the highway leading from Ho Chi Minh City to the industrial zone of Bien Hoa about 25 kilometers away reminds me of a powerful waterfall. Coming down from the arch of the bridge over the Saigon River, the vehicles fill the four-lane road bumper-to-bumper. Many buses and trucks with passenger trailers have the names of enterprises on their sides. They deliver workers from the city to the dozens of plants and factories in the industrial zone.

Ho Chi Minh City produces about a third of the industrial output of the republic. One component of this striking figure is the contribution of the industrial zone. Bien Hoa as translated from Vietnamese means "peaceful border." At one time there really was a line here to the Vietnamese settlements advancing on the south being assimilated. But those times are far back in history, and today Bien Hoa is known as an industrial complex. The construction of plants and factories began here in 1963. Some 94 enterprises equipped with quite modern equipment had been created in Bien Hoa by the time the Saigon regime fell. About a third of them have been closed down today.

"The region was created with much participation by foreign capital," related the deputy secretary of the party committee for the industrial zone, Nguyen Thanh Hoa. "The enterprises were oriented toward the assembly of products from finished assemblies or for the performance of some part of a technological process. They kind of represent several links in a chain, the beginning, and often the end of which as well, stretched abroad."

The popular authorities nationalized the enterprises. They were able to set up production at many of them. The Vikino tractor-assembly plant, for example, has set about making Daythang engine blocks, and the Sikovina textile combine has set up the output of fabrics. Cooperation with the industrial sector of the northern part of the country and collaboration with socialist partners have made a large contribution to the process of resurrecting the industrial zone, suffocating without imported spare parts and supplies.

"But we were unable to 'revive' a whole series of enterprises," Nguyen Thanh Hoa continued. "The 'missing link'—the loss of contacts with companies in the West and countries of the region—has had its effect. It has become clear today that total nationalization was a mistake. The 'cavalry charge' on capital was always distinguished by low efficiency. Such promising forms as state-and-private enterprises and the creation of joint

firms in conjunction with interested foreign businessmen have been utilized by the people's authorities in Bien Hoa. It is true that the conversion of all capitalist plants and factories to nationwide property was largely dictated by the positions of the former owners: the majority of them emigrated, and many foreign owners 'planted a cross' on their Vietnamese subsidiary affiliates. But we didn't display the proper persistence and enterprise ourselves either."

But what the Vietnamese have been able to do in the Bien Hoa industrial zone is deserving of attention nonetheless. There are metallurgical and machine-building, textile and processing, light and chemical, food and building-materials enterprises operating there. Bien Hoa provides a sizable percentage of the production of Vietnamese industrial output and is an important supplement to the list of export goods. And now, with the adoption of the new SRV law on foreign investments (it was promulgated in 1988), the southern economy has obtained the opportunity of returning the "missing link" and putting it to work in the interests of the national economy.

The new approaches of Vietnam to the use of capital investment from abroad are linked with a renewal—the policy of widespread reforms in various spheres. According to the law, foreign businessmen can create enterprises on SRV territory even without the participation of Vietnamese capital. The authoritative journal FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW that comes out in Hong Kong emphasized that "foreign businessmen feel the new law on foreign investments adopted by Hanoi to be one of the most liberal in Asia."

The measured letters "Sanyo" on the facade of the assembly shops of the Vietronics Bien Hoa plant indicate its genealogy at once. Earlier it had been the stockholding of the national bourgeoisie and the Japanese company. There was a time when production had been completely halted; deliveries were stopped after the liberation of the southern part of the country in 1975 due to the halt in deliveries of finished assemblies and parts for the assembly of consumer electronics from abroad. The situation then gradually stabilized. Vietronics Bien Hoa began buying the necessary products abroad. Almost 40,000 late-model televisions and 54,000 cassette players came off the enterprise's assembly conveyor in 1987. The majority of them had the markings of foreign firms.

"We were able to keep about 80 percent of the 'old' workers, who were very skilled," noted Deputy Plant Director Chinh Dinh Nyung. "We are thus able to solve the most complex production problems. And now two companies that are well known in the foreign market, Sanyo and Philips, have proposed creating a joint enterprise based on Vietronics Bien Hoa. This is a mutually advantageous matter, and the firms' proposals are being studied."

Analogous proposals were received by the factory for the production of woolen items and yarn that neighbors Vietronics. In the words of its director, the nice-looking Hoang Thi Nyat Le, the enterprise will have to choose among partners from West Germany and Japan or Vietnamese emigrants wishing to invest their own capital in the development of the national economy, who, by the way, are beginning to make more and more active use of both the local market and the production capabilities of the republic.

"The time has passed when the attraction of foreign investment was practically considered to be a 'deviation from socialism,'" feels a key worker of the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, economist Nguyen Van Tung. "Today it is becoming an important constituent element for reinforcing economic potential. Quite soon, all of the mothballed factories will possibly be revived, and production expanded at those in operation."

In July of 1988 the Politburo of the CPV Central Committee adopted a decree that envisages the expansion of participation of the non-state sectors of the economy in the country's development. Broad rights and opportunities have been granted to private individuals, right up to the creation of large companies. The organization of the private company Bimimesco, headed by Le Cong Thanh, that very same "fisherman" from the Saigon River, was announced in the Ho Chi Minh City press just two weeks later. Bimimesco will produce and export electric lights and toys and repair ships and motor vehicles. It has already signed agreements with four foreign firms.

It must be said in all fairness that six years ago, a party worker able to halt the persecution of the entrepreneur and render him great assistance in rehabilitating his then-small shop came to the aid of Le Cong Thanh during his time of difficult trials. He was the leader of the party committee of Ho Chi Minh City. His name was Nguyen Van Linh. Today he is the general secretary of the CPV Central Committee.

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Popular Basis of Afghan Opposition, Future Prospects Examined

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 pp 18-23*

[Interview by AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA correspondent Leonid Mironov with USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Senior Academic Associate Maj Gen (Res) Viktor Nikolayevich Spolnikov under the rubric "Our Interviews": "Afghanistan: The Opponents of the Settlement Process"]

[Text] *The Geneva accords have opened up the road to normalizing the situation in Afghanistan. It is also being facilitated by the policy of national reconciliation that is*

being pursued by the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, making it possible for the Afghans themselves to resolve their differences based on reasonable compromises and broad coalitions. The leaders of the counter-revolutionary opposition, however, encouraged from without, are opposing the process of political settlement in every way possible and are striving to resolve the issue of power in their own favor by use of arms.

Our correspondent Leonid Mironov talked with a senior academic associate of the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Maj Gen (Res) V.N. Spolnikov, about the confrontation of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. He was in Afghanistan on official duties for a span of several years.

[Correspondent] Viktor Nikolayevich, the dramatic events in Afghanistan that began after the April Revolution of 1978 are attracting the attention of broad international public opinion. They have become the object of a multitude of studies, articles and commentaries by Soviet and foreign historians, political scientists and journalists. Equivocal evaluations are being made of these events, and the most varied of conclusions are being drawn based on analysis of the exceptionally complex and contradictory situation...

[Spolnikov] A sizable quantity of features on Afghanistan really has accumulated. The stream of them has especially increased this year with the tenth anniversary of the emergence of the patriotic officers on 27 Apr 78, which has gone down in history as the April Revolution.

[Correspondent] The April Revolution contains the origins of today's events. Do you agree with how it is being treated by Western historians and journalists?

[Spolnikov] The political-science centers of the United States and the Western European countries have over the course of all these years been persistently creating a distorted impression of both the Afghan revolution itself and the causes of it, as well as the counter-revolution and those who are sponsoring it. Western political scientists, and especially such well-known American specialists on Afghanistan as L. Dupre, S. Garrison and R. Newman among others, consider the events surrounding Afghanistan in a very narrow light—first and foremost through the prism of the struggle between East and West for influence in that region. In their works, notwithstanding an outward objectivity and even a seeming desire to understand the essence of what is happening, one is struck by the unilateral and subjective approach to evaluating this or that socio-economic phenomenon. As for the Western press, as a rule it subjects practically every aspect of our country's policy in relation to Afghanistan to attack, ignores the policy of national reconciliation that is being pursued by the government of the republic and, at the same time, idealizes the political and social essence of the Afghan counter-revolution in every way possible.

[Correspondent] The works of the authors you mentioned are known to me, and I am personally acquainted with L. Dupre, who spent about 30 years in all in Afghanistan and has written several books. He, like many other Western observers, asserts that the revolution in Afghanistan took place just thanks to an accidental confluence of circumstances, that the essential socio-economic preconditions for it had not matured in the country, and thus, he says, they have encountered such powerful opposition from the counter-revolution. Do you share such conclusions?

[Spolnikov] That point of view does not seem sufficiently convincing to me. The socio-economic preconditions for an anti-feudal and national-democratic revolution, in my opinion, were objectively sufficiently ripe in Afghanistan by April of 1978. A revolutionary situation had moreover been observed as early as at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, but the progressive forces at the time were still not ready for organized action. Their development also suffered a decline as a result of the anti-monarchical coup of M. Daud in 1973 that rescued the exploiting classes and estates. The Daud regime, however, was unable to stifle the existing contradictions through maneuvers, concessions or repressions. A political crisis gradually matured in the country and there was an accumulation of forces, which led to the appearance of a revolutionary situation and the events of April 1978.

"Revolutions do not happen and cannot be without counter-revolutions"—this Leninist tenet (V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol 12, p 171), which relates to any social explosion, is also applicable to the April events in Afghanistan. Such factors as the overall backwardness of Afghan society, the many centuries of influence of Islam there, the errors and exaggerations, and sometimes just plain crimes, that were committed by the prior leaders of Afghanistan in the first stages of the revolution led to persistent and universally widespread counter-revolutionary uprisings, while active support for the Afghan counter-revolution from outside, on the part of the United States and its allies, along with regional reaction provided a scope of activity for it and imparted a certain belief in its power.

[Correspondent] The flames of civil war have not been extinguished in Afghanistan for ten years now. Why has it taken on such a protracted nature?

[Spolnikov] It must be said that the Afghan counter-revolution would have been incapable of waging armed struggle against the legal government of the Republic of Afghanistan for such a prolonged period without foreign assistance. This assistance is of a military, political, ideological and economic nature, but deliveries of weapons, munitions and equipment occupy the chief place in it. The principal "donors" are the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as a number of other countries, among which are unfortunately included the PRC. And the dimensions of this aid are moreover

growing. Whereas in 1987 the American administration allotted 630 million dollars to the Afghan opposition for military purposes, it is some 900 million dollars this year.

Today the most modern types of arms are coming in to arm the counter-revolution, including those such as American Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and British Blowpipe missile launchers, being used to shell Kabul and other cities. The flow of arms has not only not ceased, but has rather even increased, since the signing of the Geneva accords.

[Correspondent] How should the Geneva accords be regarded in that case?

[Spolnikov] They concern the political settlement of the foreign aspect of the Afghan problem. But the "package" of Geneva documents has one very marked internal contradiction. The Declaration of International Guarantees (the USSR and the United States are guarantors) lacks any mention of halting arms deliveries. This allows Washington to continue delivering arms to the Afghan counter-revolution. At the same time Pakistan, in accordance with the agreements, should not allow the flow of arms across its territory into Afghanistan. That is the known contradiction that gives the United States and Pakistan the opportunity of treating the substance of the Geneva accords in arbitrary fashion.

This situation naturally cannot fail to elicit alarm and protests both on the part of the Republic of Afghanistan as a country that signed the agreement and on the part of the USSR, one of its guarantors. E.A. Shevardnadze warned the Americans in September of 1988 that our country could not allow the Geneva accords to be turned into a scrap of worthless paper, and he proposed a meeting of four foreign ministers—from the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Afghanistan—in New York so as to consider the situation that has taken shape surrounding Afghanistan with the participation of a representative of the UN General Secretary.

[Correspondent] You have justly noted that the scale of action of the counter-revolution is to a considerable extent, if not entirely, ensured by active support on the part of the United States and its allies along with regional reaction. But after all, the new powers in Kabul are also receiving multi-faceted aid from the Soviet Union. Those who feel that the revolution could hardly stand its ground without our support are correct, evidently?

[Spolnikov] The experience of the contemporary world revolutionary process (in such countries as Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia and Nicaragua, for example) testifies to the fact that not a single social revolution is currently able to win total victory without internationalist solidarity due to the counteraction of the forces of imperialism. What forms this solidarity should take is another matter.

It is understandable that Afghanistan cannot oppose the export of counter-revolution organized by imperialism without the aid of the USSR.

[Correspondent] I witnessed the first steps of the revolution. I especially remember the seemingly genuine rejoicing on the occasion of its first anniversary. People were congratulating each other from the heart everywhere. The impression was created that the majority of the Afghan people had accepted the revolution. Some of the statements and actions of the leadership of Afghanistan at the time, however, could not help but put one on guard. N.M. Taraki and H. Amin were publicly declaring all the time that the April Revolution was the second most significant in world history after the October Revolution in Russia. They were talking about establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat—which essentially did not exist—in the country. They ground out extreme leftist decrees on the land, the abolition of *kalym* and the like one after the other.

[Spolnikov] You are correct. A typical rushing ahead, a desire to accelerate the revolutionary process artificially, was evident.

[Correspondent] The new authorities then moreover came down with repressions on the clergy, large landowners and other individuals that did not suit them, and they confiscated individual enterprises, land and property. Eyewitnesses related how at the order of the former governor of Balkh Province, Siddik Alamyar, the peasants who did not fulfill these or those orders of the authorities were driven to Amu Darya and executed with automatic weapons and machine guns. Such actions naturally inclined the people against the NDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and, ultimately, against the revolution. This of course created a favorable climate for the formation of counter-revolution.

[Spolnikov] Yes, that is how it was. But I would like to emphasize in this regard that it was not the errors committed by the leaders of the republic in the early stages in and of themselves that caused the armed uprising of the counter-revolution or allowed it to acquire a mass base. Its appearance was inevitable. The short-term delay, the "hitch" in reaction of internal and external counter-revolution to the April Revolution which lasted for just a few months, can be explained, in my opinion, by the fact that it caught unawares the ruling circles and dominant classes it was directed against, as well as the ultra-rightist forces, spoiling for power themselves, that were opposed to the previous government regime.

I note in passing that the extreme rightist clerical groups that comprise one of the principal detachments of the Afghan counter-revolution, organizationally concentrated in the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) led by G. Hekmatyar and the Islamic Afghan Society (IAS) headed by B. Rabbani, were waging an ideological, political and sometimes even armed struggle against the Kabul

authorities even before the revolution. But the edge of their struggle was directed first and foremost against the progressive forces, and then against the regimes of Zahir Shah and M. Daud, as supposedly "accomplices" and "bearers" of "communist penetration into Afghanistan."

[Correspondent] Viktor Nikolayevich, you have spoken of the counter-revolution acquiring a mass base. This fact has as a rule been passed over in silence or skirted by our press before. What segments of the population is the opposition relying on? The majority of the working class supported the revolution, after all, although I would not exaggerate its role in it. The numbers in it cited by the Afghan leadership (300,000 to 400,000, including 60,000 factory and plant workers) could instill excessive optimism if attendant elements are not taken into account. The undeveloped nature of a large machinery industry in the country has conditioned the absence of a core working class able to play a key role in unifying it. The level of cadre, hereditary proletariat among the small numbers of factory and plant workers is too low. National ethnic and religious differences hinder the cohesion of the working class. Its consciousness is still at the trade-unionist level. Although, of course, the political awareness of the working class increased appreciably after the April Revolution, and its numbers grew. The workers are taking active part in the armed struggle against the counter-revolution. The new constitution and program documents of the NDPA have consolidated the tenet that the working class is the principal support for power.

[Spolnikov] It seems that the most important and decisive issue for the fate of the national-democratic revolution is what position the working peasantry would take toward it: if they support the revolution—it triumphs, if they turn away from it or come out against it—it is doomed to defeat or disintegration. It should be said with all candor that the principal factor that has facilitated the creation of a mass base for the counter-revolution, thereby imparting to it the nature of a movement threatening the very existence of the Republic of Afghanistan, was essentially the battle the NDPA lost at one stage for the Afghan peasantry, which for a whole series of reasons did not go over to the revolution en masse.

[Correspondent] Those reasons should evidently include first and foremost the failure in pursuing land and water reforms?

[Spolnikov] Undoubtedly. The leaders of the country themselves acknowledge its actual collapse. NDPA Central Committee General Secretary Najibullah said in particular at the 20th NDPA Central Committee Plenum on 20 Nov 86, "Let us all think together about what is happening here: we are not engaging the peasantry as we should in a peasant country. We have tried to resolve such a stirring question as how land and water are distributed by issuing abstract documents, directing a flow of paper onto the heads of the peasants. We began

agrarian reform from the wrong end, destroying the existing production relations without considering national customs, traditions and mores."

[Correspondent] It must be supposed that it was namely as a result of the insufficiently clearly thought-out agrarian policy of the NDPA that the trust of the peasant, including the average ones and those with little or no land, in the new powers in Kabul was undermined?

[Spolnikov] That is the main reason. The large and medium-sized land holdings were confiscated without any, albeit even symbolic, "compensation," which directly offended the interests not only of the landowners, but also a large number of landholders from among the army's officer corps, officials in the state apparatus and the Muslim clergy. The peasant was neither socially nor psychologically ready to receive the land that was forcibly taken from its previous owner. A reverence for the principle of the inviolability of private property cultivated for centuries by religion and custom was also manifested in this. They gave the peasant the land but banned its sale, leasing or pledging, as well as breaking it up in inheritance or permitting hired labor. These restrictions, together with the ban on money-lending and the lack of a system for obtaining monetary or other grants from the state, doomed the peasants to the ownership of a plot of land that they could not fully manage and that could not be worked, having neither seed nor water. The ban on breaking up the land in inheritance went against the provisions of the *shari'a* and many centuries of tradition. And the abolition of *kalym* and age limitations on marriage were regarded as interference in the holy of holies for the Afghan—his family life.

[Correspondent] The counter-revolutionary opposition has of course not failed to take advantage of the errors of the new regime so as to attract the peasants onto its side for the sake of resolving the question of "who's giving it to whom?"

[Spolnikov] Yes, the counter-revolutionaries have made skillful use in their own interests of the shortsighted policies of the NDPA in relation to the peasants and the errors and leftist excesses of local authorities in implementing the orders and decrees of the new authorities. The idea of national-democratic revolution has been compromised in the eyes of a significant portion of the peasantry, and it has digressed from the revolution. The Islamic ideologists of the counter-revolution have moreover palmed off fully accessible stereotypes on it: power in Kabul has been seized by godless communists, they want to destroy Islamic values, they have brought foreigners into the motherland, and the duty of every Muslim is thus to arise in defense of the religion and begin a jihad against the "unbeliever"-foreigners and their Afghan lackeys. That is, strictly speaking, the whole set of philosophical and political views that the counter-revolution is addressing to the Afghan peasantry, a tried and true set that is accessible to their understanding.

The lack of skill and ability of the new powers to attract the poorest segments of the peasantry to their side, prematurely denigrating the interests of the rural bourgeoisie, along with the unjustified acceleration of agrarian reform and the evasion of purposeful work in the village, have all created favorable opportunities for a strengthening of the influence of counter-revolution there.

[Correspondent] In speaking of the mass base of the counter-revolution, one also cannot fail to mention the problem of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, whose overall numbers comprise about five million people.

[Spolnikov] The departure of such a considerable portion of the Afghan population to Pakistan and Iran after the revolution—and it is namely peasants that make up the majority of the refugees—is a complex and contradictory process. As has already been noted, had the former leaders of the NDPA not made errors in their policies in relation to the peasantry, then they would not have gone over en masse to the counter-revolution notwithstanding their guarded or even sometimes negative attitude toward the "godless" regime in Kabul. The hasty and unprepared reforms and their forced incarnation handed to the Afghan counter-revolution a powerful social and political lever in the person of the peasant that it had never had before. It can be stated with certainty that the mass emigration of peasants to Pakistan and Iran was the direct result of the purposeful activity of the counter-revolution with the active support of the landowners, khans and mullahs.

The refugees in Pakistan and Iran came to be in complete economic and political dependence on the counter-revolution, and their camps were transformed into a source of reinforcements for its armed formations. It is impeding the return of the refugees with the connivance of the local authorities. Its aims are understandable: if their mass return begins under the conditions envisaged by the Geneva accords, the counter-revolution would be deprived of a most important reserve for replenishing its detachments, without which it would be unable to continue the broad-scale fight against the legal government.

[Correspondent] What principal strains can you delineate in the Afghan Islamic counter-revolution?

[Spolnikov] Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic traditionalism. The former as the expressor of the ideology of both the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle-class urban segments, and the latter as the bearer of the ideology of the semi-feudal segments, large bourgeoisie and the upper reaches of theology.

The Islamic fundamentalists proclaimed as their aim as early as 1969 the restoration of the founding principles of Islam, its cleansing of later "distortions" and "extraneous features," a return to the state structure that existed during the times of the prophet Mohammed and

the four "righteous" caliphs and the creation of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. According to their representations, a state structure that meets all of the requirements that Islam makes of a truly Islamic state has not been established in a single country of the Muslim world.

The ideological postulates of the Afghan fundamentalists are borrowed from the arch-reactionary right wing of the Arab "Muslim Brotherhood" Islamic organization. They include the use of terror, underground action and calls for the violent overthrow of "non-Islamic" ruling regimes.

The Islamic traditionalists in Afghanistan are in favor of restoring the pre-revolutionary order and returning to the times of the monarchy. They do not advance ideas of creating a theocratic state, although they relegate an important place in running the country to Islam.

[Correspondent] It is curious, Viktor Nikolayevich, that fundamentalism often calls its movement an "Islamic revolution" in its program documents and declarations even though this radical term is missing from Islamic dogma.

[Spolnikov] The leaders of Afghan fundamentalism have their own interpretation of this term. One of their theologians, Sharifullah Fagiri, writes that "Islamic revolution is a special form of Islamic jihad. The principal difference between a jihad and an Islamic revolution consists of the fact that an Islamic revolution is accomplished with the aim of changing an existing order..."

To this could be added that if a jihad in the traditional Islamic treatment signifies only waging war against "non-believers" and usurpers, then the fundamentalists are imparting a broader political sense to it. Jihad in their understanding is the permanent and lifelong religious obligation of the Muslim. Muslims taking active part in a jihad are called *mujahedin*—"warriors for the faith"—by the Afghan counter-revolution. The opposition leaders declare that every Afghan Muslim should wage a struggle against the "godless" regime in Kabul as part of Islamic organizations using all available means and methods. Those who perish in the course of such an armed struggle are called *shahid*—"martyrs for the faith." One of the jihad's brochures states that "Every Muslim should know that the defense of Islam is a thousand times more valuable than life."

[Correspondent] Seven organizations singled themselves out among those counter-revolutionary organizations that had taken refuge on Pakistani territory as early as the beginning of 1980, forming the "Islamic Union of the Mujahedin of Afghanistan" (IUMA-7). Who joined this "alliance"?

[Spolnikov] The announcement of the creation of IUMA took place during a meeting of the opposition leaders and ulema of 25 Jul 81 in the Mahabat Mosque in Peshawar. They swore an oath of fealty to the new union

on the Koran and the holy book "Noble Bokhara," and they adopted a charter of unity. This alliance includes two factions, the traditionalists and the fundamentalists. The former includes the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the National Islamic Front and the National Front for Salvation. The latter group includes two Islamic Parties with different leaders, the Islamic Society and the Islamic Liberation Union. Both detachments of counter-revolutionaries have one and the same near-term political aim—to overthrow the current government and dissolve the conquests of the national-democratic revolution. They are trying to unite their efforts on such a basis. But there are actual estates and political circles with their own social base and prosecuting their own aims standing behind each of these groupings.

Whence the contradictions and differences of opinion that have put the alliance at the brink of disintegration more than once, especially between two counter-revolutionary detachments: the feudal-monarchist (traditionalist) and the bourgeois-theocratic (fundamentalist). These contradictions, expressed first of all in differences in political goals, are essentially of a class and estate nature, which is hidden or camouflaged in every way possible under the guise of differences in approach to Islamic teachings. While the traditionalists, as I have already mentioned, are in favor of creating a traditional bourgeois state, and possibly a monarchy, the fundamentalists are inveighing for a purely Islamic state, for which the Islamic caliphate or, closer to the times and more comprehensible in form and substance, the current theocratic Iran of Khomeini could, in their depiction, serve as a prototype. Whatever forms of association or collaboration arise between these two counter-revolutionary detachments, however, they will remain hostile to each other, and their alliances of convenience are ultimately doomed to disintegration.

Contradictions of a religious nature—Islam's division into Shiite and Sunni—is also hindering a unification of the Islamic counter-revolution. The former is entirely or to a considerable extent oriented toward Khomeini's Iran, and the latter to the fundamentalists in the countries of the Near East in which the Sunni population predominates. The Sunni counter-revolution is more-over claiming power within the borders of all of Afghanistan, including the northwestern regions where the influence of the Shiite clergy is strong.

[Correspondent] Reports often appear in the press about rivalries among various groupings for foreign aid, for control over its distribution...

[Spolnikov] Squabbles burst out in the counter-revolutionary camp due to more than the aid crumbs alone. A harsh struggle is also underway for political influence on the scale of the whole counter-revolutionary movement and within each of the organizations; for sympathy and patronage on the part of ruling figures in the capitalist countries; for influence among the Afghan refugees for

the purpose of replenishing one's own armed detachments; for control over the regions and populated areas seized on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan; and, for attracting to one's side the leaders of formations waging the counter-revolutionary struggle on Afghan territory independently.

[Correspondent] Each of the two principal detachments of the Islamic counter-revolution trying to overthrow the national-democratic order is pursuing selfish aims, which to a considerable extent determines the approach of each of them to the possibility of a political settlement for Afghanistan as well. What is at the foundation of these approaches?

[Spolnikov] The negative position of the fundamentalists on this problem was defined by the leader of the IPA, G. Hekmatyar, and the leader of the IAS, B. Rabbani. Individual members of the alliance have actually taken up their views.

G. Hekmatyar formulates his credo as follows in the book "A Political Settlement for the Problem of Afghanistan": "At the current stage our mujahedin true believers should fulfill the following directive of the Koran: 'When you are weak, do not call for peace... God is on your side, and your efforts will not be in vain!' One cannot think of peace with the enemy and hope for a political solution. It will be in favor of the Russians... This will be a deception, they are diverting us from the jihad, taking advantage of negotiations to weaken our positions and strengthen theirs."

It is no accident, concerning the agreements reached in Geneva, that G. Hekmatyar loudly declared: "We do not believe in such a solution to the problem. We seek the way of resolving the Afghanistan crisis in the victory of our revolution. We are convinced that the Russians are proclaiming the possibility of a political solution as a deception and to placate world public opinion... If the jihad continues in the form in which it is taking place today, the victory of our revolution is very near... The longer the war lasts, the greater experience the mujahedin acquire, the more their faith is strengthened, the more their confidence grows in victory, and the means of waging the war are improving as well. A continuation of the war is in favor of our jihad and revolution."

Analogous views were expressed in B. Rabbani's book "Ways of Solving the Problem of Afghanistan." His approach is also distinguished by ultimatums and a categorical and irreconcilable nature. "Our Muslim people will wage war for the Islamic order to the end," he declared, "and a political settlement thus makes no sense and has no significance."

The position of the Afghan traditionalists relative to the possibility of a political settlement is not as categorical and irreconcilable, and it leaves room for political maneuvering. It can be assumed that the traditionalists even have a vested interest in a political settlement (with

at least the partial restoration of the former institutions) while the traditional foundations of their influence and authority have not yet been completely destroyed and while the fundamentalists have not turned into the leading opposition force able to aspire to complete political power.

[Correspondent] The question of the former monarchy of M. Zahir Shah and his possible role in solving the Afghan problem and of the future state structure of the country is being widely debated in Afghanistan today. How are they reacting to this in the counter-revolutionary camp?

[Spolnikov] The leaders of the traditionalist organizations, who were closely linked with the monarchy in the past, feel that the country is now in need of a political figure of nationwide stature who embodies a unified Afghanistan. And the former king is such a figure, in their opinion. First of all, the traditionalists are taking into account the presence of a gravitation toward "legal" rule among a significant portion of the Afghan population. In their eyes the former king looks like a martyr, a ruler violently deprived of power. Second, they feel that a figure such as M. Zahir Shah is more preferable to the West as leader of Afghanistan than Islamic fundamentalists with their political extremism.

The fundamentalist counter-revolutionaries have a sharply irreconcilable attitude toward M. Zahir Shah and his possible participation in the political life of Afghanistan, feeling him to be guilty of "all of the misfortunes" of the Afghan people and calling for him to be put on trial.

[Correspondent] And what about M. Zahir Shah himself? What is his reaction?

[Spolnikov] The former king is very circumspect and is temporizing. His position is taking on more and more concrete outlines of late. In March of 1988 he called for the convocation of the *jirgi* that have been traditional for Afghanistan for a long time, "at which should be represented all elements comprising the Afghan nation," as well as emphasizing that the future Afghanistan should be a free and democratic society and that it should maintain friendly relations with all countries, especially the Soviet Union and Pakistan. In June of 1988 the former king approved the idea of creating a "traditional government" in Afghanistan, guided by the directives of the holy teachings and founded on a "national traditional world view."

[Correspondent] Viktor Nikolayevich, we have been talking so far about an organized counter-revolution which has its own underground party network and military formations on Afghan territory, but after all there is still an unorganized counter-revolution...

[Spolnikov] The non-organized (local) counter-revolution includes scattered groups that are coming forth with weapons in hand against national-democratic power but are not bound by membership to this or that organization centered in Pakistan or Iran. Headed by local landowners or religious figures, they most often engage in highway robbery and extortion from the peasants under the guise of a "war for the faith." The organized counter-revolution considers such groups as a reserve and is trying to subordinate them to their own influence.

[Correspondent] In speaking of the activity of the Afghan Islamic counter-revolution, one probably cannot fail to dwell on the crimes and acts of cruelty that are being committed by it against the Afghan people daily.

[Spolnikov] The "freedom fighters," as the Western press dignifies them, flout all norms of human behavior. To their score fall refined punishments and tortures, the beheading and dismemberment of people they have captured, including peaceful residents, the murder of old people, women and children and the destruction of all and everything with constant references to God and Islam.

According to data published in the Afghan press, the counter-revolutionary formations in Afghan territory have blown up and burned about two thousand schools, dozens of hospitals and medical stations, hundreds of bridges, dams, irrigation structures and electrical-transmission lines and have shot down dozens of aircraft from the Ariana civilian airline.

[Correspondent] The facts testify that despite the Geneva accords that opened up the way to a settlement in Afghanistan taking effect and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country that continues according to schedule, the United States and its allies are not only not halting their diverse aid to the Afghan counter-revolution, but are rather even increasing it, justifying it with "humanitarian" considerations...

[Spolnikov] Only naive people can assume that the aid, including military, is some kind of "humanitarian" act. The continuing support of the United States and its allies for the Afghan counter-revolution is only delaying a political settlement in Afghanistan.

And today there is only one sensible way toward such a settlement, and no other alternative—the achievement of national consent based on broad dialogue among Afghans, compromises and mutual regard for the interests of the forces opposing each other, political pluralism and good will.

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The article analysing the results of the visit by Mikhail Gorbachev to India in November 1986 opens the issue. It states that the importance of this visit, taken in the international context, far exceeds the framework of Soviet-Indian relations.

The next article, written by two Candidates of History—I. Zevelev and A. Kara-Murza—deals with a different subject. The founders of Marxism-Leninism thought that the victories of proletarian revolutions in the advanced states would help backward states to accelerate their transition to socialism. But, on account of circumstances, a socialist revolution took place in Russia, a country that was backward itself and, according to Lenin, had to accumulate prerequisites for socialism, which could be done by assimilating bourgeois achievements of the entire humanity. Lenin spoke for giving any assistance to national liberation movements in colonies and semi-colonies, but he did not speak of the Russian proletariat's ability to ensure, all alone, their non-capitalist development. Quite the opposite idea was proposed after Lenin's death by the Communist International.

Under Stalin, a trend toward "etatist anti-capitalism" (instead of civilizing mission) reigned supreme, presupposing a restoration of new kinds of social structures, somehow similar to Oriental despotism. True, this policy helped to radically consolidate the military-economic potential of the state, badly needed in conditions of confrontation with imperialism. It is just this experience that, in our day and age, was gained by the Afro-Asian countries which opted for socialism after decolonisation. Hence the numerous failures in the creation of a just society and the cases of degeneration of progressive regimes.

The authors arrive at the conclusion that today the opportunities for a further expansion of etatism, even screened by socialist slogans, are diminishing. A large group of countries in Asia and Africa, where capitalism has entrenched itself de-facto, could speak of a search for ways to modify capitalism (rather than bypass it), to shorten this stage and meet the interests of the popular masses. The perestroika in the Soviet Union and radical reforms in China promote a renovation of socialism, which may become a true example (and in some cases a guarantee) for intensifying social transformations in the young states. But this should be done on a more humanitarian and democratic basis.

As the Soviet-US relations are becoming healthier, the two great powers may take some joint or parallel measures toward the developing countries' progress and settlement of regional conflicts. By applying this general postulate to Africa, Doctor of History Y. Tarabrin shows how the USSR and the US might promote the turning of the continent into a nuclear-free zone, to slow down the arms race, pernicious to the young states' economy, to solve social and ecological problems such as starvation, the onslaught of the desert, inadequate health service. The author stresses that intense contacts between Washington and Moscow have helped move the issue of settling the problems in South West Africa off the dead centre.

The riot of the Arab people in Palestine, going on over a year, has become known as a "revolution made by stones." The patriots fighting on the Israeli-occupied territory do not use fire arms lest they should not provoke the occupationist army to bring down on them an avalanche of fire, in which case the casualties would be much more numerous. The well-known Soviet journalist Pavel Demchenko who saw the fighting with his own eyes, tells the reader about the reasons for and the objectives of the uprising, which is led by the Palestine Liberation Organisation. He welcomes the declaration of the Arab State of Palestine, the formation of which was envisaged by a UN Resolution back in 1947. He justly asserts that by withdrawing its troops from the occupied territories, Israel will get a chance to live peacefully with its neighbours within the boundaries, recognised by the world community.

The item by G. Shmelyov is an account of the international forum held under the slogans "Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation in the Asian Pacific Region." The forum was held in the city of Vladivostok and gathered over a hundred of political and public figures, scholars, businessmen, workers of culture and mass media. They arrived from 36 countries of the Far east and several European countries.

Kampuchians have marked the 10th anniversary of the liberation of their country from Pol Pot's regime which annihilated millions of people over the three years of its rule. Having reminded the reader of this tragedy, the author S. Georgiyev restores for him the path along

which the Kampuchean people are coming back to life. In August 1987 the government declared the course toward a national reconciliation; it expresses readiness to have a dialogue with all oppositional groupings and leaders (excluding Pol Pot and his entourage), it stipulates the withdrawal of Vietnamese voluntary troops by non-interference in its internal affairs. The government also suggests that an international conference be convened to settle the affairs around and within Kampuchea. Contacts needed for the aforesaid moves have been established. One may say that light has flickered at the end of the tunnel.

Mustafa Talas, Defense Minister of Syria, granted an interview to our correspondent in which he expressed his regret over the lack of changes for the better in the Middle East. "The Soviet Union," said M. Talas, "adheres to a clear-cut and frank position in this respect, which has been rejected by the USA and Israel, however."

In the opinion of Doctor of History V. Khoros, Soviet scholars have had for a long time published simplified, "easy" works concerning nationalism. As to the developing countries, their nationalism was viewed from the angle of their anti-imperialist sentiment. The Khomeini regime has shown, however, that "anti-imperialist" nationalism can be reactionary all right. This case, just as many others, prompts us to reassess the nationalist trends in the Afro-Asian world. Nevertheless, the author categorically rejects the trend of giving the term "nationalism" only a negative meaning. Trying to clear out the dialectics of this phenomenon, he makes most interesting digressions into the histories of Russia and Japan. The concluding part of the article will be published in one of the next issues of the journal.

A large literary portrait of Deng Xiaoping, the "architect" of the present-day reforms in China, was written by M. Yakovlev. Deng Xiaoping, who is 84 now, is a man of an unusual destiny, playing a key part in the carrying through of the historical transformations in the politics of the Communist Party of China. The author is sure that in our day and age, when confrontation is replaced by detente, consultations and dialogues, normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations are also inevitable. The old relations will be replaced by good-neighbourliness, cooperation, friendship and peace.

In answer to the request by our readers, our author V. Semyonovych tells them about the activity in Lebanon of the pro-Iranian religious-political organization Hezbollah which upholds the interests of the Shiite community, the largest in the country and comprising over a million of people, according to some estimates. This extremist grouping preaches a "holy war" against imperialism and Zionism, but on the other hand it comes out against progressive parties and organizations and has had a hand in many terrorist acts.

Candidate of Philology I. Glushkova acquaints the reader with Maraths, a people inhabiting the Indian state of Maharashtra, their philosophy, culture, way of life and traditions.

V. Karpov, our new correspondent in Madagascar, began to work there. His first travel notes from Antananarive describe the capital, its suburbs, and also give a short analysis of the country's liberalisation policy.

M. Kuzmichova wrote an article for the CULTURE, LITERATURE, ARTS column, in which she invites the reader to feast his eyes on wonderful Korean ceramics and folk embroidering. In the same column M. Kuznetsova talks to the Indian cinema actor Akbar Khan. Also in this column the reader will see chapters from the breath-taking political detective The Wilby Conspiracy, the most famous novel by Peter Driscoll. The author, born in London and brought up in South Africa, now lives in Ireland. The action of his novel takes place in South Africa. Our journal will continue publishing the novel for the whole year.

The same issue begins carrying Life of Ramakrishna, the novel by Romain Rolland, which was published in Russian only once, in 1936, and had a circulation of a bit more than 5,000 copies. As Candidate of History R. Rybakov writes in the foreword, Ramakrishna who lived in 1836-1886 has a full right of being revered among such outstanding religious leaders as Buddha, Jesus Christ and Mohammed.

The concept of the woman being second-rate, the polygamy, the marriage and divorce Moslem way—these are the questions Doctor of History D. Yeremeyev deals with in his essay. He confirms his conclusions by texts from the Koran, the works by other ethnographers and his own observations.

Candidate of History S. Guskov, who was present at the Seoul Olympic Games, has magnificently rendered in his article the atmosphere of hospitality, mutual understanding and detente which reigned supreme there. He cites vast statistical data on the successes of sportsmen from Asia and Africa at the Olympics.

As usual, various materials are presented by the issue in its EVENTS, FACTS, FIGURES.

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Soviet-Indian Relations Viewed

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 2-3*

[Unattributed article: "A Visit of Historic Significance"]

[Text] Among the most important political events of the past year was the official visit of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman M.S. Gorbachev to the Republic of India.

The significance of the visit of the Soviet leader goes far beyond the bounds of bilateral Soviet-Indian relations. The USSR and India—states with different socio-political structures—are, through the force of example, facilitating the affirmation of principles of peaceful co-existence, pointing the way toward demilitarization, democratization and humanization of international relations and counter-trends leading to nuclear catastrophe.

The results of the visit were set forth in the Soviet-Indian summit declaration. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of India, this document states, note with profound satisfaction that the principles of new political thinking embodied in the Delhi Declaration are more and more striking a chord around the world.

Recall that the Delhi Declaration, signed by the leaders of the USSR and India over two years ago, contains a call to build a world free of nuclear weapons and violence. The time that has passed since then has shown with all clarity that this historic document is having a positive effect on the overall political climate in the world and is stimulating the transformation of international relations. The signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty and the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, the ceasefire on the Iran-Iraq front and positive shifts in the direction of settlement for the conflicts in Southeast Asia, southwestern Africa and other regions of the world testify to the vitality and topicality of the Delhi Declaration.

The USSR and India, as is indicated in the Soviet-Indian summit declaration, feel the contemporary interdependent world to be the common home of mankind. They are in concert that militarism, politics from a position of force and the partitioning of the world into military alliances has outlived its time and that there should not be any military bases and strongpoints outside national boundaries.

It is natural that the participants in the negotiations in New Delhi devoted much attention to security in Asia and the expanse of the Pacific and Indian oceans. The initiatives made public in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, declared M.S. Gorbachev in New Delhi, are an invitation to seek ways together to improve the situation in the region with the participation of all interested states including, naturally, the United States. The Soviet Union is especially relying here on understanding and collaboration on the part of India, without which the problems of the Asian-Pacific region cannot be solved. This is also true in relation to another great state—China. Hopeful shifts are taking place in relations between Moscow and Beijing. An official visit of PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen to the USSR has taken place. This visit is regarded in Beijing as the beginning of a new stage in Chinese-Soviet relations.

It is gratifying that changes for the better have also been discerned in Indian-Chinese relations. Our peoples remember that the five principles of peaceful co-existence were formulated at one time namely by India and China.

The most important problems troubling mankind were discussed in the course of the negotiations in New Delhi. These include: the issue of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; the problems of a settlement surrounding Afghanistan; the situation in the Near East; questions of a political settlement in Kampuchea, an easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula and the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a peace zone; a settlement to the situation in Southwest Africa; the development, with UN assistance, of a global strategy for protecting the environment and the efficient utilization of the Earth's resources.

The Soviet Union and India emphasize, as is noted in the Soviet-Indian summit declaration, that responsibility for the future of the world lies with all countries, large and small. The United Nations is an independent mechanism for seeking peaceful solutions to international issues, breaking up crisis situations and settling other global problems. The Soviet Union and India note with satisfaction the growing activity of the UN and its bodies of late and will assist in raising the reputation and capabilities of this universal organization in the future as well. The UN system at the same time should reflect the changing realities of the contemporary world and adapt to them so as to fulfill its mission better.

The Soviet Union and India emphasize the outstanding role of the non-aligned movement in the contemporary world. It has shown itself to be a constructive, influential and innovative force in the development of the problems of peace, disarmament and development and has made its own contribution to a lessening of international tensions. The parties are deeply convinced that the movement will play an ever greater role in resolving the tasks facing the world.

The positions of the leaders of the USSR and India on these and other most important problems have elicited lively interest in many countries and are regarded as an important contribution to reviving the international climate and ensuring a lasting peace on our planet.

The fact that the Soviet-Indian summit declaration expressed concern about the obstructionist policies of certain forces violating the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan is attracting attention, the Japanese newspaper ASAHI writes. The USSR and India, the newspaper continues, have appealed to the UN secretary general with a request to realize immediately the mandate given to him by the UN General Assembly Resolution on Afghanistan, which emphasizes the necessity of a dialogue among Afghans to create a broad-based government.

The USSR and India, notes the Tokyo SANKEY SHIMBUN, have come out consistently in favor of the elimination of all foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean and not allowing the creation of new bases there. They

condemn the attempts to increase foreign military presence in that region and call persistently for the fastest possible convocation, no later than 1990, of an international conference on the Indian Ocean.

The events of the last two years have shown that with the presence of political will, the new concepts of a more secure and just world can obtain universal recognition, emphasizes the Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO. The demilitarization, democratization and humanization of international relations are essential. Militarism, politics from a position of force and the partitioning of the world into military alliances have engendered suspicion and hostility and should be eliminated. There should not be any military bases or strong points outside national boundaries, the newspaper notes.

The union between the USSR and India has been reinforced, the Italian newspaper UNITA notes. The coincidence of the viewpoints of Moscow and New Delhi on the most important international problems calls attention to itself. The ties between India and the USSR have never been stronger over the last 30 years, the newspaper concludes.

"The visit was a new confirmation of the deep ties of friendship between the two countries," emphasizes the French newspaper LE MONDE. "The aid rendered by the Soviet Union is highly valued in India, and the enormous importance of bilateral collaboration is noted. The summit meetings of the leaders of these two powers are of a regular nature, which demonstrates the stability of their ties. The fact that in India, and especially among the intelligentsia, they have not forgotten the fact of historical significance that it was namely the USSR that made a decisive contribution to the emergence of Indian national heavy industry is also important."

"The visit of M.S. Gorbachev to New Delhi took place against a background of favorable reaction in India in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troop units from Afghanistan," asserts the English newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH. "The Indians perceive this step by Moscow as testimony to the genuine aspirations of the Soviet leadership for a settlement in the region."

"The traditionally close ties between Moscow and New Delhi have been lifted to a qualitatively higher level as a result of this visit of M.S. Gorbachev," emphasizes the English newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES.

The relations of the USSR and India are defined by a similarity and, on many issues, coincidence of views on the sense and goals of world processes. Trust and an obligation not to undertake steps that could inflict real harm on the interests of the other party are based on the Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Collaboration and the Delhi Declaration.

The interaction of the USSR and India has a solid foundation and in no way hinders the development of their relations with third countries. "We," declared Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, "have demonstrated to the whole world the best example of the peaceful co-existence of two states with differing social and economic systems, accomplishing close collaboration on the basis of equality, mutual understanding and mutual trust. Indian-Soviet friendship has benefited millions and has caused harm to no one. It is relations built by the peoples of two countries over the course of decades. It is a demonstration of what can be achieved thanks to good will and mutual respect and trust."

It is natural that the international potential of the interaction of the Soviet Union and India is made more significant, the more substantive their bilateral relations are. The new agreements between the governments, signed in New Delhi in the course of the visit of M.S. Gorbachev, make it possible to impart a new quality to Soviet-Indian collaboration, to move from the profitable exchange of goods to production cooperation and the creation of joint ventures, to develop progressive technologies and materials along with new methods of agro-technology through joint efforts, and to conduct research in progressive areas of science.

Both parties, the document points out, declare anew their desire to continue the fine tradition of USSR festivals in India and Indian festivals in the USSR, organizing them in the Indian states and the Soviet republics, and a desire to mark the 20th anniversary of the Soviet-Indian Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Collaboration and the 5th anniversary of the Delhi Declaration of the principles of a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons with the holding of academic symposia, conferences and cultural functions in both countries.

The official visit of M.S. Gorbachev to India confirmed anew with especial force the truth that the fruitful development of Soviet-Indian relations is an important factor in reinforcing peace in Asia and around the world.

M.S. Gorbachev noted the international significance of the Delhi Declaration in his speech at the UN. He called the provision contained in it on the fact that force and the threat of force cannot and should not be an instrument of foreign policy any more a most important component of a non-violent world as an ideal that the two countries call upon all other states to pursue.

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New Prospects for Socialism in Asia, Africa
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 4-7

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Zevelev and Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Kara-Murza: "The Fate of Socialism in the Afro-Asian World"]

[Excerpts] *Restructuring and the new thinking, the re-interpretation of the historical path taken by the USSR and the devising of suitable approaches to the problems of*

*world development persistently demand an objective analysis of the nature and prospects of the interconnection of the building of socialism in our country and the struggle for social progress in the Afro-Asian states. The tendency to mythologize the substance of this interconnection must be decisively overcome therein. The thesis "to act everywhere and in any situation from the position of realism," including in international affairs, was advanced at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. "Only such a foreign policy can serve restructuring effectively. Only in that case can it count on a realistic attitude on the part of those to whom it is addressed."*¹

The Marxist concept of the union of anti-bourgeois forces of various natures arose logically out of an analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and first and foremost such traits of it as the ability of internationalize all of social life, thanks to which the history of mankind is becoming truly worldwide. [passage omitted]

Restructuring and the Revolutionary Process

The liberation process in the Afro-Asian world and the strengthening of its anti-capitalist component are realities of the contemporary era. The Leninist formula that it was "immeasurably easier" for revolution "to begin, but will be more difficult to continue"² in Russia (compared to the West) is wholly applicable to the liberated countries as well. The cause of the complications that arose therein in attempts to expand the social transformations in the states of Asia and Africa is not only the weakness of the civilized preconditions necessary for this, but also to a considerable extent the non-realization of the advantages of the new order in the world of socialism. The policy of restructuring in the USSR, having as its aim breaking free the social revolution within the country, opens up the way for the formation of a social force in the form of renewed socialism in the world community that can really become an example and, in a number of instances, a guarantee of the consistent expansion of the social transformations being pursued in the liberated countries.

This is the sense of the new quality of interconnection between the building of socialism in our country and the revolutionary process in the Orient. It can be surmised, also taking into account the radical change in the model of socialism within the framework of which China is developing, that favorable external conditions have been created in recent years for seeking new and more realistic, humane and democratic ways of social progress in the countries of Asia and Africa. We will delineate two aspects herein.

First of all, the theoretical depictions of socialism are being fundamentally renewed and, as a consequence, the practices of building a new society are gradually changing. The moral and political discrediting of the Stalinist command-administrative system (being, in our opinion, a typical version of statism), the "restoration of rights," common humanitarian ideas and a turn in the direction

of socialist pluralism and the democratization of society are constituent elements of these processes in the Soviet Union. A certain evolution of the strategy of part of the revolutionary forces of the liberated countries, a regrouping in their social base, changes in the tactics for seeking allies etc. should clearly be expected in this regard. The basic direction of these shifts, it seems, will consist of a turn away from seeking to "make the people happy" quickly, foisting on them the "paradise" of a totally "statized" society, toward a search for effective ways of overcoming backwardness while observing the principles of social justice, democracy and tolerance. A certain portion of the revolutionary forces will probably remain in their original positions herein and will not be cured of the "infantile disease of 'leftism'" that is leading, under the contemporary conditions of the countries of the Orient, to an analogue of statism in its patriarchal-bureaucratic and especially anti-humane forms.

The second aspect of the influence of restructuring on the Afro-Asian world consists of the marked changes in the international climate. The time when world development was defined by the struggle of two systems, each of which was striving by all means to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of the Third World, is gradually passing. The trend toward the internationalization of all of social life on a truly global scale, moreover under conditions of growth in the diversity of the trajectories of the movement along the path of social progress, will grow stronger to the extent that the principles of the new thinking are affirmed in the practice of international relations. The concepts of freedom of choice, occupying a key place in the new thinking and for the affirmation of which in international relations the USSR is fighting, assumes both a respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states and the voluntary material and spiritual mutual enrichment of the peoples of the world.

In this climate, the rigid statist regimes with a "leftist" ideology that have existed up until now under conditions of "hot" and "cold" regional conflicts largely thanks to support from without are having to face the necessity of moving toward constructive collaboration with part of the opposition (which, as a rule, is far from being homogeneously reactionary), utilizing elements of capitalism monitored "from above" to overcome backwardness, limiting the omnipotence of state structures and seeking their place in a mutually dependent and integral world, and not one divided into hostile "camps" by an Iron Curtain. The political development of Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and Kampuchea in 1988, in the face of all the lack of similarity of the situations in those countries, had one important common feature: notwithstanding the obstacles erected by imperialism and its allies with a vested interest in the complete dismantling of anti-capitalist factors, sustained work on creating the preconditions for a stabilization of the situation on the basis of domestic and foreign political compromises has been underway there. Restructuring and the new thinking can gradually create the external guarantees that the peace and welfare of whole peoples will not fall victim in

the future to contrived schemes of rapid leaps forward by backward countries to "socialism" of a barracks bent, engendering, as a rule, a sharp worsening of the international climate.

The lessening of the military-forces rivalry of the two systems will probably also lead to the creation of unfavorable outward conditions for the appearance and existence of autocratic traditional-statist regimes. Their inability to solve urgent socio-economic and political problems through civilized means was confirmed once again by the events of the past year in Burma.

It seems that it would hardly be correct under contemporary conditions to pose the question of the possibility of transforming traditional anti-capitalist factors into a favorable basis for socialist development, even in the most backward regions of Asia and Africa. They could, however, play their own—and no small—role as a constituent element of the movement along the path of social progress. A pledge of this is union with the progressive forces of the developed part of the world, and first and foremost with **revolutionarily renewed socialism**. The great possibilities for the fruitful enrichment of the struggle for social liberation in the developing countries using the ideas and achievements of **contemporary Western societies**—first and foremost in the realm of the self-organization of restructuring as expressed in the broad sweep of mass democratic social movements, which are becoming one of the principal forms for limiting the power of state-monopoly structures and modifying social development with a regard for the interests of the popular masses—should also not be underestimated.

The renewal of socialism, on the other hand, also makes the pursuit of policies of force by the leaders of the imperialist states and their support for dictatorial statist regimes with "right-wing" ideologies under the pretext of the necessity of firmly countering the "communist threat" more difficult to a certain extent. Good will on the part of the ruling circles of the West and the rejection of any methods of foisting one's own development models onto the liberated countries, however, are also essential for the creation of favorable external conditions for social progress in the Afro-Asian world.

The transition from social mythology (and the political practices fitted underneath it) toward the postulation and solution of problems on the basis of humanity and common sense is thus undoubtedly a life-giving one and will produce its own results. It is also clear, however, that the process of forming a new theory also should not and cannot be limited by the bounds of pragmatic common sense. It does not consist of the simple negation and "turning inside out" of yesterday's discredited concepts alone. The revolutionary intellectual restructuring in interpreting the realities of the liberated countries and their interaction with the world of renewing socialism is just beginning.

Footnotes

1. Materials of the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1988, p 29.

2. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol. 36, p 10.

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Soviet, U.S. Goals, Activities in Africa

Moscow *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA* in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 8-10

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Ye. Tarabrin: "Africa—Soviet-American Parallel Actions: Goals and Opportunities"]

[Text] Among such global problems of modern times demanding immediate resolution as the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, disarmament and the protection of the environment is the problem of the Third World, that is, the developing countries. The majority of them are burdened with most severe contradictions: economic backwardness and crushing foreign debt; a desire for social justice with poverty and hunger; rapid population growth and disease, epidemics and increasing infant mortality; the necessity of spiritual emergence with ignorance and illiteracy; a gravitation toward unity within the non-aligned movement, the OAU etc. and regional conflicts, domestic and among states, taking millions of lives and destroying material assets.

I will not go into the reasons for these contradictions—they are well known. Something else is more important: what is to be done? The new political thinking provides an answer: we must move from isolated palliative measures toward well thought-out and comprehensive international actions.

What can the role of the USSR and the United States be here, especially apropos of the African continent, where the aforementioned and other contradictions have taken on an especially tragic nature?

The Starting Line

Recall that during his meeting with President R. Reagan in Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev, touching on the situation in the developing world, noted that the initial and main way the great powers and the international community overall could help is with an unconditional recognition of the freedom of choice of each country to its own path of development and support for the idea of a restructuring of world economic ties without discrimination against any states for political motives. This approach would not permit disputes on the score of the fate of the Third World to take confrontational forms. R. Reagan in turn emphasized that both sides had taken on the obligation to collaborate in resolving political issues.¹

"Although serious differences of opinion have been revealed by these discussions in evaluating both the causes of regional tensions and the means for overcoming them," we read in the joint declaration on the results of the summit negotiations, "the leaders are agreed that these differences should not serve as an obstacle to constructive interaction between the USSR and the United States." Whence it follows that "constructive interaction" of the two powers in various areas is not only possible, but desirable.

The revival of Soviet-American relations moreover directly assumes the arrangement—and far from on the basis of some condominium—of parallel or joint actions by the USSR and the United States for the sake of the progress of the young states and the breaking up of regional conflicts. Such acts would serve at the same time as a reinforcement of their own mutual trust.

The opinion has formed in the course of a series of discussions among many Soviet and American scholars that broad opportunities for such collaboration do exist in Africa, which is experiencing a most acute need for assistance. A corresponding draft plan was advanced at a conference of representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute and the Center for African Studies and the Center for International and Strategic Studies of the University of California—Los Angeles, as well as the University of Southern California (Moscow, December 1987).

We will consider in detail some of the realms where parallel or joint actions by the USSR and the United States could be especially promising.

Disarmament and Security

The realization of the INF Treaty is creating the preconditions for a further reduction in the already not-too-great strategic military significance of Africa for the USSR and the United States. The sanctions that have been imposed by the U.S. Congress against South Africa, despite their limited nature, do not permit the United States to develop nuclear collaboration with Pretoria. The two great powers, thereby having taken a common position, could come out firmly in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the continent, and to find ways to compel South Africa to reject any attempts to produce them and put the nuclear facilities on its territory under international monitoring.

Some African states are openly objecting to the very idea of non-proliferation, classifying it as "contempt for the sovereignty of the weak." It will hardly be possible to convince them of the error and danger of such views without joint international efforts, the initiative for which would preferably come from the USSR and the United States.

The growth of military spending and conventional arms is a sad fact (true, it has slowed somewhat in a number of countries south of the Sahara, but chiefly due to economic difficulties). There are objective reasons for this as well, for instance, among the neighbors of South Africa. It cannot be deemed normal, however, that the military appropriations of the developing states of the continent increased by almost 16 times in comparable prices over 1960-80, and their share of worldwide spending on defense has gone from 0.4 to 3.8 percent. They spent about 140 billion dollars for these purposes from 1976 through 1987, that is, a sum roughly equal to two thirds of their aggregate national debt.² The region has moved into first place in the developing world in per-capita arms procurements despite its poverty. The number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa with tanks increased from 2 to 18 between 1966 and 1981, while those with aircraft went from 6 to 21 and artillery from 7 to 36 etc.³

It is no secret that the United States and the USSR, although for fundamentally different motives, are supplying arms to the developing countries, especially the African ones. Interaction between the two powers directed toward reducing their influx into Africa (political will must be displayed for this, of course, and a concrete study of the issue with a regard for the realities of the continent performed) would serve as a real precedent for the rest of the exporters—France, Great Britain, Italy and other European and non-European states. I would note in passing that according to American sources, the volume of Soviet arms deliveries to Africa declined by 60 percent from 1984 through 1987, while the number of countries procuring them has dropped to 7 versus 22 in 1970.⁴

Their African recipients bear considerably more responsibility than before both for halting the arms race on the continent and for universal security. It would be incorrect to assert that the leaders of the overwhelming majority of the African states are not aware of this. Testimony to this is the multitude of OAU documents indicating the necessity of trimming military spending. There is no small gap, however, between collective appeals and individual actions in this sphere.

The principal role in a positive solution to the problem of African demilitarization remains with the African countries themselves. Consultative interaction on this issue between the USSR, the United States and other industrially developed states is both essential and possible.

Economic and Social Problems

The new political thinking also requires fresh approaches to such African problems as the scandalous backwardness, poverty, hunger, mass diseases and the threat of ecological catastrophe. A concentrated expression of the crisis is the sharp growth in the foreign indebtedness of the countries of the continent (from 11 billion dollars in

1970 to 220 billion in 1987), surpassing two thirds of their aggregate GNP and requiring annual payments on the scale of half of their export receipts.⁵ If this crisis becomes aggravated, it will affect the interests and living conditions of all the peoples of the planet.

I will briefly enumerate a series of directions in connection with the aforementioned in which joint or parallel actions by the USSR and the United States are realistic. These are first of all aid to the African countries in the production and distribution of agricultural products, in prospecting, extracting and marketing minerals and supporting the individual economic plans of these or those subregional organizations, for example the South African Development and Collaboration Conference (SADCC).

Soviet-American interaction would be expedient in the realm of protecting the environment, fighting against land going to desert and against natural disasters and raising the level of medical care on the continent. Why not create there, say, a major joint treatment center with branches in a number of countries? A hospital that was founded before the turn of the century by the French physician and philosopher Albert Schweitzer, who also invested the Nobel Prize he was awarded in its expansion, is functioning to this day in Lambarene (Gabon). What he was able to do this at his own expense cannot be beyond the strength of the two great powers. It seems that this idea is deserving of attention from both a humanitarian and a political point of view.

Scholars, political figures and world opinion overall are more and more willing to acknowledge the necessity of a comprehensive approach to ecological, food and medical problems in Africa—an approach according to which the fight against land turning to desert, droughts, hunger and disease requires coordinated actions on the national, regional and global levels simultaneously. It also envisages close contacts among specialists from various states in researching the complex mechanism of the effects of the African climate, especially drought, on the natural environment, socio-economic processes, agricultural production and the food situation. Initiatives by the USSR and the United States on these issues would undoubtedly be highly regarded by the international community.

I note that the aforementioned problems have no clearly expressed ideological nuances and in practice do not touch on the remaining "sore spots" in Soviet-American relations, and it is thus namely in their solution that the two powers could begin collaboration today.

This is not my opinion alone. In a work recently published by the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies titled "Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next President," it was stated directly that the depiction of Africa as a "chessboard for an East-West match" is "oversimplified" and ignores the political realities of the continent.⁶ In the United States, at least in academic

circles, they are more and more inclined to the conviction that the USSR "is present" in Africa not as an "exporter of revolution" with the aim of transforming it into one of the Soviet socialist republics, but rather as a state desiring—and this is entirely normal—to have friendly relations with all African countries, and moreover "not treading on the corn" of their Western partners.

As for the USSR, the 19th All-Union Party Conference underscored the role that new thinking, rid of historically outdated stereotypes, should play in foreign policy. At the same time—we do not hide this, but make a display of it—the solidarity of the USSR with peoples who want to achieve national, social and economic liberation via sweeping away the debris of the past and the present remains unaltered. The necessity of a just solution to the problems of the Third World is also recognized by no small portion of the public in the United States.

I am reminded of the words spoken about Africa by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during his visit to Casablanca in November of 1943: "What riches! The imperialists (this was about the European mother countries—Ye.T.) do not understand what they could do, how much they could create! They have pumped billions out of this continent, but in their short-sightedness they have not understood that these billions are brass farthings compared to the opportunities that are revealed before them, opportunities that should provide a better life for the population of this continent..."⁷

Today the United States together with the USSR and other states ready to display their good will can effectively facilitate improvements in the life of Africans.

Regional Conflicts

In moving on to the issue of breaking up conflicts in Africa, and first and foremost in the southern part of the continent, I want to quote the statement of M.S. Gorbachev from his interview with the WASHINGTON POST and NEWSWEEK magazine: "If constructive interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States is arranged, if the reputation and opportunities of the United Nations, its Security Council and other bodies are widely utilized, then the political settlement of regional conflicts and the aversion of new ones will gradually enter the practice of international relations and become the norm."⁸

Concrete reflection of this thought was found in particular in the meeting of the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, A. Adamshin, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker that took place in Lisbon on 18-19 May 88. The report published on the meeting states that "Having affirmed the positive attitude toward the dynamics that have appeared recently in the area of a political settlement of the situation on the continent, the parties have concentrated their attention on the possibilities for parallel or

joint steps by the USSR and the United States so as to assist the further development of this process with a regard for the legal interests of all interested forces."⁹

I am far from ascribing such events in Africa as, for example, the normalization of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, Libya and Chad or the countries of the Maghreb only to the influence of the foreign policy of the USSR and the change for the better in Soviet-American relations. In my opinion, however, the new political thinking, becoming the property of an ever greater number of countries and peoples, has definitely had an effect here.

The interaction of the USSR and the United States in the spirit of the new thinking could largely ease and accelerate the resolution of the conflict in the southern part of the continent. This conflict, although it is included among regional ones, has gone far beyond the bounds of the South African region and has become internationalized. Some 11 African states are taking immediate part in it (six of them are even called "front-line" states), and the United States first and foremost, and then Great Britain, France, West Germany and Canada (earlier comprising the so-called contact group for negotiations on the independence of Namibia), as well as Cuba, the USSR and a number of other socialist states, have a direct or indirect relation to it. International organizations—the UN, the OAU and the non-aligned movement—are also involved in the conflict.

Hundreds of resolutions condemning the South African regime have been adopted, and in 1973 the UN General Assembly approved a convention on cutting off the crime of apartheid and punishing it which classified apartheid as a crime against humanity that creates a serious threat to world peace and security. While the states of the socialist community have unswervingly fulfilled the anti-racist resolutions of the UN, many countries of the West, in words dissociating themselves from apartheid, have maintained close ties with South Africa and refused to join the convention. It is namely this that allows Pretoria to ignore the demands of the world community.

The opinion expressed on this score by the eminent American scholar and associate of the Council on Foreign Relations, M. Claff, is of interest: "When a new president takes his place in 1989, he will inherit a tangled clump of policies in relation to southern Africa—policies that are inconsistent, incompatible and to a considerable extent ineffective. The development of a strategy meeting the challenges of the region and able to obtain widespread support in the United States itself will require 'new thinking.'"¹⁰ This is a condemnation of "constructive engagement" with South Africa and a call to find new approaches to the conflict.

There are, in my opinion, real possibilities for practical steps in the matter of a step-by-step settlement of the conflict in southern Africa, for example, for concluding

peace agreements that are guaranteed by third countries with the active mediation of international organizations. The Soviet Union, as its leaders have declared, is ready for interaction with the United States and other countries on this issue.

Some shifts toward a political settlement have already been noted. Negotiations of Angola and Cuba with South Africa with U.S. mediation have been held in London, Cairo, New York and Geneva. The ministers of foreign affairs of Angola and South Africa have met in Brazzaville. Groups of experts are at work. The document "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwest Africa" has been prepared, and consent has been reached relative to the necessity of granting independence to Namibia based on UN Security Council Resolution 435. South African troops have been withdrawn from Angola, and the phased departure of the Cuban contingent from the country lies ahead. The statement of C. Crocker that clearing the way to progress in the negotiations was helped by "intensive contacts between Washington and Moscow" is noteworthy. Much depends on the position of South Africa today. Will they prefer rational compromise to their former wager on force?

As for the internal aspect of the conflict, the crisis of the apartheid regime—political, economic and military—is obvious. The fight of the oppressed majority of the country's population, headed by the African National Congress (ANC), for the creation of a democratic and non-racial state in South Africa continues despite its ups and downs. The ANC has won the support of a certain portion of the white citizenry of South Africa as well, which is natural; far from all of them are racists.

The political will of the population of South Africa itself should of course play a decisive role in the elimination of apartheid. But outside influence on the regime, and especially sanctions, have enormous significance as well. It must be noted that American scholars and other analysts have concluded that conversations regarding the "vital importance" to the United States of sea lanes skirting the Cape of Good Hope and the minerals obtained from South Africa contain exceedingly propagandistic exaggerations. The point is not only the United States, however. I cite another statement by M. Claff: "The most serious difficulties are being created by the refusal of four states—Israel, Japan, Great Britain and West Germany—to follow the American example" even in the event the new president tightens the strategy of sanctions. Why? "These states have significantly broader and more important economic and other ties with South Africa than the United States."¹¹

And so then, if the author is right (and he evidently is), parallel or joint actions on this issue are essential not only by the USSR and the United States, but by the states mentioned as well. Taking into account the specific nature of the thinking of the ruling group in South

Africa, pressure on them should be strengthened by the whole international community, right up to the employment of a broad set of diverse sanctions.

The creation of a mechanism for parallel or joint actions by the USSR and the United States on African issues and the launching of that mechanism is nonetheless a simpler task than, by way of example, reducing the nuclear arsenals of both powers with most strict and exceedingly complex verification. But that task is being resolved! The political will and the ways and means must be found to unite our efforts for the good of the peoples of long-suffering Africa. Time does not wait. It is time to move from discussions to practical matters.

Footnotes

1. See: PRAVDA, 1 Jun 88.
2. Calculated from: "World Armament and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1985-1987."
3. See: "African Armies. Evolution and Capabilities." London, 1986, p 96.
4. See: "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987." Washington D.C., 1988, p 31, Table IV.
5. See: "World Debt Tables 1980-1987." World Bank.
6. "Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next President." The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington D.C., 1988, p 1.
7. Elliot Roosevelt. Through His Own Eyes. Moscow, 1947, pp 98-99.
8. PRAVDA, 23 May 88.
9. IZVESTIYA, 20 May 88.
10. "Beyond Sanctions: Reorienting U.S. Policy on Southern Africa."—"Critical Issues" (Council on Foreign Relations), 1988, No 3, p 5.
11. Ibid., pp 12-13.

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Causes, Effects of Palestinian Uprising
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 11-13

[Article by P. Demchenko: "The Revolution of Stones"]

[Text] On the night of 15 Nov 88 the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, announced in Algiers the creation of

an independent Palestinian state, without, it is true, citing the dimensions of its territory or its exact boundaries. That is not all that important today, by the way. The main thing is something else. The new state was proclaimed on the solid legal basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 adopted 42 years ago. It envisaged the formation of two states—a Jewish and an Arab—on the territory of Palestine that was then under British mandate. One—Israel—was created in May of 1948. The other has not appeared on any geographical map, while all of its lands have gradually fallen under Israeli control. And now a historical wrong is being righted.

The Palestinian people have traversed a difficult, tortuous and sometimes tragic path to this resolution, which is undoubtedly a historic event, and not only on the scale of the Near East alone.

The Soviet Union and dozens of other countries have recognized the proclamation of the Palestinian state.

The uprising that burst out in the occupied territories over a year ago led logically to the resolution adopted by the Palestinians. At first it looked like a "youth riot," since the generation that had been born and raised during the years of Israeli rule had long been bursting to go into battle despite the daily cruel repressions of the occupiers. They know the history of their fathers, driven from their native lands in 1948-49, and passionately recall the lot of their fathers who placed their hopes in the Arab armies and suffered terribly in their defeat of 1967. The youth had been seized more and more with the idea of a mass popular uprising under the slogans "Rely on our own forces," "We are the vanguard of the PLO" and "This is our land, we must live here."

Literally on the eve of the outbreak there were few who knew that an underground leadership had already been created for the uprising and the days for it to start had been planned—at the end of December 1987 and beginning of 1988. Most likely it was to coincide with the date of the first operation conducted by the Fatah organization against the Israelis on New Year's Night of 1965—that same bold operation from which it is accepted to count the record of the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM).

But the popular uprising occurred three weeks before the planned time. The cup of patience overflowed when Israeli hooligans shot up a bus of Palestinian workers in Gaza. Barricades went up in the streets of the city the next day, which the police tried to remove. Cobblestones and bottles rained down on them. Bursts of automatic weapons fire sounded in reply. The first blood had been spilled in a protracted struggle that the Arabs call by their word *intifada*, which in translation means "uprising."

The events of December 9 in Gaza served as the spark from which the dry tinder of universal dissatisfaction was ignited. The largest clash of the Israeli state with Palestinians living on the territories occupied in 1967

unfurled. The patriots displayed courage and staunchness. They were able to overcome the barrier of fear of the Israeli militarists and planned the most sensible means of resisting the powerful and cruel adversary—meetings, strikes and demonstrations, non-payment of taxes, boycotting Israeli goods—and used other forms of the campaign of civil disobedience.

At first it seemed to some that the outburst of universal indignation was of a spontaneous nature and would soon be exhausted. That is what the Israeli leadership assumed as well, by the way. It became obvious to the extent of the widening of the bounds of the *intifada*, however, that a well-defined plan was being realized: not to give the occupiers a day's peace, exhaust them, deprive them of confidence in their strength. The leaders of the uprising called upon the patriots not to give in to the provocations of the soldiers and not to use firearms, to be limited to cobblestones, slingshots and bottles with flammable substances. The opinion prevails that if the uprising takes up automatic weapons, that would give the Israeli army cause to employ all of its might and there would then be more casualties. It is namely for that reason that the Palestinians call the *intifada* the "revolution of stones."

Today, when the tempestuous events on the West Bank and the Gaza sector have continued for many months, no few questions arise. How to explain the duration of the uprising? Who is leading it and how? What sentiments are widespread among the Palestinians? To what political consequences and results could they lead?

It so happened that I had occasion to visit Israel on the eve of the *intifada* and to be in the occupied territories, where I talked with the Palestinians living there. In the course of the uprising itself I have met with many Palestinian figures in Cairo, Baghdad and Abu-Dhabi, as well as with the general secretaries of the Democratic Liberation Front, N. Havatma, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, G. Habash, who visited Moscow. The meetings and discussions that took place, along with personal observations, made it possible to understand better the essence of the situation that has taken shape in the lands occupied by Israel and to evaluate the realities and prospects for the mass Palestinian uprisings. I would like to share my thoughts with our readers in this regard.

If we turn to features that appeared in the first months after the start of the uprising, it can be noted easily from the statements of some Palestinian activists that the events seemed to burst out unexpectedly and that outside centers (having in mind the PLO) had an indirect relation to it. But the unfounded nature of such points of view later became apparent. The fact is that the uprising had ripened long ago, it had been prepared in good time, while the organizers of the *intifada* had kept much a secret and not all Palestinian groups were in on it.

"The outburst was inevitable, since half a million Palestinians had been brought to despair and saw no way out of their dramatic situation," is how M. Bar-Zakhar, an advisor to the Israeli foreign minister, described the situation. It is difficult not to agree with such an acknowledgment. The occupation had made worse and worse the economic and social problems of the Palestinian population from year to year.

Unemployment had risen sharply as a result, creating a huge reserve army of unemployed restructuring who were being exploited by Israeli businessmen. Roughly 50,000-60,000 Palestinians have found permanent or seasonal work in Israel in recent years. So many more were in the role of day laborers, paid at poverty levels and completely devoid of any social protection whatsoever. I saw these people at the most unskilled work both in Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem. The phrase of Lord Kelson at one time that "The Zionists want a Jewish state in which the Arabs would be the woodcutters and water carriers" is not taken as a metaphor at all.

To the extent of the economic degradation of the West Bank and the Gaza sector, aggravated by their isolation from the Arab world, they have been turned more and more into a monopoly market for Israeli industrial output. In the opinion of N. Havatma, the exploitation of the population of the occupied lands has been turned into an extremely profitable business for Israel from which all segments and all classes of Palestinian society have suffered. The lack of social prospects has incited the Palestinians, especially the educated ones, to emigrate abroad. The drop in income from the "black gold" and the recession in the Arab oil-producing countries, however, has also reduced their need for manpower, which has had a painful effect on the inhabitants of the occupied lands as well.

These circumstances also explain why the uprising has proved to be so stubborn and prolonged, and the slogan "There is no way back for us!" remains one of the most popular. The people, driven to despair, believe that they can improve their situation only in the struggle against the occupiers. That is why the *intifada* is of a mass political nature.

Such is the moral, political and social background. It is of course more difficult to say precisely when the preparations for an uprising began, how the organizational structures were created, how the strategy and tactics were determined. But my interlocutors invariably said that the impetus was provided by the Algiers session of the Palestinian National Council. It united various detachments of the PDC within the framework of the PLO, not only those outside the boundaries of the occupied lands, but in the occupied land themselves, thereby giving the signal for action. The collaboration of Fatah, the Democratic and the Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Communist Party had become a reality. It was representatives of them first and

foremost that joined the committees guiding the uprising. Two or three Muslim organizations joined them in Gaza as well. The religious factor is also extremely palpable in East Jerusalem. As for the West Bank, the influence of Islamic tendencies there is evidently considerably weaker than in Gaza.

And so there is a united national leadership at the head of the uprising. Judging from everything, it has two centers—one in the occupied lands (Western journalists cite a specific place—East Jerusalem with a branch in Gaza) and the second abroad. Local committees with a large amount of independence have moreover been created in the occupied lands in all of the cities and many villages. Decentralization ensures stability and "viability" for the uprising: the rout of one or several committees provides no practical results. The Israeli newspaper AL HAMISHMAR wrote in this regard, "It can be said without exaggeration that the unprecedented arrests... in the Arab territories prosecute the aim of weakening namely the popular committees. But this has not led to success as yet, since their comrades rise up in place of those arrested. As one highly placed military source put it, 'we can't assign a soldier to look after each Palestinian.'"

I got the impression on the West Bank that division into factions is less noticeable there than in the emigre centers. Some could not say altogether what organization they belonged to, mentioning only the PLO.

"A patriot—isn't that enough?" they asked.

And another observation: the lack of the extremism that is frequently encountered in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan among the majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, a realism in political evaluations, a sensible pragmatism based on a regard for the existence of Israel and the disposition of forces in the international arena.

"What do we want, what are we striving for?" they told me. "We hunger to be rid of occupation. Our goal is an independent Arab state on the West Bank and in Gaza alongside, not instead of, Israel. It would be best, of course, to achieve this by political means. Our rejection of firearms is essentially an invitation to peaceful dialogue. The occupiers unfortunately answer with gas, bullets and prison."

It can be asserted with complete justification that the most important political consequence of the uprising has been the increased attention of the world toward the Palestinian problem as the heart of the Near East conflict and a more accurate awareness of the persistent necessity of its rapid resolution. The Palestinians have forced a re-evaluation of attitudes toward them both in the Arab world and in the international arena. This was concretely reflected as follows. The Arab leaders held a summit meeting in Algiers dedicated exclusively to the Palestinian problem. They thereby in a way corrected the results

of the prior Amman meeting where that problem was in the shadow of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The UN is once more occupied in earnest with the Near East question. Enhanced interest has also been displayed by state figures in Western Europe. Y. Arafat was invited to speak before the deputies to the European Parliament for the first time.

The nature of the uprising obviously moved King Hussein of Jordan to decide to halt administrative and other ties of the country with the West Bank. What does that mean? It has somehow been forgotten over the years that before the Israeli aggression of 1967, the West Bank of the Jordan River was part of Jordan, while Gaza was under the control of Egypt. The kingdom, strictly speaking, began to be called that after the addition of the West Bank territory to it. Before that it was called Transjordan.

The Palestinians on the West Bank, notwithstanding the occupation, remained Jordanian citizens and had the corresponding passports and representation in parliament. That is why American diplomacy asserted that the question of the future of the occupied lands and their population should be resolved in Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. For all these years Jordan has been paying the wages of municipal officials, physicians in state clinics, university instructors and public schools. The amount of such individuals is not great—21,000-25,000 people. But facts are facts. While coming out for an independent state, the Palestinians at the same time sent their deputies to the legislative bodies of Jordan and had financial receipts from it.

At the end of July 1988 Hussein declared that this situation had become obsolete. The parliament was disbanded, and the implementation of programs of economic development and the payment of wages were curtailed. Here is how this step was explained by the editor of the Palestinian newspaper AT-TALIA:

"The uprising forced Hussein to make a choice: keep control over just the East bank alone or try as before to resurrect the kingdom within its former boundaries, putting his own regime in danger therein. It must be noted, however, that nothing has yet been changed in the Jordanian constitution. The break is thus not of an irreversible nature. The rest depends on the Palestinians."

The PLO welcomed Hussein's actions overall, since an end had been put from thereon to the distinctive duality of the administrative status of the inhabitants of the West Bank. The question has been posed with all acuity: the Palestinians in the occupied lands are citizens of what state? There is one logical answer, it seems: the Arab state of Palestine whose creation was envisaged by UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 Nov 47.

The resolution, in the opinion of my Palestinian interlocutors, is a legal foundation for the political self-determination of the people of Palestine and their formation of their own independent state on the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. That is the line the *intifada* has reached.

Suppose they are able to achieve that aim within the context of a peaceful settlement in the Near East. That would be a victory, of course, a success for the peace process in the region and a contribution to improving the overall international climate. And what fate awaits the Palestinians who were driven from the territory that went over to Israel in 1948-49? At first only some portion of the refugees will be able to return. But for those that for some reason do not return, their state will become a step to a new life. They will cease to be odd men out and will become fully enfranchised citizens able to solve their own problems differently.

Here is what one of the leaders of the PLO, Abu Ayyad, said on this score: "In our understanding of a state, the issue is not so much geography as it is politics. We want to create a state so that each Palestinian, regardless of where he lives—Alaska or Australia, Africa or America—can say, 'I have a homeland, the name of which is Palestine. I belong to the Palestinian people, I have Palestinian citizenship.'"

The new climate, it seems, will rid the Palestinians of the feeling of interminability and defenselessness and will soften nationalist passions, although it is difficult to expect unanimous support here. Differing views both within the PDC and among the Arab governments were manifested even during the period of preparation for proclaiming a Palestinian state.

And what about Israel? It only loses? Not at all. Leaving the seized lands, it would get peace with its neighbors, without which no state can exist normally. Recall at least that Israel lives within borders that are not recognized by anyone—not the UN, not its neighbors, not even its allies.

Israel is a small country. Even with support on the part of the United States it is unable to be a punitive occupier forever. From the point of view of the historical perspective, it would be more sensible for Tel Aviv to consent to granting independence to the Palestinians and find ways of arranging good relations with them.

Be that as it may, the uprising on the West Bank and in Gaza has demonstrated the determination of the long-suffering Palestinian people to achieve justice and create their own independent, democratic state. It will still have to surmount no few difficulties and obstacles on that road.

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International Meeting on Asia-Pacific Region
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 p 14

[Article by G. Shmelev: "A Vladivostok Forum"]

[Text] The interest of the world public in the Asian-Pacific region (APR) is growing steadily. And this is entirely just. The issue, after all, is the most extensive and densely populated part of our planet, where three billion people live, a large and dynamically developing group of countries and territories playing a more and more visible role in world politics and economics, a region for which analysts are promising a paramount place in the world at the threshold of the new millennium.

And what will its future be? Peaceful or troubled and uneasy as before?

The international meeting "The Asian-Pacific Region: Dialogue, Peace, Collaboration" that was held in Vladivostok was devoted namely to the problems of seeking mutually acceptable approaches and paths to the revival of the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, expanding the zone of good-neighbor relations and mutually advantageous collaboration and ensuring a lasting peace and security in the region. Organized at the initiative of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Collaboration, this meeting assembled over a hundred political and public figures, scholars, representatives of business circles and workers in culture and mass media from 36 countries of the region and a number of states in Europe and North and South America.

The participants in the meeting constantly addressed the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives of M.S. Gorbachev in considering issues of socio-political development of the countries in the Asian-Pacific region and an expansion of economic and cultural collaboration. "It seems to me that there is one good foundation for our discussion today—the new Soviet proposals that M.S. Gorbachev came forth with in Krasnoyarsk," declared the publisher of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, B.M. Diakh. "It is typical that they also take into account the well-known principles of *Pancasila* and Bandung. We share the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership that the creation of a system of security, including in the Asian-Pacific region, is possible only using the principles of the new thinking."

In the opinion of the deputy foreign minister of Laos, Thongluna Sisulita, the significance of the new Soviet initiatives consists first and foremost of the fact that they stimulate the development of the process of the struggle to turn Asia and the Pacific into a zone of peace, friendship and collaboration. In our mutually dependent world, he said, international collaboration should be accomplished in the harmonious linking of national interests and the interests of the region and the world

overall. The director of the Pacific Program of the Aspen Institute of Humanitarian Research (United States), Mark Earl, spoke in the same spirit, noting that the glasnost and perestroika in the USSR are making it possible to conduct the search for ways of developing the whole Asian-Pacific region in constructive and realistic fashion.

The director of the Institute of Asia and the Pacific Ocean of the People's Republic of Vietnam, Van Chong, pointed out the positive influence of the Soviet-American INF Treaty on the political climate of Asia and the Pacific region, and he called for the peaceful political settlement of regional conflicts.

The Soviet initiatives, as was emphasized in the presentations of the participants in the Vladivostok meeting, are being manifested in the positive processes that are transpiring today in the Asian-Pacific region, especially in the signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, the creation of real preconditions for a settlement to the Kampuchean problem, the traits of a reduction in tensions on the Korean peninsula and the cessation of military operations on the Iran-Iraq front. A move away from military-force methods for resolving issues toward their solution via compromise is becoming the guiding principle of the political life of the region.

But at the same time the situation in the Asian-Pacific region remains complex and far from stable overall and is characterized by increased levels of militarization. And the primary cause for such a situation is the policy of certain forces, striving to preserve strategic and military-political superiority for themselves, not to permit an activation of the role of the Soviet Union in the affairs of the region and to oppose the development of positive trends there.

The seven-point plan advanced by M.S. Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk, said USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I.A. Rogachev, has elicited an equivocal reaction in the region, which is partly explained by the restrained reaction of official Washington. They are not hurrying to reply in a number of countries because the Soviet proposals are a topic for serious reflection and time is required for that. Another trend can also be discerned—to muffle the initiatives, adopt the guise that nothing has happened. Those who are behaving in that manner know full well that over the period of the effect of the "Vladivostok doctrine," significant changes have occurred in the role of our country in the Asian-Pacific region: political dialogue with a large number of Asian-Pacific states has deepened, and bridges are being built in the trade and economic sphere. The proposal to create some negotiating mechanism for considering Soviet and any other ideas in the interests of the stability and welfare of the peoples inhabiting the Asian-Pacific region is thus of especial practical value on this plane.

The ultimate aim of the foreign-policy initiatives of the USSR in the Asian-Pacific region is the creation of a lasting and all-encompassing structure for stable and mutually dependent collaboration. It is obvious that the "Asian-Pacific house" will be more difficult to construct than the European one by virtue of historical, economic and even geographical reasons. But why not begin thinking about how to proceed toward the establishment of the lasting peaceful cohabitation of the Asian peoples?

Speaking at the close of the meeting, the president of the Soviet National Committee on Asian-Pacific Economic Collaboration, Academician Ye.M. Primakov, said, "We live in a dynamic, agitated region that possesses great prospects and opportunities and whose countries and peoples are striving for progress, peace and welfare. Regional conflicts occur here at the same time, far from all is fine here, and we have not yet reached the appropriate level of socio-economic development. The participants in the meeting could not consider all of these tasks, and that was not even our aim. But if we have advanced even a millimeter along the road to reinforcing trust, familiarity with each other and collaboration, then we feel that the aims of our Vladivostok meeting have been achieved."

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Syrian Defense Minister Interviewed on Arab-Israeli Conflict

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 19-20

[Interview by AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA Damascus correspondent Anatoliy Ubilava with Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas under the rubric "Our Interviews": "Who Opposes a Settlement"]

[Text] *The Syrian Arab Republic has opposed the aggressively inclined Israeli militarist clique for 20 years now. It was a participant in several Arab-Israeli wars. A Syrian contingent is part of the inter-Arab armed forces stationed on Lebanese territory. Its active efforts on behalf of peace in the region are to no small extent facilitating a leveling off of internecine strife in that country. Our correspondent in Damascus, Anatoliy Ubilava, requested that Syrian Minister of Defense Corps Gen Mustafa Talas answer a series of questions of interest to Soviet readers.*

[Correspondent] Mr. Minister, how do you evaluate the role of the popular masses in the liberation struggle for independence and against aggression?

[Talas] Our people have always burned with a desire to battle for their liberty. And they can build and create a new future nation for us and liberate the occupied territories. The words of President H. Assad will be an eternal slogan: "Victory or death!" They have had a great influence on reinforcing the moral spirit of our warriors and has strengthened their determination to free their

land and return rights to those that remained to live on that land. There is in modern history a whole series of examples and precedents where peoples have been able to return their rights and build the future of their sons with their own hands. Among these examples are the Great Patriotic War of the fraternal Soviet Union against the Nazis, the liberation of Vietnam from American aggression and the evacuation of the French colonizers from Algerian land. Here in Syria, our people was able to drive the French colonizers off our lands in the middle 1940s after a prolonged armed struggle that lasted roughly a quarter of a century. The October War of 1973 is a shining example of the liberation upsurge of the people. It has become an outstanding event in the Arab region and in the modern history of our country.

[Correspondent] It is no secret that the might of the Syrian armed forces has grown over the years since the end of the 1973 war. Do you feel that Syria has lived in peace for a decade and a half now thanks to that?

[Talas] Since the implementation of the "corrective movement" under the leadership of President H. Assad on 16 Nov 70, Syria has urgently developed its armed forces. President Assad has outlined the goal for our people of building a strong army, including in an ideological regard, that is able to defend the motherland and the nation. Our armed forces entered the war in 1973 inspired by the ideas of the Movement and achieved great successes.

After the October War, imperialism and Zionism were able to knock Egypt out of the Arab ranks. Syria remained the sole force opposing the greed of colonialism, Zionism and expansionism. Immediately after this, President H. Assad advanced the slogan "strategic balance" with the Zionist enemy. Our army quickly gained experience in an organizational regard and in the ability to master combat technology. Today it has also mastered modern types of weaponry and is a real force able to stop and restrain an enemy.

We thus see that the political and social stability of Syria is explained by the firm and unchanging policy pursued by our country under the leadership of President H. Assad in all areas, including in the realm of defense, the aim of which consists of repelling the danger emanating from Israel.

[Correspondent] The Arab states and Israel have accumulated considerable military potential. History shows that each succeeding war has been more bloody than the preceding one. It is logical to assume that if the next war bursts out in the Near East, it will be even more destructive. The Arab-Israeli conflict has as yet not been resolved militarily. Do you consider it possible to resolve it peacefully? If so, under what conditions?

[Talas] The events, catastrophes and wars that have burst out in the Near East are explained by Israeli colonial aggressiveness. Under such conditions it is

essential to repel the aggressor and restrain the usurpers. Syria has acted quickly and with the aim of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully. We have taken up a policy aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the region, which is possible with the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories and the return of legal rights to the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to a historical homeland, self-determination and the formation of their own independent state.

I am convinced that not a single state in the world would want the annexation of its territory, would not want to see part of its people tormented by the yoke of occupation, living with their hands tied.

We are for peace, but for a just peace that is incompatible with hegemonism. We are for a peace that returns all rights taken away from people, and it is just that which is opposed by Israel and the United States.

[Correspondent] Thanks to the new political thinking it has been possible to take the first steps on the road to disarmament and to achieve some real results. Could the Soviet-American experience, in your opinion, be suited to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

[Talas] The Soviet Union fights tirelessly to rid mankind of the nuclear threat, it spares no effort for the sake of that aim. The treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States to eliminate intermediate- and short-range missiles is a useful step and a turning point in the direction of peace without weapons.

Time will tell how that experience is reflected in the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel enjoys the unlimited support of the United States and world Zionism. It is supported in addition by the Western mass media as well.

The leaders of the United States and the Western states, for example, as well as the Western press, agitated for peace when it became "known" to them that one of the Arab countries had either obtained or produced some weapon to support its defensive capabilities. The Western press at the same time takes no notice at all of the fact that Israel is producing both nuclear and chemical weapons, taking part in the Star Wars program and manufacturing contemporary missiles. It stands on the side of Israel in the cause of banning any form of international monitoring of its nuclear arsenal.

It is essential, on the other hand, to draw attention to the cover-up of the repressive and inhuman actions against the Palestinian people by the capitalist press. This was demanded by Israel through the mass media, the majority of which are controlled by world Zionism.

The Soviet Union is playing an important role in the cause of preserving peace on the planet and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. It takes an open and clear-cut

position on this issue. This position, however, is repudiated by the United States and, naturally, Israel. And we, unfortunately, still do not see any changes for the better in the cause of achieving peace in the region. Notwithstanding the proximity of the points of view of the Soviet Union and the United States on some world problems, the desired results cannot be obtained even via the holding of intensive negotiations at all levels. The United States is pursuing a policy of unreserved support for Israel in various realms, which is the principal obstacle on the path to a peaceful settlement.

[Correspondent] What would your comments be on Israel's launch of an artificial satellite?

[Talas] The launch of the first Israeli artificial satellite represents a dangerous violation of the military equilibrium and opens the door to a further expansion of the arms race in the Near East region.

Israel has tried to explain this launch as having technological-research aims of a civilian nature. The aggressive thrust of Israel and expansion of its military presence in the region, however, show that the Israeli leadership is striving to develop a means of spying against the Arab states and their armed forces in various aspects as before, which is also facilitated by other means obtained from the United States. Israel, with the aid of American artificial satellites that are used in the realm of electronic warfare, is accumulating information and employing it in its aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic.

The step Israel has taken could have dangerous consequences. This is a military and technical challenge to the Arabs and a danger hanging over us threatening the existence of the Arabs and the future of the Arab nation. It is simultaneously a threat to peace in the region and the whole world.

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China's Deng Xiaoping Profiled

*Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 24-29*

[Article by M. Yakovlev under the rubric "Political Portrait": "Deng Xiaoping"]

[Text] Deng Xiaoping is often called the architect of today's Chinese economic reforms both within China and outside its borders. He is a man of unconventional fate, at the age of 84 (born in 1904) continuing to play a key role in implementing the historic turnaround in the policies of the CCP.

Not tall, smaller than average height, in an invariable gray-colored service jacket, Deng Xiaoping is never in the front ranks at public functions, and the impression is created that he is trying to be unnoticed. He seems calm, imperturbable and good-natured. He smokes a great

deal. During the last session of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, he stayed at the presidium table during a break and lit a cigarette. A note came from the hall to the presidium with the request not to smoke. Deng Xiaoping read it and, smiling, put out the cigarette.

Deng Xiaoping devotes himself to more than work. He loves to spend time with his family (he has three sons, a daughter and several grandchildren), meet with friends, play bridge and take walks. He is sometimes abrupt and blunt in conversation. This does not hamper him from being charming.

A Difficult But Envious Fate

The 16-year-old youth Deng Xixian (Deng Xiaoping is a pseudonym that he took in 1927, after the CCP went underground) went to France with a group of Chinese students in 1920 with the intention of studying and working. He spent five years there and was introduced to the revolutionary movement. In 1922 he joined the Communist Youth Union, and in 1924 became a member of the Chinese Communist Party. At the beginning of 1926 he visited the Soviet Union, where he studied first at the Communist Workers of the Orient University and then at the University imeni Sun Yatsen. In 1927 he returned to his native land. The revolutionary activity of Deng Xiaoping in China began at the Xian Military-Political Academy imeni Sun Yatsen, where he became the head of the political department as well as secretary of the party organization. This military school, actually created by the communists, prepared a whole constellation of specialists, many of whom then became the supreme commanders of the Chinese Red Army.

He spent over 20 years in military service. As secretary of the main front party committee, he along with Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi, who later became marshals, led the Huaihai operation in 1948-49—one of the three largest in the course of the war of national liberation. The troops of the National Liberation Army of China took the city of Nanking, where the Guomindang government had been before, as a result of it.

In 1945 Deng Xiaoping was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee, in 1955 a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, and in 1956 at the 8th Congress, general secretary of the CCP Central Committee. In 1977 Deng Xiaoping was elected Deputy Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and in 1982, at the 12th CCP Congress, he was made a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of Central Commission of CCP advisors. From 1952 through 1980 he was designated deputy premier of the PRC State Council many times. From 1983 through 1988 he was chairman of the All-China Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China.

Over his 60 years of revolutionary activity, perhaps the most difficult ones for Deng Xiaoping were the years of the Cultural Revolution, when he was twice subjected to persecution. He and PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi were then declared to be "the two major individuals in power in the party taking the capitalist road."

Almost six years after the start of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping appeared in the Chinese leadership once again. This happened quietly, without advertisement, but in such a way that it was evident to all Chinese and foreigners working at the time in Peking. In the spring of 1973 Norodom Sihanouk, returning to Peking after visiting areas of Cambodia freed from the forces of Lon Nol, arranged a showing of a film shot there. The Chinese leaders headed by Zhou Enlai came to the All-China Hall of Assembly of People's Deputies, where there was also a photo exhibit devoted to this trip by the prince. After viewing the exhibit, those attending went into the theater. By journalistic custom I and my colleagues did not rush in and waited for all of the Chinese officials to pass so as to see who was present at this function. And right at the very end came Deng Xiaoping, calmly and without hurrying. In answer to my question as to in what capacity he appeared again on the political stage, a person from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered that he was deputy premier of the PRC State Council.

At the time many were saying that he had been rehabilitated with the assistance of Zhou Enlai. Deng Xiaoping himself said in an interview that his return to the leadership had occurred at the initiative of Mao Zedong.

The year 1975—the penultimate year of the Cultural Revolution—was one of the most complex and difficult in the life of the Chinese people. The country was still being lorded over by leaders who a year later would be castigated as the "Gang of Four," and unwarranted repressions continued. Mao Zedong moved more and more noticeably away from affairs, and Zhou Enlai, thanks to whose efforts economic life had still been maintained somewhat, remained seriously ill. "In this difficult time for the land," wrote the current PRC Chairman, Yang Shangkun, "Comrade Deng Xiaoping was entrusted with the day-to-day work of the party and the government."

Deng Xiaoping directed his efforts toward instilling order in a country wracked by chaos. He tried to lessen the consequences of the Cultural Revolution that had pushed the PRC into a dead end. The situation improved somewhat thanks to this.

Zhou Enlai, who had headed the Chinese government for a quarter of a century, died on 8 Jan 76. The question of a change of power arose with his death. The leftists went on the offensive at once. They understood that they had little time: Mao Zedong was not actually engaged in affairs. The old cadres that had been rehabilitated during the lifetime of Zhou Enlai had come into force. Now they

began grouping around Deng Xiaoping. The leftists thus opened up a ferocious fire namely on him. He was once more accused of "revisionism" and trying to "restore capitalism." The political scales tilted noticeably in their favor. Just a pretext was needed to strike the final blow. And it appeared.

All of China marked 4 Apr 76—Qingming—as a day of prayer. Throngs of people gathered in Peking, on Tiananmen Square. Fights had broken out and disorder was beginning by the evening of the next day among the throng of hundreds of thousands. The people of Peking were demanding the restoration of order in the country and improvements in the standard of living. Leaflets appeared with criticism of Mao Zedong and the military-bureaucratic regime. And then the leftists put into motion the police, the people's home guard and the army, who beat and shot those assembled in the square.

They incriminated Deng Xiaoping for organizing the "counter-revolutionary events on Tiananmen Square on April 5." For the second time during the Cultural Revolution he was removed from all of his party and government posts, but he remained in the party so as to have the "possibility of reforming himself."

The country was in mourning once again on 9 Sep 76—Mao Zedong had died. But the days of mourning passed and the people breathed easier. The white chrysanthemums—a sign of mourning—were removed from jackets and coats, and life took its accustomed path. But a sharp battle broke out in the upper echelons of the leadership. Forces with a negative attitude toward the Cultural Revolution gained the upper hand at the beginning of October. Its chief leaders, headed by the widow of Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing, were arrested. Changes occurred in the policies of the leadership, which was headed by Hua Guofeng, but not right away. For two years after the rout of the "Gang of Four," the work of the CCP, in the words of the Xinhua agency, was described as moving forward accompanied by vacillation. Hua Guofeng, then in the position of chairman of the CCP Central Committee, took a course of observing the "two absolutes" ("we must determinedly observe all decisions made by Chairman Mao Zedong; we should be unswervingly guided by all the directives of Chairman Mao Zedong"), refusing to uncover the errors committed by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping was not restored to his positions due to the procrastination of Hua Guofeng.

The Architect of Reforms

Only in July of 1977 did he once more occupy the leading position in the CCP leadership. It was namely at that time that the slogan appeared that called upon everyone to adhere to a businesslike approach in everything, to proceed from realities.

The movement under this slogan served as a prologue to the 11th Convocation of the 3rd CCP Central Committee Plenum, which took place 18-22 Dec 78. Deng

Xiaoping and other proletarian revolutionaries of the old generation, the Xinhua agency noted, had conducted thorough preparations that ensured the success of the plenum, which devised a new economic policy and a new political course for the CCP and the Chinese state. The Chinese people have since that time, the Chinese press notes, entered onto the path of constructing socialism with a specific Chinese nature.

The 11th Convocation of the 3rd CCP Central Committee Plenum decided to shift the center of gravity of party work chiefly to the economic realm. The task was posed of a significant development of productive forces to a level corresponding to changes in many aspects of productive relations and the rejection of obsolete forms of management and the former way of thinking. Deng Xiaoping at the plenum defended with determination the necessity of comprehensive reforms so that it would be possible to construct socialism with a truly Chinese specific nature. Deng Xiaoping, in the words of Yang Shangkun, was not afraid to jettison old stereotypes and old styles of working that were not up to the new tasks. It was noted in a decree of the plenum that it was not possible to repudiate wholesale everything that came before, it was essential to bring unwaveringly to life those postulates of economic policy that had fully justified themselves in long-term practice. It was also proposed at the same time to implement a series of important economic measures with a regard for the new conditions and to set about the radical reform of economic management and methods of business operation. These postulates were permeated with a desire to draw a line under the former command methods of management and business operation, that is the administrative-command methods, as we now call our own such methods.

The 11th Convocation of the 3rd CCP Central Committee Plenum called upon the party to concentrate its chief attention on ensuring the fastest possible rise in agriculture. Deng Xiaoping emphasized, in a discussion with a member of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium, Stefan Korosenec, on 12 Jun 87 that economic reform in China had begun in the village, where 80 percent of the country's population lives. "If the peasantry," he noted, "do not rid themselves of need, that means that an absolute majority of our people will not be rid of it. We thus decided at the 11th Convocation of the 3rd CCP Central Committee Plenum to pursue reform first and foremost in the village. The majority of our peasants have lived in unbelievable need. They have suffered enormous difficulties due to shortages of clothing, foodstuffs and housing and have been deprived of freedom of movement. The reform has greatly raised the activeness of the peasantry. People have begun to conduct farming apropos of the local conditions... The right of independence changed their approach to matters immediately. The results were noticeable in just a year in some places. Incomes went up significantly, and in a number of cases were even double or four times more."

The successes in the village have, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, given the Chinese leadership faith in the correctness of the path they have chosen, while the experience accumulated there has helped them set about restructuring the urban economic system. Its implementation began in 1984. The urban reforms embrace industry, trade, science and education.

The third constituent element of the Chinese economic reforms is associated with the policy of expanding ties and collaboration with the outside world, in which Deng Xiaoping has a particular role. It has already brought no small advantage to China. The policy of expanding ties abroad, in the words of the Chinese leadership, has three aspects. First, an expansion of ties with the developed capitalist countries, from which chiefly capital is attracted and technical achievements are borrowed, is underway. On the other hand, relations are also being strengthened with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. China is in favor of making trade, technical collaboration and even the creation of joint ventures, as well as the technical modernization of enterprises built with their aid in the 1950s, more active. And finally, an intensification of ties with the developing countries is envisaged.

The goal of all of the economic reforms, in the definition of Deng Xiaoping, consists of increasing annual industrial production and agricultural output by four times over 20 years with a continuous increase in economic efficiency, that is, increasing the amount of the gross national product from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2.8 trillion yuan in the year 2000. The accomplishment of this task will make it possible to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people significantly. China, says Deng Xiaoping, is still poor. Annual per-capita income is an average of just 300 American dollars. Today the task has been posed of bringing it to 800 dollars by the end of this century. Further development over the next 30-50 years will make it possible for China to approximate the level of the developed countries. "In short," emphasizes Deng Xiaoping, "we have now directed all of our intentions toward accomplishing modernization, and we thus genuinely hope that there will be no war, that there be prolonged peace."

The experience in pursuing economic reform testifies to the fact that the Chinese leadership is devising a way of bringing the economy out of its stagnant situation and lifting it further up that corresponds to Chinese conditions.

A Center for Restructuring the Political Structure

Life has put onto the agenda the question of reforming the political structure, which should be, they feel in the PRC, an organic part of the overall modernization of Chinese society. The restructuring of the political structure and transformation of the economic system are interconnected and conditioned by each other.

The pursuit of economic reform without a restructuring of the political structure will not produce any results, since impediments caused by people are encountered, Deng Xiaoping says. The question of relations between party and government bodies and delimiting the functions of these bodies with the preservation of leadership on the part of the party, in his opinion, should be at the center of the restructuring of the political structure. For this it is essential to teach the ability to lead and not to interfere excessively in the affairs of government and business organs.

The goal of restructuring the political structure, Deng Xiaoping emphasized in one of his speeches, consists of eliminating bureaucratism, which has deeply permeated the party and government apparatus, and expanding the activeness of the masses and lower organizations. He included conceit, abuse of power, separation from the reality of the masses, work for show, demagogery, ideological ossification, obstinacy, ballooning staffs, red tape in resolving affairs, irresponsibility, the non-fulfillment of promises made, frequent verifications of people and punishments, the suppression of democracy, deception of the leadership and the oppression of the people, arbitrariness and violence, nepotism, violations of the law and venality among manifestations of bureaucratism at a session of the CCP Central Committee Plenum.

The question of restructuring the political structure was raised in China as early as in 1980, but it was not developed, since the situation in the party and in society was exceedingly complex and confused at the time overall. The CCP numbered some 39 million members, many of whom had entered its ranks during the Cultural Revolution and were an enormous mass difficult to influence. A sort of inertia of self-preservation took shape. A clear resistance to change was felt at all levels right up to the highest echelon. Some communists put the factions that were still preserved from the time of the Cultural Revolution and factionality itself higher than the party. Deng Xiaoping emphasized in his speeches at the time that the party should be a proletarian, vanguard, unified, highly aware and disciplined detachment. "Only after the restoration of that situation," he noted, "will the party be ready for battle."

The restructuring of the political structure in the PRC is tied first and foremost to cadre policies. A course of making the party and state apparatus younger and a search for efficient forms of personnel renewal and replacement has been taken in recent years. The idea, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, is to make the whole personnel composition of the party and state younger over the course of the next 15 years. It would be good, he remarked, if a constellation of strong 30-40-year old political figures, business leaders, scholars, literary people and other specialists appeared in China over that time.

This process has been going on for several years now. The CCP itself, and first and foremost its Central Committee, provide an example. The composition of the

CCP Central Committee underwent marked changes at the 8th CCP Congress in October-November 1987 in accordance with the policy of making party leadership younger. Such party veterans as Deng Xiaoping, Li Xianyan, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen were not included in it. The average age of the members and candidate members of the 13th Convocation of the CCP Central Committee is 56 years old. This is four years younger than the prior composition. An institute of advisors that includes old cadres who have left active party and state work has been created in the CCP Central Committee and the provincial party committees, and a new procedure for assigning pensions for so-called *nomenklatura* workers and a number of other steps have been instituted. Knowledgeable and energetic young specialists are coming to the leadership of party and government institutions, industrial enterprises and academic institutions.

Accent will unwaveringly be placed in the selection of personnel, it was indicated at the congress, on high qualifications of the leader or specialist and on encouraging competitiveness, democracy and glasnost. The introduction of the mechanism of competitiveness into enterprise management has created favorable conditions for expanding the forces and abilities of talented businessmen and specialists in various fields. It was also noted that the mechanism of competitiveness should also be instituted in the management of all other types of professional workers. The congress called for an end to outmoded views as expressed in emphasizing length of service and former merits or constricting initiative and enterprise.

And finally, the third goal of improving the political structure consists of seeing that the activeness of the lower classes is raised and the initiative of the restructuring, peasants and intelligentsia is unleashed.

The new climate of pursuing economic reforms and the renewal of all of Chinese society has placed on the agenda the task of re-animating the work style of the CCP. Deng Xiaoping emphasized the necessity and importance of this issue in his concluding words at the 11th CCP Congress. He called for a unity of word and deed and close coordination of theory and practice, and he indicated the persistent necessity of coming out against any sort of bragging for show. "At this crucial moment in history, when mountains of problems and work have piled up," he noted, "strengthening party leadership and devising a party style of work have decisive significance."

The ideas of Deng Xiaoping to revive the work style of the CCP were reflected in the documents of the 13th CCP Congress, which noted that the work that had been done in that direction in the prior period had had positive results. Some party leaders, as was pointed out at the 13th Congress, nonetheless continued to be

engaged in extortion and embezzlement and were assigning personnel that were relatives. The congress emphasized in this regard that the elimination of flaws in the work style of the party would take no little time.

The question of restoring the rudimentary democratic rights of the population or, in other words, the development of socialist democracy, in the country arose with particular acuity after the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the renewal of Chinese society. And no small merit here belongs to Deng Xiaoping.

The line of developing socialist democracy was defined, as was the course of economic reform, at the 11th Convocation of the 3rd CCP Plenum. Much has done for its incarnation in recent years: they have put an end to mass repressions, rehabilitated the innocent, and halted the multitude of political criticisms of literally the whole population that had attained an unprecedentedly broad scope during the years of the Cultural Revolution.

The 13th CCP Congress was a landmark event in the development of socialist democracy and the improvement of its institutions. The ideas of Deng Xiaoping that he had expressed in the preceding period were widely reflected in its decisions on these issues. A policy of making the lower organizations and popular masses more active was adopted. The achievement of this aim was thought of first and foremost via strengthening the influence of the assemblies of people's deputies at all levels, which should represent the people better and be monitored by them. Their further improvement and the institution of multiple-mandate elections are planned.

Attitude Toward the Personality Cult

In investigating the question of improving and developing socialist democracy in China, one cannot fail to mention the attitude of Deng Xiaoping toward such a phenomenon as the personality cult. He was a passionate advocate of collective leadership for many years.

He was present at the 20th CPSU Congress at which the personality cult of I.V. Stalin was condemned, and soon afterward he expressed his attitude toward this phenomenon at the 8th CCP Congress in September of 1956. "Leninism," he said, "demands of the party that all important issues be resolved by the appropriate collective body, and not by a single person," "The 20th Congress shined a bright light on how important it is to adhere to the principle of collective leadership and fight the personality cult," and "an important achievement of the 20th CPSU Congress was the fact that it showed us what serious consequences can arise from the deification of a single person." It is well known that the aggrandizement and deification of Mao Zedong had taken on enormous scope in China. The negative attitude of Deng Xiaoping toward the personality cult in the leaflets and *dazibao* during the years of the Cultural Revolution of the students were classed as a speech against the "ideas of Mao Zedong." On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping did

not take the path of a complete negation of the positive role of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Revolution, even though it is easy to go wrong with it.

In an environment of the pursuit of a new economic political course in China, the necessity of answering the question of the attitude toward the personality cult of Mao Zedong, his role in the Chinese Revolution and socialist construction is being felt more and more, and the necessity of drawing a line under a series of odious aspects of the former policies, especially the policies of the Great Leap Forward, the people's communes and Cultural Revolution, is becoming more and more urgent in order to proceed further along a cleared path toward the modernization of society.

A reply to it, the Chinese leaders feel, was given by the 11th Convocation of the 6th CCP Central Committee Plenum in the "Resolution on Some Issues of the History of the Communist Party of China During the Formation of the PRC" that was adopted in 1981. Deng Xiaoping had an active part in its development. He emphasized in his remarks and conversations that it was essential in this document, first of all, to determine the historical place of Mao Zedong; second, to give him his just due based on a realistic analysis of the most important events over the 30 years that have transpired since the formation of the PRC; and third, to summarize the results of the past so as to lead the whole people forward. There is no doubt that the first point was the most topical, that is, determining the attitudes toward Mao Zedong and his role in the Chinese Revolution and during the years of peaceful construction.

The resolution was developed over almost a year and a half. Deng Xiaoping, in an interview with the editor-in-chief of the Hong Kong newspaper MINGPAO, noted that the draft of it was discussed many times. About four thousand people took part in the largest discussion, while over a thousand took part in another. There were also discussions with the participation of several hundred and several dozen people.

Did this resolution play the role allotted to it? To a certain extent, the answer can be "yes." In the part concerning the personality cult of Mao Zedong and his policies of the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes and the mass repressions carried out during the 1950s and during the years of the Cultural Revolution, however, the whole truth has not yet been spoken and a complete answer has not been given to many of the questions troubling Chinese society. The repressions, especially the massacre of cadres and even rank-and-file workers of the party and the actual devastation of the CCP during the Cultural Revolution, fall to the account of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four." And after all, as history testifies, Mao Zedong and his voluntarism and subjectivism in politics had a direct relation to them. All of the distortions of the period of Mao Zedong's rule cannot be explained just by his detachment from reality during the last years of his life, as is often done today in

China. But individual voices are sounding in the country, still timidly, demanding the whole truth, however bitter it may be. Can it be that the time has not yet come?

Socialism With Specific Chinese Features

The idea of the need to combine the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, to take its own path and construct socialism with a specific Chinese nature, threads through the many years of work of Deng Xiaoping.

In the foreword to the second anthology of the speeches of Deng Xiaoping recently published, it is indicated that at the current stage of development, he is the creator of the new policies of the CCP to implement socialist modernization.

Many of the ideas that Deng Xiaoping has expressed in the last decade were at the foundation of the policy devised at the 8th CCP Congress for the further implementation of economic and political reforms. The congress came to the important theoretical conclusion that China is at the initial stages of the development of socialism. It was pointed out at the congress that the initial stage of socialism is a special period namely in China, an Asian country, which is building a new society under conditions of the undeveloped nature of productive forces. It has been noted that the aforementioned initial stage of socialism will last a minimum of a hundred years, counting from the moment of the completion of the transformation of private property into the means of production in the 1950s.

The opinion is being expressed that if this conclusion had been reached sooner, say at the end of the 1950s, and if the CCP had constantly based its new policies on it, China could have avoided many mistakes—mistakes that engendered rushing ahead and distortions in the economic and political realms (the Great Leap Forward, the people's communes, the Cultural Revolution).

Today the CCP is selecting methods of development based on conclusions regarding the initial stage of socialism. The party theoretically substantiates the impossibility of building socialism on raw enthusiasm alone or with the aid of commands and administration by injunction and the impermissibility of the complete collectivization of property, violations of the laws of commodity production or the displacement of the small owner-producer from it.

There is no question that Deng Xiaoping has been the most prestigious leader of China since the end of the 1970s. But he is trying to warn his supporters both inside and outside the country against his aggrandizement or the exaggeration of his role. He notes, "Some especially outstanding role for me should not be propagated, since such propaganda leads to the idea that when Deng is no more, policies will change." Deng Xiaoping has thus

recently constantly spoken of the unchanging nature of current PRC policy and its reliable continuation in recent conversations with foreign guests.

Over the last decade Deng Xiaoping has met with many eminent state and public figures from practically a majority of the countries in the world. Only the Soviet Union has remained on the sidelines. As can be seen from his recent conversations with foreign guests and the reports of the Chinese mass media, however, Deng Xiaoping has not abandoned the idea of a summit dialogue between the Soviet Union and China.

The desire of the Chinese also coincides completely with the aspirations of the Soviet Union, which has repeatedly expressed its readiness for a number of years for a dialogue at any level, including the summit level, for the purpose of normalizing relations between the two great neighbors. And now, as they say, the ice has started to break. Agreement has been reached on the impending meeting of M.S. Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. This will doubtless be an event of salient international significance.

Thanks to the efforts of both parties, much has changed for the better in recent years in Soviet-Chinese relations. Ties are being steadily developed in the realm of economics, science, culture, education, sports and along the lines of state and public organizations, and the first steps are being taken on the path of exchanging opinions on international issues. Both sides acknowledge that the peoples of both countries are now engaged in the resolution of similar tasks, while the normalization of relations is opening up new possibilities for mutually advantageous collaboration between the two neighboring socialist states and the exchange of experience. There is no doubt that a complete normalization of relations between the two countries will also have a positive impact on improving the situation both in the Asian-Pacific region and in the world overall.

Deng Xiaoping noted in talks with President Koivisto of Finland that took place in Beijing in October of 1988 that Soviet-Chinese political and economic relations should be relations of a new type, differing from the relations of the 1950s, and that these relations should be constructed on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and on the basis of equality and mutual advantage.

Time moves forward, the world is changing, and the thinking of people is changing as well. Detente, consultation and dialogue, which are becoming the behest of the times, are replacing confrontation. A comprehensive normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, which should be good-neighbor relations of collaboration, friendship and peace, would be expedient against this background.

The political and economic policy of the CCP and the Chinese state that oriented the country toward the pursuit of radical socialist transformations had been basically

devised by the middle of the 1980s with the active participation of Deng Xiaoping. And it was namely at that time that Deng Xiaoping began to say that he wanted to retire, since, he declared, he could no longer work 12-14 hours a day as before. He has stepped more and more away from the immediate leadership of the country and the implementation of grandiose programs for the construction of socialism with a specific Chinese nature. Deng Xiaoping was not elected to the new Central Committee at his request at the 8th CCP Congress, but he kept the post of chairman of the PRC Central Military Council. This post is not considered to be a secondary one in China, and it gives Deng Xiaoping the opportunity of influencing the development of the economic and well as the political principles of the Chinese leadership.

Deng Xiaoping "has left the front line and is now in the second echelon" and "will no longer be engaged in day-to-day government affairs. We will only consult with him on important affairs," recently reported All-China Assembly of People's Representatives Standing Committee Chairman and CCP Central Committee Politburo member Wan Li.

The cause to which Deng Xiaoping had given so much force and energy to over the last decade has passed to the hands of the new leaders who are leading China along the path projected by the CCP. He himself dreams of "living a little longer." He would like to see some time later not only the stable results of his labor, but a completely united China as well. He dreams, in his words, of living until the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and seeing at least the initial steps of the re-unification of Taiwan with the mainland of the country.

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Hezbollah Activities Described

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 37-38

[Article by V. Semenovykh under the rubric "Reader Discussion": "Hezbollah"]

[Text] *Readers Rakhib Akhundov and Emin Dzhalilov of Baku ask that we relate the activity of the pro-Iranian group Hezbollah in Lebanon. We are meeting that request.*

There are about 60 political parties and groupings in Lebanon today. One of those—the religious-political organization Hezbollah—represents the interests of part of the Shiite community of the country. The role that Hezbollah plays in the extremely confused and complex internal political life of Lebanon, however, will not be completely clear without a regard for some events in the contemporary history of the country.

After the creation of the Republic of Lebanon in 1943, a so-called denominational system was established in the country, based on the principles of the proportional participation of various religious groups and communities in the organs of higher power. Relying on data from the sole census in the country's history in 1932, which revealed an insignificant numerical superiority of the Christian community, the denominational system determined the preferential position of the Christians in running the country. The positions of president, army commander and a series of key ministries along with six places to five for the Muslims in parliament and in all states institutions were fixed for them.

It is completely obvious that over 45 years, the correlation of denominational groups has changed. Muslims currently comprise about 60 percent of the population, and their proportionate share of the economic life of the country has increased as well. Whence the demands of the Muslim circles to redistribute power in the state with a regard for the quantity and influence of Muslims. That is one of the chief domestic political reasons for the civil war that has been going on in the country for over 13 years now.

The Shiite community is today the largest in Lebanon and numbers, according to some evaluations, over a million people. As opposed to other ethno-religious groups, however, the Shiite community, for the most part hapless and poor, has not played an appreciable role in the political life of Lebanon for a long time. The rise in its political activeness is tied to the name of the imam Musa Sadra, Iranian by descent, who created the political organization of the Shiites—the Amal movement—in 1975. It favors dissolving the denominational system of the state structure, welcomes the efforts of Syria to maintain peace and order in Lebanon and demands the preservation of a unified, integral and independent Lebanon.

The "Islamic factor" has come to have a considerable influence on the internal political climate in Lebanon in recent years. The slogans advanced in the course of the anti-monarchical revolution of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 in Iran have struck a chord among part of the Shiite community of Lebanon, which sees in them a way to solve a multitude of problems and a way out of the political dead end of civil war. Hezbollah occupies a special place among pro-Iranian Muslim organizations.

This organization appeared on the Lebanese political stage at the beginning of the 1980s and gathered sufficient force over a short period of time to claim a leading position in the Lebanese Shiite community. The aims of Hezbollah were formulated in program documents by its leaders. They assert that a "holy war" ("jihad") is being waged in Lebanon against imperialism, Zionism and

their disciples that goes beyond the bounds of Lebanon and is of a general Muslim nature. Its immediate aim is the liberation of the holy city of Jerusalem and the elimination from the Orient of everything "that comes from the West." "We are fighting against the military and political presence of Israel and against the United States and France. This fight will continue until the people in Lebanon make their own decisions," declared one of the leaders of Hezbollah, the thirty-five-year-old sheik Ibrahim al-Amin, at one time. Another Hezbollah leader, sheik Hussein Fadlallah, confirmed this viewpoint in his interview with the Tunis newspaper REALITE: "We will accept no political concessions. As for the military realm, Hezbollah does not want to be get mixed up in internecine warfare, and its members do not wish to be turned into an army unit. They only want to remain active fighters in the *jihad*." Hezbollah is also against progressive parties and organizations.

On a domestic political plane, Hezbollah is for the creation of an "Islamic state" in Lebanon on the Iranian model. The overwhelming majority of Lebanese, however, do not support this Khomeini idea. Even sheik Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, who is considered to be the spiritual mentor of Hezbollah, feels that the advancement of that slogan is premature.

The creation of the organization in its current form goes back to the summer of 1982, when several hundred Iranian "volunteers" from the "Islamic Revolutionary Guards" arrived in the Lebanese city of Ba'albek under the pretext of rendering aid to the Lebanese people in repelling Israeli aggression. The "volunteers" later remained in the Bekaa Valley and, along with cadres from the Iranian Ministry of Islamic Guidance that arrived later, set about creating a pro-Iranian military and political organization of local Shiites (some 90 percent of the population is Shiite in the area of Ba'albek).

The headcount of the organization is currently valued in the Western press at four to five thousand people. Armed formations that have not only firearms, but even light artillery, mortars and portable anti-aircraft missile systems and armored personnel carriers have been created.

Hezbollah basically consists of the most fanatical and least literate elements of the Shiite community, who are strictly subordinate to their leaders and are ready to carry out any one of their instructions without question. The majority of the members of the organization are young. Without any opportunity to study, as well as to get a job or a profession, under the conditions of civil war, they are easily swayed by the pro-Iranian propaganda of the Hezbollah functionaries. The monetary sustenance of the Hezbollah fighters is moreover several times higher than in the other armed militias of Lebanese parties and organizations.

The members of Hezbollah are categorically forbidden to use alcoholic beverages, "amuse themselves" with women, wear stylish clothing or enjoy many other worldly diversions. The study and observance of the tenets of Islam are compulsory, and religious asceticism is instilled in every way possible.

Hezbollah, according to the statements of its leaders, is not a party but rather a "people's movement." Here a decisive role was played by the opinion of Khomeini that a party on the Islamic stage is a legacy of Western ideas and should be disbanded. In Lebanon, according to the weekly ASH-SHIRAA, Hezbollah has been organized as follows. There is a "higher consultative council" that consists of 12 members, principally religious figures and military. If a decision cannot be arrived at unanimously, it is affirmed by a majority of votes or is deferred for the consideration of the imam Khomeini. The activity of the organization is concentrated in the three areas primarily settled by Shiites: Beirut and its southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley and the southern part of the country. Each of these areas has its own "consultative council" which is represented by one person on the central council.

The financing of Hezbollah is accomplished primarily from Iran. According to data from the GUARDIAN newspaper, Teheran invests one sixtieth of its budget in Lebanon in the hope of creating a "second Islamic republic" in that country. Schools, hospitals and radio stations have been built with its aid in Lebanon, a new television channel launched and newspapers and journals founded.

In the opinion of the Western press, Hezbollah has been affiliated with many terrorist acts against foreigners in Lebanon and the taking of hostages, as well as blowing up the American and French barracks in Beirut on 23 Oct 83, as a result of which 241 American Marines and 58 members of the French contingent to the international forces in Lebanon at the time were killed. Despite the fact that this organization has not taken responsibility for such acts, the U.S. CIA, in the words of WASHINGTON POST correspondent Bob Woodward, prepared an answering series of explosions with the aim of eliminating M.H. Fadlallah. There was a powerful explosion not far from his residence on 8 Mar 85, as a result of which 80 Lebanese were killed and 200 wounded. It caused great destruction and started fires, but the sheik remained alive nonetheless, and his advocates hung an enormous sign in front of the destroyed building that said "Made in the U.S.A."

The forms and methods of the political activity of Hezbollah, as well as its slogans and aims, elicit sharp criticism from the Amal movement, which repudiates a theocratic form of rule and accuses its rivals of terrorism and the taking of hostages. The contradictions between the two Shiite organizations spilled over into a bloody clash in the southern part of the country in April of 1988, as a result of which a serious blow was struck against the Hezbollah positions in that region. Sharp battles broke

out between armed formations of Hezbollah and Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut in May, wherein both sides employed tanks, multiple missile installations and multiple rocket launchers as well as firearms and grenade launchers. As always, the main victims of the conflict were the civilian population: no fewer than 300 people were killed and over a thousand wounded. This battle for the leadership of the Shiite community, which had taken on such a bloody nature, could only be halted after the

entry of Syrian troops and units of the Lebanese Army into the southern suburbs of Beirut. Lebanese observers, however, fear new outbreaks of armed fighting, since the causes of the differences between these Shiite organizations have not been eliminated, as is the case, by the way, in the country overall as well.

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Procedure for Licensing Foreign Trade Operations
18250131 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 89 p 4

[Article: "Procedure for Licensing Operations in USSR Foreign Economic Relations"]

[Text] The decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers of 2 December 1988 "On the Further Development of the Foreign Economic Operations of State, Cooperative, and Other National Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations" and of 7 March 1989 "On Measures for the State Regulation of Foreign Economic Operations" established the system for the state regulation of foreign economic operations. It includes measures for the efficient regulation of foreign economic relations, most of which are licensing operations.

The licensing of exports and imports is practiced for specific periods in time in transactions involving products (works, services) on the list of goods of statewide significance and transactions covered by export and import restrictions and as a preventive measure against unscrupulous competition and operations injuring state interests.

The licensing requirements apply to all enterprises, associations, production cooperatives, and other organizations directly engaged in foreign economic activity, including consortiums, joint-stock companies, trade houses, associations for commercial collaboration with foreign countries and other associations, joint enterprises established within the territory of the USSR, international associations and organizations, and to all forms of foreign economic activity, including direct production, scientific, and technical contacts, coastal and border trade, and barter operations.

Licenses will be issued to participants in foreign economic relations listed in the state register.

Licenses for transactions involving goods of statewide significance will be issued by ministries and departments of the USSR and by union republic councils of ministers for the assortment stipulated in the lists of these products (works, services) approved by the USSR Council of Ministers.

The existence of a contract concluded prior to the issuance of a license will not constitute grounds for its issuance.

Licenses for export and import transactions covered by restrictions (or quotas) will be issued by the USSR MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] for the specific volume or value of shipments in each individual transaction.

Licenses issued as a preventive measure will also be approved by the USSR MVES in each specific case.

Ministries and departments of the USSR and union republic councils of ministers will have the right to ask applicants for additional information needed for decisions on the issuance of licenses. Participants in foreign economic operations will be accountable for the accuracy of information.

Decisions on the issuance of licenses will be made by the appropriate ministries, departments, and union republic councils of ministers within 30 days after the receipt of applications. A fee will be charged for licenses. Applicants will be notified in writing of decisions to refuse the issuance of licenses. Issued licenses cannot be transferred to other legal persons.

Information about lists of goods of statewide significance approved by the USSR Council of Ministers and about export and import restrictions will be published regularly by the MVES in the central press. This information and lists of participants in foreign economic relations whose operations have been curtailed or require the issuance of a separate license for each specific transaction will be brought to the attention of state customs control agencies.

Procedural documents on the licensing of USSR foreign economic operations will be published in *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*, *VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA*, and the USSR MVES Foreign Commercial News Bulletin.

An information and consulting center will be set up by the central staff (Moscow) of the USSR MVES (the telephone numbers for general information are 244-15-33 and 244-13-35).

USSR Grain Imports Detailed

18250167 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 19, 20-16 May 89 p 8

[Letter to the editor from I. Sivtsov]

[Text] **We are purchasing grain abroad. I would like to know the volume of the purchases and how much hard currency is spent on it?—I. Sivtsov, Voronezh**

The information you are interested in is published annually in the statistical collection "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR" [USSR Foreign Trade]. Thus, the Soviet Union imported grain in the amount of 30.3 million tons at an overall cost of 1.55 billion rubles in 1987.

As TASS reports from a citation in the American press, Soviet grain purchases this year will reach a level of approximately 37 million metric tons, i.e., much less than the record purchases in 1984 which totaled 55 million tons. According to projections of U.S. economists, the American share of overall Soviet imports of grain will increase to 57 percent this year, whereas it was 40 per cent in 1988 and 26 per cent in the two previous

years. The USSR intends to purchase 24-26 million metric tons of wheat and corn for the year. Total purchases of these two types of grain are now 18 million tons.

At the beginning of May President Bush approved the sale of another 1.5 million tons of wheat at the subsidized price of \$175 per ton (it is currently selling at \$185 on the domestic market).

Italian CP Head Interviewed on Expectations for Gorbachev

18120079 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 11, 19-25 Mar 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Alexander Bangersky. An interview with the Italian Communist Party General Secretary Achille Occhetto]

[Text] Achille Occhetto spoke with Mikhail Gorbachev for nearly five hours. That evening we interviewed him at Moscow's Oktyabrskaya Hotel.

MV: Had you ever met with Mikhail Gorbachev before?

A.O.: Yes, this was our second meeting. The first one took place when I wasn't yet General Secretary of the ICP.

MV: What new qualities did you discern this time in him?

A.O.: He made an enormous impression on me during our first meeting. Direct contact with him reveals a quality which can't be conveyed by a photograph—its his charisma, his special manner of talking which doesn't at all fit the old patterns.

Gorbachev impresses me as a person who is well aware of what a serious battle he is waging, who is full of energy and confident of victory. This confidence, I think, comes from his own clear vision: there is no other way.

MV: You met for nearly five ours. Was it planned this way?

A.O.: I really thought the meeting would be shorter, but that it lasted so long didn't surprise me. I knew that Gorbachev likes to quiz people and is an attentive listener. I also knew he was eager to know the ICP's view of common human problems and the issues that concern Italy and Europe.

We compared two theories of reform, two perestroikas—the one in the Soviet Union and the one we wish to carry out in our Party so as to elaborate a new course. We discussed matters of a great philosophical dimension: organization of society and concepts of democracy. We also discussed more current world problems.

MN: The West now knows more about our country than it did before. While there is considerably more information about the Soviet Union, some aspects of our reality obviously remain unclear to people in the West. Did you touch on this?

A.O.: I talked about the great interest in perestroika in Italy, not only among our Party membership, but among people of all walks of life. While Brezhnev was in power Italians took no interest at all in Soviet politics.

I told Gorbachev that many Italians wish perestroika success, worry whether it will be able to surmount opposition from bureaucrats.

In the West they have to see that you have now moved beyond the old patterns of the communist movement. There are still Communist Parties in Europe which have yet to rise up to this new thinking. One should unite with all progressive forces on a new basis so as to jointly tackle common human problems. I have in mind actions based on the Helsinki principles: democracy, freedom of speech, human rights. Without doubt, conservative forces in the West don't care to see that new ideas in your country are prevailing and thus increasing the appeal of socialism. Soviet opponents of perestroika, of the new economic reform, are in fact working to defeat the cause of socialism in the West too. This suggests that there exists an objective alliance between conservatives in the East and in the West.

MN: Do Italian Catholics know well about the Soviet Union's new approach to religious matters?

A.O.: Yes, and naturally they welcome it. I think the new approach could make it possible for Mikhail Gorbachev to meet with the Pope during his visit to Italy this year.

MN: You discussed new Soviet initiatives in the military sphere. How convincing are they to Italians?

A.O.: The Soviet initiatives on unilateral cuts of Soviet troops presented by Gorbachev at the UN last December, made a big impression in Italy. His proposals on the developing countries' debt problem also had a great impact. I consider Soviet peace initiatives to be one of the strongest aspects of your foreign policy. Your positions are clear-cut and inspire confidence.

MN: Did the discussion in the Kremlin fail to resolve some issues, were there differences of opinion, of assessment? Is there some permanent arrangement for contacts between the two Parties' General Secretaries beyond face-to-face meetings? Like correspondence or telephone calls?

A.O.: So far all matters are solved during meetings, but phone contacts seem to be a good idea. I'm pleased with the meeting, we had no differences of opinion. Though, of course, we don't always approach problems in the same way. For example, the ICP is very critical of East European countries where the Helsinki principles are ignored and the process of democratization is hampered. We condemn the fact that Dubcek's political reputation has not been restored yet in Czechoslovakia. We think that the Prague Spring was a phenomenon that could have changed that country's fate. The ICP believes that serious failures exist in Romania as regards genuine democratization. We hope that perestroika and glasnost in the USSR will affect the situation in these countries positively.

MN: What does Europe expect of Gorbachev, what developments in our country?

A.O.: That you keep on the road of democratization, on the road of political and cultural pluralism. We hope that all socialist countries will follow this road. Without this, it is difficult to hope for a success in the building of a common European home. It is important in the process, and this was stressed by Gorbachev, that the Soviet idea for a common European home does not drive a wedge between people living in the Old World and in America. On the contrary, this idea, according to your leader, will promote a stronger bond between all people and will emphasize the priority of our shared values.

Swedish Lack of Interest in Soviet Market Discussed

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Sten Shestrem, Moscow correspondent of the Swedish economic paper DAGENS INDUSTRI: "From the Editor's Mail: If I Were Asked for Advice"]

[Text] In the past few years Swedish firms have been paying increasing attention to the Soviet market. Unfortunately, this interest has not been translated thus far into a higher volume of trade between the USSR and Sweden, and Swedish exports to the USSR remain negligible. As far as joint ventures on Soviet territory are concerned, only five contracts have been signed so far, of which only one project has been put into operation.

I think that the foreign companies which are prepared to make investments in the USSR regard an opportunity to sell on the Soviet domestic market as their main objective. The special economic zones are intended primarily for the foreign market, and for that reason hold little priority for Swedish businessmen.

Pondering the prospects for such zones, I tend to think that in order to increase their efficiency to the utmost we have to solve the problems connected with the repatriation of profits in hard currency, a fast and reliable supply of raw materials and finishing equipment to the enterprises, and raising the quality of goods to match world standards.

The future position of the ruble is a separate issue. According to my forecasts, its value can drop by 50 percent on the domestic market within the next year. And it can be further devalued in the next couple of years. Due to this inflationary process, the situation becomes unpredictable; this impedes the establishment of joint ventures, both inside and outside the special economic zones..

If I were asked what should be done to encourage Western companies to make investments in such zones, I would reply that the Soviet government should pass an elaborate law on such zones based on available international experience. We should avoid the situation of two years ago when a decree was passed on creating joint ventures that contained very ambiguous guarantees. It is very encouraging that the Soviet government modified the law more than once after taking into account the criticisms voiced by foreign firms. It would be more appropriate, however, to make things right from the very beginning.

Many difficult issues have emerged....But all these issues can be resolved if we succeed in ensuring trouble-free production and granting privileges to foreign companies as far as taxation, financing, and personnel are concerned. The special economic zones and joint ventures on Soviet territory can make a tangible contribution to East-West economic cooperation.

Discussion of GDR Electoral System

18070181 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by S. Pomerantsev, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent: "GDR: How Deputies Are Elected"]

[Text] Prior to the elections of peoples deputies in the USSR, the reader may be interested in information on how the organs of people's authority are formulated in other socialist countries. The editors asked our correspondent in the GDR to tell about the peculiarities of the electoral system in that country.

This spring, the citizens of the GDR will also go to the polls. On 7 May they will determine the make-up of the 7,800 local organs of authority (the last elections to the highest organ of state power, the People's Chamber, were held in 1986).

There are 206,000 deputies employed in the district, regional, city and community public representation. However, 60,000 more candidates are presented for consideration. Anyone who gets over 50 percent of the qualified votes is considered elected. The ranking order in the list of candidates determines which of those elected will receive deputy mandates.

Yet those for whom there "will not be enough" mandates will actively participate in the work of the public representation. The fact is that, according to many years of tradition, in the GDR there is an institution of deputy reserve candidates. They have the same rights and responsibilities as deputies, with the exception of the right to vote in decision making. Such a reserve makes it possible to quickly replace a deputy if one gets sick or changes his place of residence. We might add that the law also provides for the possibility of recalling deputies in the period between elections.

There are five political parties in the GDR, and each of them, as well as a number of public organizations, have a portion of mandates and their own faction within the public representations at all levels. The mass socialist organization of farm workers—the Association for Peasant Mutual Aid—has secured a certain portion of the mandates in the local organs of authority, and as of 1988 also in the GDR People's Chamber, where it also has its own faction. This year, the formation of a block of

candidates has been placed on an even broader democratic footing: The right to nominate candidates has been given to a number of other public organizations which do not have their own mandates, including to the union of gardeners and amateur livestock breeders.

And one more innovation: On 3 March at the meeting of the GDR People's Chamber, the Law on Elections to public representation was supplemented with a statute which gave foreign citizens living in the country for at least 6 months an active and passive electoral right in municipal elections.

Very high requirements are presented to a candidate for deputy. Whatever party or public organization promotes him, each candidate must necessarily undergo discussion in his own labor collective, and if rejected by his work comrades he cannot be included in the list of candidates. Thus, according to the report of the central electoral commission, out of about 200,000 candidates reviewed at the labor collectives by the beginning of March, 729 persons did not receive approval, specifically due to violations of labor discipline and social inactivity. A new feature in the current municipal elections is the fact that the candidates must be publically presented also in their districts and must answer the questions of the voters (such meetings evaluate the candidates and at the same time determine their ranking in the electoral bulletins).

Before the candidates are included in the lists, the local committees of the National Front must also have their say. In the course of the current pre-electoral campaign, objections were voiced against 824 candidacies out of almost 233,000 which have been reviewed to date. The reasons for these objections were unsatisfactory work in one's own region, shortcomings in former deputy work, and in some cases even violation of socialist legality and community standards.

The activity of the people's deputies in the GDR is generally respected. However, it is also evaluated by the strictest standards: By correspondence of word and deed. The pre-electoral campaign is at the same time also a summary of the results of work by the organs of authority. Over a million new apartments, over 170,000 places in kindergartens and nursery schools, 11,500 classrooms and 700 school gymnasiums, and 1,500 youth clubs—all these are among the positive results of the 5 years which have passed since the previous elections to organs of local people's representation.

Aspects of Soviet-Vietnamese Trade Viewed
18250092 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
21, 22, 23 Feb 89

[Article by Yu. Semenenko, special correspondent of SELSKAYA ZHIZN: "Renewal"]

[21 Feb 89 p 3]

[Text]Hanoi-Moscow—The industriousness of the Vietnamese peasants has long been talked about throughout South-East Asia. And not without reason! I became convinced of this, having covered more than 100 km throughout the fraternal country with Le Tu and Vyat Dau, workers at the editorial department of the newspaper NYAN ZAN. No matter how much we traveled on asphalted or country roads, the picture in fields did not change—strenuous, laborious work from darkness till darkness, on holidays and weekdays.

Having scattered over tiny plots, peasants in cone-shaped straw hats (the best protection against the sun, which is very hot even in winter) were cutting rice of the second sowing time with sickles and right away plowed the soil, planted white or sweet potatoes in accurately divided beds, and weeded corn and seedlings of rice—the first 1989 harvest of the country's main food crop.

Almost all operations are performed manually by means of the simplest implements, which resemble big ladles of buckets, harrows, and wooden plows pulled by complaisant buffalos and cows—the main draft animals in the Vietnamese village.

Having looked closely at how peasants now work and live and having a heart-to-heart talk with many of them (and—I would like to note in parenthesis—having delighted in their cordiality and optimism), I took for granted the comments by Chong Dang Doan, chief of the Main Administration for Cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry, on the statistical report:

"Despite the damage from the powerful typhoon, which befell Vietnam's central provinces, the biggest harvest of agricultural crops during the entire postwar history—19 million tons in terms of the rice equivalent, or 305 kg of food per capita—was gathered in our country in 1988. At the same time, the catch of fish and other sea products increased somewhat. Furthermore, now you will not find a peasant household, where some domestic animals are not kept. As a result, against the background of a reduction in the import of grain the population's food supply improved and export deliveries increased."

These, possibly, are the most important results of the radical economic reform, which began in the country after the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (December 1986).

Renewal. I heard this word—a synonym of our perestroika—everywhere: in ministry cabinets, provincial and district party committees, offices of agricultural cooperatives and state farms, and peasant homes. It means a fundamental change in economic relations, a decisive eradication of the administrative and bureaucratic style of national economic management, a policy of self-financing, an optimal combination of state, cooperative, personal, and private property, and self-provision on a country, province, district, and community level.

The family contract based on leasing principles has become the basic organizational-economic form of agricultural production. In April-May 1988 cooperatives and state farms leased out land, work and productive livestock, and almost all agricultural implements to peasants. At the same time, production centers for mechanization and chemicalization, as well as scientific research institutes and experimental stations, continue to function in the country, supplying peasants with fertilizers, seeds, pedigreed livestock, machines, and fuel through cooperatives and state farms. Small farms and enterprises, which have no prospects, break up or join economically strong collectives. Farms of a family nature are being established intensively in southern and mountain provinces.

Perhaps earlier than anywhere else profound transformations began in the agrarian-industrial sector of the economy of the Thai Binh Province, which takes the first place in the rates of development in the country. In half a year, owing to the reform, the peasants of this region, which is located in the fertile valley of the Red River, were able to increase the rice yield by one-fourth, bringing it up to the mark of 90 quintals per hectare, which is a record for Vietnam.

Comrade Ri Chu Shon, second secretary of the provincial party committee, an energetic and competent manager, who was promoted to this post only 2 years ago, mentions the main components of this success:

"Having become a lessee and having received everything that he needed, the farmer finally felt that he was the master on land, which stimulated highly productive labor and an assiduous attitude toward property better than any administrative and other measures. The fact that for the first time in the country in 1988 we increased the purchase price per kg of rice from 50 to 400 dong also played an important role. Previously, it cost farms 380 to 400 dong. Consequently, peasants produced this product at a loss."

The basic idea of the Vietnamese version of leasing relations is simple. Peasants receive fixed capital for a period of 5 to 15 years. In perennial crop cultivation zones the leasing period is 15 to 40 years longer. Accounts with lessees are settled on a natural basis and are of the nature of a food tax, which is profitable for the state, farms, and peasant families. At the same time,

cooperatives and state farms remain with rare exception and many peasants unite on a voluntary basis into something similar to our partnerships for joint working of the land in the early 1920's.

In the village of An Boy in the Kyen Syn District located on the central highway connecting the country's north and south we stopped at the homestead of Chang Song Zyong, a member of the local agricultural cooperative. His home attracted our attention precisely for its typicality. Nine people lived in a small brick structure, whose rooftop was covered with straw tiles. There were six adults. The head of the family had just returned from the field and immediately began to repair a very old bicycle—the basic means of transportation in urban and rural areas.

"I plowed check plots for the winter harvest with my own buffalo. Four homesteads bought it jointly," the elderly peasant emphasized this detail, which was of no small significance for him.

This is understandable. Previously, he never had any draft animals.

Familiarizing us with his family budget, Chang Song Zyong, in order to be accurate, constantly consulted the model contract concluded with the cooperative at the end of 1987. At that time the family had only a tiny plot of land near the house—100 square meters. At the beginning of 1988 it leased from the cooperative a field of an area of 1.25 hectares, but on the previous terms, which extended to the first harvest. Out of the planned rice yield of 7,312 kg a total of 731.2 kg (10 percent) had to be delivered to the cooperative as the rent, 199 kg were withheld for mineral fertilizers, and 32.7 kg had to be given for the use of equipment... Normative deductions were established mechanically, without taking into consideration the actual use of chemical preparations, equipment, and services of the reclamation station, construction organization, kindergartens, and other offices and institutions. And with minus 642 kg of last year's arrears to the cooperative the family was able to leave only 67 kg of rice (consider, a bag) for itself. True, a distribution of 8 kg of rice per head at a preferential price from public consumption sources was provided.

Beginning from the second harvest the nature of settlements changed radically. The eyes of the elderly man, who went through a great deal in his lifetime, lit up with a live fire:

"You know, this is like a generous rain, which fell on almost completely dried up land. Hopes were revived and prosperous life became a reality. Look at people's mood and how diligently they work. What is there to say! Only a year ago the numerous authorities of the cooperative, the community, and the district had to force us by every possible means to work. But everything was for nothing. After all, who will make an effort without asking anything in return? But now there is no need to force us

and, moreover, there is no one to do this. For example, only 10 percent of the managers—truly the most necessary people—have remained in our cooperative. The rest, those who previously had the role of 'drivers,' work in fields. Let us take our family. We have now given more products to the cooperative than before, have left so much rice and potatoes for ourselves that they are sufficient until the new harvest, and even have some surplus for sale."

The detailed talk with peasants and management of the Vin Lok Cooperative in the Tkhak Tkhat District of the capital province stuck in my memory. There in April-May 1988 (after the gathering of the first harvest) all 228.2 hectares of arable land were leased out to villagers.

"Land was distributed on the basis of available resources and the composition of families. A total of 450 square meters per adult and 150 meters per child under the age of 18 were allotted. Furthermore, there was one buffalo per 10 homesteads and other domestic animals and farm implements were also distributed," Nguyen Zan Tkha, chairman of the cooperative, said.

Personal incentive. It aroused energy and initiative and increased peasants' interest in everything that could raise the field yield and livestock productivity. In northern and southern provinces I was told about the following fact: Previously, the production of the third harvest was an unattainable dream. This was understandable: What reason did peasants have to increase the amount of work so that after gathering the second harvest they would have 3 or 4 months before the spring sowing campaign? Now the third harvest has become a reality.

However, noting these gratifying changes, one cannot say that everything is smooth and that there are no problems. Recurrences of the past make themselves felt. Our Vietnamese colleagues fight against them by replacing personnel, reducing the administrative and managerial apparatus, and introducing economic methods of management. Nor did the people I talked to hide the following problem, which arose in the last few months in connection with the family contract: Fields have become much smaller than before. How to use modern equipment on them? Small-size machines and attachments are needed, but where can they be obtained? After all, the main supplier of equipment—the Soviet Union—produces only large, powerful machines and units. The processes of procuring agricultural products and of forming batches of export deliveries have become complicated.

The fact that the party and the government of the fraternal country see these problems and do not shy away from their solution is reassuring. This guarantees that a new level of development will be reached successfully.

Only Facts

A total of 50 percent of the national income is created in Vietnam's agriculture.

The per-capita area of agricultural land is 0.1 hectares.

The following food and industrial crops are produced in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: rice, soybeans, hevea, coffee, tea, castor-oil plants, tobacco, mulberry trees, pineapples, sugar cane, coconut palms, pepper (red and black), oil-bearing crops (peanuts and sesame), vegetables, and tropical fruits. These, as well as rich reserves of sea products (fish, shrimps, and other products), form the export potential of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1986 the cattle population totaled 5.4 million head.

In 1986 the arable land allocated for grain and pulse crops in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam totaled 5.6 million hectares—about [illegible] of the productive spring area.

[22 Feb 89 p 3]

[Text

Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh-Moscow—It is difficult to imagine our daily life without rubber in all its hypostases. It includes motor-vehicle and bicycle tires, footwear, surgical and other sanitary-hygienic articles, soft toys, elastic and light fillers for couches and armchairs, and many other things needed in daily life. Natural rubber obtained from the milky sap of a tropical plant—hevea—serves as the best raw material for them.

The needs of the world community, including of the Soviet Union, for this natural material grow annually almost in a geometric progression. Naturally, our glances more and more frequently turn to the countries where this unusual tree, that is, hevea, from the same family as such a common and quite unpleasant weed of ours—spurge—can grow.

Here they are—these vast plantations, which come right up to the road leading from the city of Ho Chi Minh to the border with Cambodia. We are going to one of the seven Vietnamese-Soviet companies for the extraction and initial processing of latex.

The dense formation of green giants with amazingly even and smooth trunks parts and our "Volga" shoots forward into the spacious ravine, at the end of which a two-story administrative building, a garage, a center for the initial processing of latex, an [elementary] school, a vocational and technical school, and a kindergarten loom. All of them belong to the Vin Long Company in the southern Shong Bye Province.

After a short talk with Comrade Synk Le Min, secretary of the party committee, the company's deputy director, we go to the plantations. This specialized association, which was established and functions with the financial and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, includes 11 state farms.

Latex is collected in the morning hours, when it exudes with special abundance. In general, this specific production requires special efficiency. At sunrise sap collectors "equipped" with pails, bowls, and long "kamu" knives sharpened like razors go out to the forest. A meticulously precise cut, only 1.5 mm thick slantwise the trunk, follows and latex immediately rushes through a tin groove into a plastic bowl, which is hung below the fresh wound. The collector continues along the plot assigned to him. And so, for 3 hours. Then the collector in the same order walks around the trees and pours sap into pails or milk cans. In a year every tree is "milked" up to 100 times. It rests during 2 months in a year—in January and February—while old leaves fall and new ones grow.

In the forest we talked to the young couple To Mong from the Kuang Loy State Farm. They work together. The tiny, attractive Tkhi fastens bowls onto trunks and makes cuts with a purely feminine dexterity, while her husband, Ngok, collects the sap, which amazingly resembles milk fresh from the cow, and pours it into cans.

"We came here from the north because of the shortage of land. Here we found both work and land. We have a house built for us, as for settlers, by the state farm. Next to the house there is a garden and an orchard, where coconut palms, bananas, black pepper, and, by the way, a very profitable crop—papaya—grow. We make daily rounds to two assigned plots, on which 560 old heveas grow. Previously, we worked on the basis of the piece-rate system, but in the middle of last year both plots were leased out to us for 40 years. So, our children will also work here. A correct decision! Previously, the trees seemed to be ownerless. Now they are ours. Of course, we try both to obtain more output and not to weaken heveas with excessive 'milking,'" said Ngok without stopping his work.

The couple collects 40 to 50 liters of latex per day—about 15 kg of rubber is obtained.

The collected sap is transported without delay in tanks to the initial processing center. It represents a huge awning, under which concrete baths are built and dryers and presses are installed.

A ZIL-554 truck had hardly managed to unload the tank's content when a MTZ-52 tractor with a trailer took its place. Machine operator Le Van Khan, who brought the sap from the Za Kam State Farm, skillfully opened the bolt of the neck and in a foamy jet the latex poured into a bath filled with an organic coagulant. The sap was reduced literally in front of our eyes and transformed

into a loose mass resembling colostrum. However, this "colostrum" has many features of natural rubber, primarily, a phenomenal elasticity.

After coagulation pieces of the yellowish mass are transported over a hydraulic conveyor to mechanical cutters and after that powerful ventilators and centrifuges dry the rubber. Then it arrives at presses. "Blocks" weighing one-third of a ton are put in containers, on which, after a laboratory analysis, an appropriate mark is placed. Almost every trade mark has the figure 5, which attests to the highest quality of uncured rubber. A valuable cargo is ready for shipment to the USSR.

Rubber deliveries to our country follow a rising line. According to Comrade Tan Chang Kong, chief of the Information Department at the General Administration of the Rubber Industry under the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in 1985-1988 they totaled 25,000 tons. The following year, as stipulated by the contract, they increased to 27,000 and in 1988, on the initiative of rubber farm workers themselves, rose to almost 30,000 tons, which was 2,000 tons more than the assignment. Specialists attribute the growth of deliveries to the intensive rejuvenation of plantations, increase in the import of fertilizers and other chemicals from the Soviet Union, strengthening of the material and technical base of farms, and introduction of leasing and family contracts, which increased the productivity of plantations considerably.

On the whole, however, definite progress in the production of valuable raw materials, as Vo Nok Khoay, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, believes, is brought about by the improvement in business relations between Vietnam and the USSR. Signs of cooperation are noted without difficulty literally at every step. For example, all state farms of the Bin Long Company are equipped with Soviet machinery and our building materials have been used in the construction of many projects for production purposes. Machine tools, garage and shop equipment, fertilizers, and plant protection agents are also from the USSR. Our specialists were uninterruptedly there, among tropical jungles, during the years of the organization and formation of the rubber company and helped by word and deed to set up production. To this day Bin Long remembers with gratitude A. K. Chelikov, A. K. Zhurkin, I. F. Litvenchuk, P. D. Kovalenko, and other envoys from the Land of the Soviets who worked there.

Current and long-term issues concerning the functioning of rubber companies were stipulated in Soviet-Vietnamese agreements. The first was concluded for the 1981-1985 period and envisaged the allocation by the Soviet side of funds for the establishment of new plantations and creation of an appropriate material and

technical base on specialized farms. In turn the Vietnamese side was supposed to increase annual deliveries of natural rubber from existing plantations to the USSR as early as 1985.

Mutual efforts directed toward a common goal give good fruits. However, in the era of glasnost and perestroika problems must not be passed over in silence. The people I talked to spoke not without regret about the miscalculations made owing to the incompetence of workers at the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam during the conclusion of both agreements. True, through the efforts of specialists it was possible to correct some things in the last document. If workers of rubber companies had participated in the elaboration of agreements from the very beginning, it would have been possible to avoid blunders in the planning and construction of irrigation systems for young hevea plantings and distortions in the supply of materials and fertilizers.

It is understandable that the extremely irregular deliveries of mineral fertilizers, fuels, lubricants, and spare parts from the USSR do not contribute to efficient work. Vietnam colleagues not without bitterness showed me dozens of idle motor vehicles and tractors. Nor does the fact that companies buy a considerable amount of gasoline and spare parts on the Ho Chi Minh market for ready cash from dubious people save [the situation]. At the same time, no one hid such a reason as the poor skills of drivers and tractor operators. For example, it is not accidental that in Bin Long hopes are connected with the new vocational and technical school, which was also built with the scientific and technical assistance of the Soviet Union. It will make it possible to reduce the acute shortage of skilled workers and to give an impetus to production development.

Only Facts

For the cultivation of such perennial crops as hevea, coffee, and tea Vietnam has at its disposal more than 1 million hectares of land, of which only one-fifth has now been developed.

In 1987 the produced national income of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as compared with 1976, increased by 45 percent, the foreign trade turnover, 2.6-fold, and per-capita output of electric power, 1.8-fold.

In Vietnam areas of hundreds of thousands of hectares can be allocated for the cultivation of such a very valuable industrial crop as hevea. In 1985 hevea areas totaled about 202,000 hectares and more than 50,000 tons of natural rubber were obtained in the country.

In 1986-1987 the gross output of Vietnam's industry increased by 15 percent.

[23 Feb 89 p 3]

[Text] Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh-Moscow—Articles of applied art and folk industries occupy a special place among the diverse products exported by Vietnam to the Soviet Union. They include multicolored exotic carpets, ceramics, mats and screens made of rice straw, bamboo, palm leaves, and jute, ornaments made of tropical wood species, metals, stones, buffalo horns, and coconut and sea shells, lacquered pictures inlaid with mother-of-pearl, which are unique in their charm, and other works by skilled folk craftsmen of the fraternal country.

"Every year we export various works of applied art and folk industries worth hundreds of thousands of rubles to the USSR. Their deliveries are increasing continuously," this is how Khoay Vo Nok, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry, commented on this sphere of foreign trade of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in a talk with me. At the same time, he added that, owing to the policy of combining state, cooperative, personal, and private property adopted by the country after the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, as well as the change in the export policy, real prerequisites were created for an expansion of the assortment of articles offered to foreign partners and for an equalization of the foreign trade balance.

The roots of subsidiary and art industries go deep into the history of the industrious and talented Vietnamese people. Today, however, this is not only the contribution of tradition, or a method of esthetic self-expression and of foreign currency earnings, or, moreover, something secondary and insignificant. This is an integral part of the work, way of life, and budget of almost every Vietnamese family, be it a city or a village.

In the east people say: In order to become better familiar with the country, it is necessary to visit the market. One cannot but agree with this. I visited crowded and noisy markets in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Thai Binh, Dongnai, Tainan, and other cities and villages and everywhere articles by skilled folk craftsmen occupied a place of honor among the inconceivable abundance of tropical fruits and vegetables. I would like to emphasize: They were in such an amount and assortment that I simply did not know where to look first!

For example, articles of potters in the provincial center of Dongnai are considered objects of pride of any Vietnamese homeowners. Le Vyen Van is the first among the local master craftsmen. His modest home in no way differs from neighboring farmsteads on Potter's Street. But then this is not quite so. So to speak, firm products—pitchers, cups, vases, and figurines of people and animals—are exhibited in front of every home. The Vyen Van family makes 50-cm glazed earthenware elephants and mythical lions. They are made in a folk manner and

are richly decorated, covered with glaze, and painted in bright colors. The master craftsman's rich fantasy and the realistic features of animals get along fancifully in every figurine.

As far as 65-year old uncle Le remembers, he spent his entire life with clay. His father and grandfather were ceramists. His children and grandchildren did not change this occupation. He also has followers at the neighboring ceramic plant, to which the master craftsman has devoted 30 years of his life.

At the country's other end, in the village of Dong Ko in the northern Thai Binh Province, I together with colleagues from the newspaper NYAN ZAN visited several homes of local residents. Here the specialization is different—braiding of cone-shaped hats, mats, big, medium-size, and miniature baskets, and screens characteristic of Vietnam. Almost everything given by the generous tropical nature is used in making them.

We enter one of the homes, which is covered with hangings of mats. Every mat is decorated with a rich ornamental design, in which a sea with boats under feather-like sails and a steep coast overgrown with palms are discerned without difficulty. These mats are put on floors and beds and hung on windows and doors. In brief, they are necessary and, I would like to add, beautiful things.

Nguyen Tkhi Tye, an elderly housewife, continuing the slow work, which requires a great deal of patience and, of course, skill, says:

"I and my husband are pensioners. We have worked at the local cooperative during our entire life. Our children grew up and scattered all over the country. In April 1988 the cooperative leased out to us 1,400 square meters of irrigated land. We deliver 2 kg of rice per square meter on preferential terms to the farm as the rent. The remaining product is ours. We have begun to live not badly. Nevertheless, we do not give up braiding mats. We have become used to this. Moreover, they give us a considerable income. We sell them at the price of 4,500 to 5,000 dong per unit. So we also help our children."

Yes, subsidiary industries represent an important income item. And not only for families. Communities and agricultural cooperatives are interested in this. In the village of Fung Sa in the capital Tkhat Tkhat District I was shown a subdivision typical of present cooperatives—a subsidiary shop. True, its product seemed to me somewhat unusual. Judge for yourselves: It produces the basic implement of the Vietnamese peasant—a wooden plow. At the same time, cultivator points and mold-boards are formed from semisteel and toolbars and handles are cut out of the wood of hard species, of which there is no shortage in this country.

"Our shop, where 20 people work, will now produce 23,000 wooden plows worth 265 million dong. The sale of the simplest rice threshers will give us about 35 million more. One-half of this sum will go into the cooperative's till and the other will go for workers' wages. Now we are mastering the output of two more types of products, which are in no smaller demand in our country—cast iron pots and boilers," Nguyen Dak Min, chairman of the agricultural cooperative, shared his plans.

Throughout the vicinity this village is famous for its master craftsmen in the manufacture of hoes, shovels, and various knives—from small ones designed for fish processing to kinds of swords, with which sugar cane is chopped. Many families, so to speak, not stopping peasant labor, make wooden plows and threshers. They apply a division of labor, which increases the efficiency of the cottage industry considerably. For example, something resembling a cooperative in a cooperative, which includes families of the local peasants Van Kuey and Van Fan, has operated for 15 years. The first has a very small melting furnace and molds for casting metal parts of wooden plows and threshers and the second makes wooden parts and assembles agricultural implements.

The mini-cooperative has 2 families, but 16 workers, because everyone—even 12- or 14-year old children—has his duties.

"We utilize every minute free from work in the field and we grab night hours and days off. Children help us after classes in school. Every month our family 'plant' brings up to 40,000 dong of monetary proceeds," 55-year old Chang Van Fan, the head of the family, noted.

An intensive growth of the number of industrial arts, family cooperatives, and private enterprises, which produce applied art articles and items necessary in everyday life, has been noted in the country in recent years. The number of subsidiary shops in agricultural cooperatives and state farms is also increasing. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam not only welcomes, but also supports in every possible way, these processes, which contribute to an improvement in the economy and to the population's provision with work and earnings.

In the district city of Khyng Kha in the Thai Binh Province we visited a cotton article factory. Until September 1987 it led a miserable existence. Utterly worn out machine tools stood there, but there was no money to

replace them. Workers' wages were low, which in no way contributed to highly productive labor and to an improvement in the skills of personnel. The enterprise incurred losses systematically and it seemed that there were no forces that could get it out of the deplorable state. But such forces were found.

Energetic and enterprising Sen Chang Son, who had been one of the district leaders during the recent past, headed the factory and the situation improved sharply. The director's family invested its personal savings in the enterprise's reconstruction. Many factory workers followed this example. A kind of joint-stock society with its own capital, charter, and securities was formed. How this increased the people's sense of responsibility for affairs at their own enterprise! How its technical equipment improved! Now it is a highly profitable and flourishing factory.

An expertly elaborated shell, which reminds me of the rich nature of the tropics and of the talented and skillful people of Vietnam, lies on my table. I wish them good luck and prosperity!

Only Facts

The cottage industry, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the gross volume of consumer goods produced in the country and for 20 percent of the Vietnamese exports, plays an important role in the economy.

The means of production form the bulk of the imports (up to 86 percent). In particular, fuel, mineral raw materials, and supplies make up more than 50 percent of the imports.

CEMA countries account for 72 percent of the total foreign trade volume of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Countries of the socialist camp provided assistance in the construction of more than 300 projects in nearly all key sectors of Vietnam's national economy, including the Soviet Union, in the construction of about 250 projects.

Among other projects, Falay and Chian electric power stations and Khoabin, the biggest hydro-engineering complex in South-East Asia on the Da (Black) River, whose power will exceed 1.9 million kw, were and are being built with the technical and economic assistance of the USSR.

The Bimshon Cement Plant (with an annual capacity of 1.2 million tons), the Vangan Coal Mine, and others were built with USSR assistance.

Turkmen River Workers Receive Awards From Afghanistan
18070206

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian on 14 February 1989 carries on page 1 a brief report by Turkmeninform correspondent A. Orzov on awards given to a group of Central Asian river workers by the Republic of Afghanistan. Medals "From the grateful people" and "10 years of Afghan revolution" were given to river workers for their contributions to trade and economic cooperation between the Turkmen SSR and Afghanistan. Cargoes of material for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, food, and industrial goods are being sent continuously to Afghanistan from the Turkmen SSR.

Greater Role for Turkmen Peace Activists in Afghanistan Urged
18070207

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian on 15 February 1989 carries on page 1 a Turkmeninform report on a meeting between G.A. Borovik, chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee and Vice Chairman of the World Peace Council, and activists of the Turkmen Peace Committee. Great interest was expressed in the public's role in settling the military conflict in Afghanistan. The article notes that Turkmen peace activists must play a significant role in preventing a blood-bath in Afghanistan, particularly since Turkmenia and Afghanistan share a 1,000-kilometer border. Activists are urged to form contacts with organizations and individuals in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, including contacts with Turkmens living in these regions. Wider use of "religious personnel" in the peace-making process is encouraged.

Indian Communist Party Meeting Reported
18070158 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by V. Baykov: "The Congress Ended"]

[Text] Calcutta, 13 March. (PRAVDA's own correspondent). The 14th Congress of the Communist Party of India ended there last evening.

At the concluding meeting its delegates elected 125 members of the supreme leading party organ, that is, the National Council of the Communist Party of India, 13 candidate members of the National Council, and 11 members of the Central Control Commission. About one-fourth of the members of the National Council were elected to it for the first time. It was decided to convene an extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of

India, which will examine and adopt a new party program prepared by a special commission. The date, on which the congress will be convened, will be announced later.

Radjeshvara Rao made the concluding speech at the congress. Our congress, he said, was held in an atmosphere of unity. We declare that the Communist Party of India, as before, will carry high the banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, firmly defend the people's interests, fight against the forces of public-communal dissension and separatism, which try to undermine the unity of the nation and the country, and strive toward the attainment of a unity of all leftist democratic forces.

Before the final day of work the delegates approved the accountability report presented by the National Council of the Communist Party of India, as well as the political resolution.

The resolution notes that, owing to the policy of new thinking and the bold initiatives undertaken by the leadership of the USSR and other socialist countries, a new approach to the solution of international problems has appeared. The struggle for peace and disarmament finds wide support all over the world.

The document calls upon the working masses, working class, peasantry, and agricultural workers to actively come out in defense of their rights, to strive for a true implementation of land reforms, and to rebuff divisive and separatist forces.

The resolution pays much attention to the attainment of a unity of actions by all the country's leftist democratic and patriotic forces. In this special significance is attached to the unity of actions between the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (M).

During the second half of the day columns of demonstrators filled the streets of Calcutta. With a red flag they headed for one of the city's main squares—Parade Ground. A huge rally devoted to the conclusion of the work done by the congress of the Communist Party of India was held there.

Radjeshvara Rao, Indradjit Gupta, and other party leaders spoke at the rally, in which several hundreds of thousands of workers took part. They called upon Indian communists to intensify the struggle for peace, in defense of workers' fundamental rights, and for strengthening the unity of the country's leftist and democratic forces.

K. Makhkamov, head of the CPSU delegation, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, made a warm speech of welcome at the rally.

We are happy, he said, that in the striving for humanization and democratization of international life the Soviet Union finds the full support of friendly India—the great Asian power. Soviet-Indian relations have long served successfully the cause of relaxation of tension, disarmament, and peace.

In conclusion the head of the CPSU delegation said that the CPSU highly valued the traditional fraternal relations established between our party and the Communist Party of India. He wished the Communist Party of India great success in its activity for the good of Indian workers in the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress.

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